Williams v. Medstar Health Inc.

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3242
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KAWANA J. WILLIAMS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03242 (UNA) ) MEDSTAR HEALTH INC., ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”),

ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The

Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this case

without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of the District, sues Defendant MedStar Health, Inc., and its chief

counsel. See Compl. at 1–4. She brings this action on behalf of her business, see id. at 3, which

she may not do, because “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct

their own cases personally or by counsel[,]” and Plaintiff is not licensed counsel, see 28 U.S.C. §

1654; see also Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Found., Inc. v. Potter, 586 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir.

2009) (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993)). Moreover, a non-

individual cannot proceed under the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); the Supreme Court has

interpreted that provision as applicable “only to individuals” or “natural persons,” not “artificial

entities.” Rowland, 506 U.S. at 201–07 (1993); see Franklin v. Vilsack, No. 11–0206 (D.D.C. Apr.

15, 2011) (denying IFP status to plaintiff in his capacity as an officer of a corporation which, as

an artificial entity, cannot proceed IFP).

The allegations themselves fare no better. Plaintiff’s Complaint includes nearly 200 pages of unexplained exhibits, contravening D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(e), (g). Plaintiff appears to take

issue with MedStar’s alleged failure to recognize an agreement for physician services, purportedly

executed between MedStar and her company, Well-Konnect, LLC, and MedStar’s alleged refusal

to reimburse her for primary care services rendered by Well-Konnect. See Compl. at 3, 9–10, 15,

38–39, 45–47. Plaintiff asserts that MedStar’s alleged actions violate countless federal civil and

criminal statutes, and provisions of the D.C. Code, see id. at 7–8, 10–17, 19–21, 25–26, 29, but

she fails to flesh out any of the supporting facts or details to meet the elements to support any of

these intended claims, where a private cause of action is even available. She also accuses a

Medstar facility employee of assaulting her, see id. at 7, 10, 24, 27–28, and MedStar of “gang

stalking,” see id. at 10, 24, 26, 28, “voyeurism,” id. at 21, “affiliat[ing] with extremist networks,”

see id. at 11, “harassment and intimidation,” id. at 26, “unauthorized surveillance and biometric

tracking,” id. at 13, and other “cyber crimes,” see id. at 10–11, 24, 27–28. She demands upwards

of $500 million in damages and assorted equitable relief. See id. at 13–16, 17–18.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule 8(a), which

requires such pleadings to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v.

CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s Complaint is not short or plain. Neither

the Court nor Defendants can reasonably be expected to identify Plaintiff’s intended claims. When,

as here, allegations are presented in a “disorganized and convoluted” manner, dismissal is often

appropriate for that reason alone. See Spence v. U.S. Dep’t of Vet. Affairs, No. 19-cv-1947, 2022

WL 3354726, at *12 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022), aff’d, 109 F.4th 531 (D.C. Cir. 2024), cert. denied,

145 S. Ct. 594 (2024). In other words, a complaint that “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions,

sharp harangues and personal comments[,]” does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts

v. Dist. of Columbia, 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Dist. of

Columbia, No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017).

Nor has Plaintiff established this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3). Federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented, or the parties

are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1332.

First, plaintiff has broadly cited to federal laws, but has failed to state a cognizable federal

question, and the Court does not independently discern any basis for federal question jurisdiction

from any of the allegations presented. See Johnson v. Robinson, 576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir.

2009) (per curiam) (“[F]ederal court jurisdiction must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly.”)

(cleaned up).

Second, Plaintiff has failed to establish diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Both Plaintiff and Defendant MedStar are located in the District, thus defeating complete diversity.

See Bush v. Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (“For jurisdiction to exist under 28

U.S.C. § 1332, there must be complete diversity between the parties, which is to say that the

plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” (citing Owen Equip. & Erection

Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1978))).

For all of these reasons, the case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: December 11, 2025 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge