Williams v. Newman

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EZRA K. WILLIAMS, Case No.: 3:23-cv-0136-BAS-MDD CDCR #AF-1812 12 ORDER DIRECTING U.S. 13 MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE Plaintiff, OF FIRST AMENDED 14 vs. COMPLAINT UPON 15 DEFENDANTS NEWMAN AND

GALLEGOS PURSUANT TO 28 16 WILLIAM NEWMAN; D. GALLEGOS; U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND FED. R. CIV. WARREN MONTGOMERY; JOHN DOE 17 P. 4(c)(3) 1; JOHN DOE 2, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 22 Plaintiff Ezra Williams (“Plaintiff” or “Williams”), an inmate proceeding pro se and 23 currently incarcerated at the California Correctional Institute (“CCI”) located in Tehachapi, 24 California, commenced the instant civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on 25 January 23, 2023. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) The action arises out of Williams’ claim he was 26 denied his constitutional rights when he previously was housed at Calipatria State Prison 27 (“CAL”) in February 2021. (See generally id.) 28 1 On March 8, 2023, the Court granted Williams’ request to proceed in forma pauperis 2 and conducted the required sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 3 1915A(b). (Initial Screening Order (“Order”), ECF No. 4.) The Court found that while 4 Williams adequately stated a First Amendment free exercise claim and Eighth Amendment 5 excessive force claim against Defendants Newman and Gallegos, he failed to state a claim 6 as to Defendant Montgomery. (See id. at 7–10.) In addition, the Court found that Williams’ 7 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim regarding CAL prison officials’ alleged 8 failure to provide him with adequate medical attention could not proceed because he did 9 not even attempt to identify the individuals purportedly responsible for this alleged 10 violation. (See id. at 8.) 11 The Court gave Williams the options either to file (1) a notice of intent to proceed 12 as to his First and Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Newman and Gallegos or 13 (2) an amended pleading to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s 14 Order. (See Order at 13.) Plaintiff chose the second option when he filed his First 15 Amended Complaint. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 5.) Because Williams is a 16 prisoner and is proceeding IFP, the Court again must conduct a pre-answer screening of 17 Williams’ new pleading. See Chavez v. Robinson, 81 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006). 18 I. LEGAL STANDARDS 19 A. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1915(e)(2)(B) 20 Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) require this Court to review and sua sponte 21 dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails 22 to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 23 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); 24 Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 25 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 26 malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 27 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 28 1 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 2 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 3 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 4 Civil Procedure [(“Rule”)] 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. 5 Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 6 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard 7 applied in the contest of failure to state a claim under [Rule] 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 9 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 10 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Detailed factual allegations 11 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported 12 by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 13 states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 14 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The “mere 15 possibility of misconduct” or unadorned, “the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 16 accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 678–79. 17 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 18 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 19 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 20 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a 21 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 22 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 40 U.S. 386 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal 23 quotation marks omitted). “To establish [Section] 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both 24 (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 25 that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 26 Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 27 // 28 1 II. ANALYSIS 2 A. The First Amended Complaint’s Allegations 3 Williams’ action arises out of his claim Defendants violated several of his 4 constitutionally protected rights when he was incarcerated at CAL in February 2021. (See 5 generally FAC.) 6 For several years, Williams has been a “devout practitioner of the Asatru faith.” 7 (FAC at 3.) He alleges that practice of this religion requires him to wear religious 8 “headgear” and a talisman. (Id.) On approximately February 12, 2021, Williams was 9 released from his cell so that he could go to the “pill line” to pick up his medication. (Id.) 10 Williams was adorned in those religious items. (Id.) At the pill line, Williams was 11 confronted by Defendant William Newman, a CAL Lieutenant (“Newman”). 12 (Id.) Citing 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3213 and CDCR’s Religious Personal Property Matrix 13 (“RPP Matrix”), Newman admonished Williams he only could wear his religious headgear 14 while confined in his cell. (Id.; see RPP Matrix (listing permissible religious personal 15 property), Ex. 1 to Compl., ECF No. 1); 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3213(e) (“The institution 16 head or designee retains authority to remove or restrict use of an approved religious item . 17 . ., based on a serious threat to facility security or the safety of inmates, and to the degree 18 necessary to eliminate the threat.”). Newman demanded Williams to “remove his religious 19 headgear,” but Williams refused. (FAC at 3.) 20 Williams’ refusal purportedly prompted Newman to place Williams in handcuffs 21 and physically remove Williams’ religious headgear and talisman. (FAC at 3.) Williams 22 threatened Newman that he would file a grievance, to which Newman allegedly responded, 23 “That wouldn’t be a smart idea, you know where you’re at.” (Id.) Williams asked Newman 24 what he meant by that statement, to which Newman allegedly responded, “You’re in 25 prison, anything can happen.” (Id. at 3–4.) 26 On approximately February 13, 2021, Williams filed a grievance against Newman 27 pertaining to the events that had taken place the day prior. (FAC at 5.) Williams 28 1 alleges that the next day Defendant D. Gallegos, a Control Booth Officer, intentionally 2 “closed [Williams’] electronic cell door on [Williams’] skull as he set his breakfast tray 3 out for collection.” (Id.) As a result, Williams alleges he suffered from a loss of 4 consciousness, a laceration above his right ear, severe head pain, blurred vision, dizziness, 5 nausea, and “distorted equilibrium.” (Id.) 6 Williams sought medical assistance for his injuries, but he alleges the responding 7 CAL officers refused to get him medical attention, one of whom stated, “I’m not calling 8 medical, you can walk or crawl, or take your ass back to your cell.” (FAC at 5.) Other 9 inmates helped escort Williams to the CAL medical unit, where Williams was “bandaged 10 [and] his laceration glued shut.” (Id.) Williams was instructed to return to his cell but to 11 “report to medical immediately if [his] condition worsen[ed].” (Id.) Williams’ condition 12 purportedly did worsen: he “experienced a blinding headache, vomiting, nosebleed, and 13 further loss of consciousness.” (Id.) Accordingly, he again sought medical attention from 14 CAL officers located on the floor where his cell was located, but these officers again 15 refused. (Id.) They purportedly told Williams, “You’re okay, tell them at pill call.” (Id. 16 at 5–6.) Six hours later, Williams was unable to bring himself to the CAL medical unit 17 and was “immediately sent to [the] hospital for symptoms of head 18 trauma.” (Id. at 6.) 19 Williams alleges that as a result of the events that occurred in February 2021, he has 20 experienced a “campaign of harassment.” (FAC at 6.) He claims he has suffered 21 several injuries for “filing civil rights grievances and grievances for staff misconduct which 22 initiated an internal affairs investigation.” (Id.) He further claims he was told by 23 prison officials on several occasions that “we can make things very uncomfortable for you” 24 and “we can make your life hell” if he “insisted on pushing issues in CDCR.” (Id. at 7.) 25 Plaintiff seeks $200,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 10.) 26 // 27 // 28 1 B. Claims Against Defendant Montgomery 2 In its Initial Screening Order, the Court dismissed all of Williams’ claims against 3 Defendant Montgomery for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 4 1915A(b). (See Order at 13.) The Court instructed Williams that, if he filed an amended 5 complaint, “[d]efendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended 6 Complaint will be considered waived.” (Id. (citing See Civ. L.R. 15.1)); see also Hal 7 Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended complaint 8 supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 9 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended 10 pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”). 11 In the FAC, Williams no longer names Warden Montgomery as a Defendant. 12 Accordingly, all claims against this Defendant are deemed waived and he remains 13 dismissed from this action. 14 C. Remaining claims 15 The First Amended Complaint contains four claims. Two of those claims— 16 Williams’ First Amendment free exercise claim against Newman and his Eighth 17 Amendment excessive force claim against Gallegos—are supported by substantially the 18 same facts alleged in Williams’ initial Complaint. In its Initial Screening Order, this Court 19 found these claims sufficiently pled. Accordingly, for precisely the same reasons 20 enunciated in the Initial Screening Order, this Court finds the iteration of Williams’ First 21 Amendment free exercise claim and Eighth Amendment excessive force claim alleged in 22 his First Amended Complaint survive the “low threshold” set for sua sponte screening 23 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) in its Initial Screening Order. (See 24 Order at 9–10.) 25 The First Amended Complaint also contains new allegations in support of Williams’ 26 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, and a new Fourteenth Amendment equal 27 protection claim that is predicated upon the same facts as his First Amendment claim. For 28 1 the reasons set forth below, the Court also finds these claims survive 28 U.S.C. §§ 2 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need Claim: To 4 state an Eighth Amendment medical care claim, Williams must show a prison official’s 5 “deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 6 104 (1976). “Indifference ‘may appear when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally 7 interfere with medical treatment.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) 8 (citation omitted). 9 Williams’ deliberate indifference claim in his initial Complaint failed because he did 10 not even attempt to identify the CAL officials purportedly responsible for the violation. 11 However, now Williams seeks to remediate that deficiency through “Doe” pleading. The 12 First Amended Complaint alleges that after Gallegos injured Williams by closing the cell 13 door on his head, Williams requested medical assistance from the floor officers, to whom 14 he refers as “John Doe 1” and “John Doe 2.” (FAC at 5.) But Correctional Officer Does 15 refused to help. (Id.) Specifically, the First Amended Complaint states John Doe 1 16 purportedly told Williams, “I’m not calling medical, you can walk, or crawl, or take your 17 ass back to your cell.” (Id.) Other inmates later helped Williams go to the medical unit, 18 but when he returned to his cell, he began to experience headaches, vomiting, nosebleed, 19 and loss of consciousness. (See id. at 5–6.) Williams reported these issues to John Doe 1 20 and John Doe 2 who again “refused to call medical, stating, ‘you’re conscious and talking, 21 you’re okay, tell them at pill call.’” (Id. at 6.) Nearly six hours later, Williams was able 22 to get to the medical unit where he was “immediately sent to the hospital for symptoms 23 consistent with head trauma.” (Id.) 24 The Court finds these allegations are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment 25 deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim and that, for now, Williams has 26 rectified the deficiency noted in this Court’s Initial Screening Order by identifying John 27 Doe 1 and John Doe 2 as the individuals responsible for this violation. 28 1 * * * * 2 Despite this Court’s conclusion, Williams must first identify Correctional Officer 3 Does 1 and 2 and substitute their true names in an amended pleading before the United 4 States Marshall will be ordered (or able) to execute service upon them. See Aviles v. Vill. 5 Of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“John Doe defendants must be 6 identified and served within [90] days of the commencement of the action against them.”); 7 see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) & 15(c)(1)(C); id. 10(a) (requiring a complaint to name the 8 parties being sued). Generally speaking, Doe pleading is disfavored, including in the IFP 9 context. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Doe pleading 10 inhibits—and in most instances makes impossible—service by the United States Marshal 11 upon defendant prison officials. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) 12 (holding that in an IFP case the plaintiff is required to “furnish the information necessary 13 to identify the defendant” to enable the United States Marshal to effect service); Finefeuiaki 14 v. Maui Cmty. Corr. Ctr. Staff & Affiliates, 2018 WL 3580764, at *6 (D. Haw. July 25, 15 2018) (“As a practical matter, the United States Marshal cannot serve a summons and 16 complaint on an anonymous defendant. The use of doe defendants is therefore disfavored 17 in federal court.”; citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)). 18 Ninth Circuit authority permits Williams the opportunity to pursue appropriate 19 discovery to identify unknown Correctional Officer Does 1 and 2. See Wakefield v. 20 Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). But 21 Williams is warned that if it becomes clear that discovery will not disclose the identity of 22 Does 1 and 2, his claim against them will be dismissed. Id. 23 Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim: In order to state a claim for 24 violation of Williams’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, he must “show that 25 the defendants acted with intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon 26 membership in a protected class.” Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 27 2013) (citation omitted.) “The Constitution’s equal protection guarantee ensures that 28 1 prison officials cannot discriminate against particular religions.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 2 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated in part on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 3 514 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008). 4 Here, Williams alleges Newman “singled [him] out” when Newman confiscated his 5 religious headgear pursuant to the RPP Matrix, despite the fact there are other inmate 6 religious populations who are permitted to wear headgear n “many different colors, shades, 7 tints, hues [and] patterns” outside of their cells. (FAC at 4.) The Court finds this allegation 8 amounts to a sufficiently firm factual premise for Williams’ Fourteenth Amendment equal 9 protection claim. Accordingly, this claim, too, surpasses the “low” pre-answer screening 10 threshold. 11 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 12 Based on the foregoing, the Court: 13 1. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue summonses as to Plaintiff’s FAC (ECF No. 5) 14 upon Defendants WILLIAM NEWMAN and D. GALLEGOS, and forward them to 15 Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Forms 285. In addition, the Clerk will provide 16 Plaintiff with certified copies of the March 8, 2023 Order (ECF No. 4), a certified copy his 17 FAC (ECF No. 5), and the summonses so that he may serve the Defendants. Upon receipt 18 of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the Forms 285 as completely and accurately 19 as possible, include an address where Defendants may be served, see S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 20 4.1.c, and return them to the United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk 21 provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package. 22 2. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the FAC and summons upon 23 Defendants WILLIAM NEWMAN and D. GALLEGOS as directed by Plaintiff on the 24 USM Forms 285 provided, and to file executed waivers of personal service upon 25 Defendants WILLIAM NEWMAN and D. GALLEGOS with the Clerk of Court as soon 26 as possible after their return. Should a Defendant fail to return the U.S. Marshal’s request 27 for waiver of personal service within 90 days, the U.S. Marshal shall instead file the 28 1 completed Form USM 285 Process Receipt and Return with the Clerk of Court, include 2 the date the summons, FAC and request for waiver was mailed to that Defendant, and 3 indicate why service upon the party remains unexecuted. All costs of that service will be 4 advanced by the United States; however, if a Defendant located within the United States 5 fails, without good cause to sign and return the waiver requested by the Marshal on 6 Plaintiff’s behalf, the Court will impose upon the Defendant any expenses later incurred in 7 making personal service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 8 3. ORDERS Defendants, once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 9 FAC, and any subsequent pleading they may file in this matter in which they are named as 10 parties, within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 11 Procedure 12(a) and 15(a)(3). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (stating that while a defendant 12 may occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a 13 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” 14 once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 15 and 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the 16 pleading that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is 17 required to respond). 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 1 4. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 2 ||serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ 3 ||}counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 4 || Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 5 original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 6 |}manner in which a true and correct copy of that document was served on Defendants or 7 ||their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 5.2. Any document 8 || received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk, or which fails to 9 || include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, may be disregarded. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. / , 11 DATED: June 12, 2023 Lin A (Ayphan 6 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -ll-