Williams v. Lang

273 N.W.2d 448, 404 Mich. 639, 1979 Mich. LEXIS 424
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 5, 1979
Docket59443, (Calendar No. 3)
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 273 N.W.2d 448 (Williams v. Lang) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Lang, 273 N.W.2d 448, 404 Mich. 639, 1979 Mich. LEXIS 424 (Mich. 1979).

Opinions

Levin, J.

It has not been determined whether Bobby V. Williams was an employee of Hansell Lang, doing business as Lang’s Gulf Service, and therefore we cannot reach the question on which leave to appeal was granted of whether Gulf Oil Company or Bole Oil Company, a Gulf distributor, is a statutory employer obliged to pay compensation because of their relationship with Lang who was not insured and had not otherwise complied with the workers’ compensation act.1

We do not read the opinion or order of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board as a finding or determination that there was insufficient evidence that Williams was an employee of Lang. Rather, it left that issue undecided. We remand to the WCAB for a finding on that issue, retaining jurisdiction.

Williams was severely injured while working out [644]*644of Lang’s service station. He claimed that he was employed by Lang, who had disappeared and was not available to give testimony, and that Bole and Gulf were statutory employers required to pay him compensation because, while he was so employed by Lang, he was engaged in the execution of work for one or both contracted out by them to Lang. Alternatively, he claimed he was employed by D. C. Gregory of Dewey’s Automatic Transmission.

The referee and WCAB view of the facts and case law was that Bole and Gulf were not statutory employers. They also concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Dewey’s Automatic Transmission, individually or in partnership with Lang, had employed Williams.

While the referee found that the testimony of Williams’ wife did not "fill the void” and that he could not "determine the relationship between Lang and” Williams,2 the WCAB did not in terms adopt that finding.3 The statements in the control[645]*645ling WCAB opinion that "there is insufficient evidence from which to draw reasonable inferences” and that the "evidence before us is insufficient for the drawing of even reasonable inferences much less is it sufficient for such findings [emphasis supplied]” are in the context of whether Dewey’s was responsible as an employer, not whether Lang was so responsible.4

In a word, while the WCAB adopted the referee’s conclusions that the cause should be dismissed as to Bole and Gulf with prejudice and as to Lang and Dewey’s without prejudice,5 it does not appear to have adopted the referee’s finding that the relationship between Lang and Williams could not be determined.

The controlling WCAB opinion made no refer[646]*646ence whatsoever to any of the evidence concerning the relationship between Williams and Lang.6 It, therefore, does not appear that the WCAB considered the evidence bearing on their relationship or made any determination as to its sufficiency or a finding in that regard.

The WCAB’s failure to find whether Williams was an employee of Lang is understandable in light of its conclusion that Bole and Gulf were not responsible as statutory employers. Having so concluded and Lang being uninsured and absent, the WCAB apparently saw no need to go on to decide whether Williams was an employee of Lang. We often similarly avoid decision regarding questions, factual and legal, that no longer appear pertinent to the dispute.

The minority, two of the five sitting members of the WCAB, indicated that they were inclined to find that Williams was employed by Lang.7 The [647]*647testimony of Williams’ wife as well as of the amnesiac Williams lends support to such a finding. Also, there is some corroborative testimony of other witnesses.

We granted leave to appeal to consider whether Bole or Gulf, or both, are statutory employers, i.e., whether Lang, who sold Gulf products under the name "Gulf’, had contracted "for the execution” "of the whole or any part of any work undertaken by” Bole or Gulf so that one or both are liable to Williams as a person "employed in the execution of the work”. Our grant of leave indicates that we may take a view of the law different than reflected in the decision of the WCAB. Therefore, Bole or Gulf may be statutory employers liable to pay compensation to Williams if it were determined that Lang had employed him.

Since the question whether Williams is an employee of Lang may be determinative, and there is evidence from which the WCAB could find that he was, and it does not appear that the WCAB decided that the evidence is insufficient to support such a determination, we vacate the order of the WCAB and remand to it for further findings, retaining jurisdiction.

[648]*648Kavanagh, C.J., and Williams and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Levin, J.

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Related

Williams v. Lang
327 N.W.2d 240 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1982)

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Bluebook (online)
273 N.W.2d 448, 404 Mich. 639, 1979 Mich. LEXIS 424, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-lang-mich-1979.