Williams v. New York Temporary Disability
This text of Williams v. New York Temporary Disability (Williams v. New York Temporary Disability) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
17-3848-cv Williams v. New York Temporary Disability
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 3 New York, on the 14th day of November, two thousand eighteen. 4 5 PRESENT: 6 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 7 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 ___________________________________________ 11 12 CHARLES WILLIAMS, CHARLES OF THE 13 FAMILY WILLIAMS, 14 15 Plaintiff-Appellant, 16 17 v. 17-3848-cv 18 19 BRONX COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT 20 CUSTOMER SERVICE UNIT, AND ITS 45 21 CFR SEC302.34 CONTRACTED AGENTS, 22 NANCY MANEY, IN HER OFFICIAL 23 INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY 24 COMMISSIONER OF OFFICE OF 25 TEMPORARY DISABILITY ASSISTANCE 26 (OTDA), EILEEN STACK, IN HER 27 OFFICIAL INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS 1 ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMISIONER OF 2 CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES (CSSU), 3 4 Defendants-Appellees, 5 6 NEW YORK OFFICE OF TEMPORARY 7 DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, ANTHONY 8 LOPEZ, SUPPORT MAGISTRATE, 9 10 Defendants. 11 ___________________________________________ 12 13 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Charles Williams, pro se, Bronx, 14 NY. 15 16 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance. 17
18 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District 19 of New York (Gregory H. Woods, J.).
20 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 21 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
22 Appellant Charles Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua 23 sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 complaint and its denial of his motion for leave 24 to amend. That complaint challenged the enforcement of his state child support order by 25 the Bronx County Child Support Customer Service Unit and its representatives. We assume 26 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the 27 issues on appeal.
28 District courts have the authority to dismiss an action sua sponte, even if the pro se 29 litigant has paid the filing fee, if the complaint is frivolous. Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh 30 St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363–64 (2d Cir. 2000). Pro se submissions are reviewed 31 with “special solicitude” and “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the 32 strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 33 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 34 Nonetheless, a pro se litigant’s complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to 35 relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), 36 and “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 37 misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 2 1 Although we have not decided whether a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a 2 complaint pursuant to its inherent authority is reviewed de novo or for abuse of 3 discretion, see Gottlieb v. Ford, 633 F. App’x 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order), an 4 independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court’s 5 grounds for dismissing Williams’s complaint “easily pass[ ] muster under . . . de novo 6 review.” Fitzgerald, 221 F.3d at 364 n.2 Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of 7 Williams’s complaint for the following reasons.
8 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) the 9 violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the 10 alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Vega v. 11 Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 12 marks omitted). A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if the municipality itself is 13 "actually responsible" for the deprivation of a federal right. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 14 of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 15 479 (1986). To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must establish “that ‘action 16 pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused [his] injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 17 U.S. 51, 60–61 (2011) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
18 Furthermore, to state a § 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process, “a 19 plaintiff must demonstrate that he possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and 20 that he was deprived of that interest without due process.” Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 21 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998). If a random and unauthorized state action deprives a person of a 22 protected interest, the State satisfies procedural due process requirements if it provides a 23 meaningful post-deprivation remedy. See Rivera-Powell v. New York City Bd. of 24 Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2006).
25 Even if we assume that Williams was deprived of a property interest when the 26 Bronx County Child Support Enforcement Unit and its agents enforced Williams’s child 27 support order, Williams has failed to state a procedural due process claim. Williams 28 alleges that this enforcement was accomplished in an “improper and unlawful manner.” 29 Appellant’s Br. at 5. The State satisfied procedural due process requirements if it 30 provided a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. See Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 465. 31 Williams alleged no facts in his amended complaint to indicate such state procedures 32 were unavailable or inadequate. See ROA doc. 4 (Am. Compl.). On appeal, Williams 33 argues that no adequate post-deprivation remedy existed because prior hearings were part 34 of “a systemic fraud.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. Even if these allegations had appeared in his 35 complaint, they are too vague and conclusory to state a claim for relief. Twombly, 550 36 U.S. at 570.
37 Moreover, even if these allegations reflected a deprivation of Williams’s rights, 38 Williams has not alleged that there is an official municipal policy to deny access
3 1 to adequate post-deprivation procedures, nor did he allege facts from which an inference 2 could plausibly be drawn that such a policy existed. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. 3 Accordingly, the district court properly found that Williams failed to state a § 1983 4 claim.1
5 Williams also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for leave to 6 amend. We review denials of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, unless the denial is 7 “based on an interpretation of law, such as futility, in which case our review is de novo.” 8 Allen v. Credit Suisse Sec.
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Williams v. New York Temporary Disability, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-new-york-temporary-disability-ca2-2018.