Williams v. Jimerson

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 251084-U No. 1-25-1084

Order filed August 25, 2026 Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________

TAMEIKA WILLIAMS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of

Petitioner-Appellee, ) Cook County.

)

v. ) No. 24 OP 62093 )

SHERRICA JIMERSON, ) Honorable ) Koula A. Fournier,

Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Ellis and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the judgment of the trial court where respondent failed to provide a sufficiently complete record on appeal for review of the issues presented.

¶2 Respondent Sherrica Jimerson appeals pro se from the trial court’s entry of a plenary order of protection against Jimerson and in favor of petitioner Tameika Williams. On appeal, Jimerson argues that (1) the court erred in finding that “acts of physical abuse, harm, [and] harassment” occurred; (2) the court improperly “exclude[d]” an order entered by a previous judge and permitted

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an array of evidentiary and procedural errors; and (3) her self-representation was undermined by a “hostile courtroom.” Because Jimerson has failed to provide a sufficiently complete record on appeal for review of these issues, we affirm.

¶3 The following background is derived from the limited record on appeal, comprising only the common law record. Both parties proceeded pro se in the trial court.

¶4 On November 19, 2024, Williams filed a petition for emergency and plenary orders of protection against her sibling, Jimerson. Williams alleged that Jimerson sent text messages to Williams and Williams’ grandmother saying Jimerson would break into the grandmother’s house. In the texts, Jimerson referred to Williams as “the devil and a witch” and a “demon.” Jimerson also sent videos of her breaking into the grandmother’s house. Williams additionally alleged that Jimerson told the grandmother that Jimerson would kill Williams. Williams requested exclusive possession of a residence and a vehicle, and that Jimerson have no contact with Williams. The same day, the court denied the petition for an emergency order, stated the petition for a plenary order “shall remain pending,” and continued proceedings to December 10, 2024.

¶5 On December 10, 2024, the court entered a disposition order stating that a “plenary order *** issued on” November 19, 2024, would be “extend[ed] to” January 30, 2025. (The record on appeal does not contain a copy of the November 19, 2024, plenary order.)

¶6 A disposition order entered on December 18, 2024, stated that Williams had filed a motion to reconsider the denial of an emergency order of protection.

¶7 On December 23, 2024, the court granted the motion to reconsider and entered an emergency order of protection effective until January 9, 2025.

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¶8 Subsequently, the court entered orders extending the emergency order of protection to April 16, 2025. The court also ordered mediation and no unlawful contact between the parties.

¶9 On April 16, 2025, the court extended the emergency order of protection to May 2, 2025, and set a hearing for that date. In the order, the court noted that there was no agreement in mediation.

¶ 10 On May 2, 2025, after a hearing, the court entered a plenary order of protection, effective until May 1, 2026, prohibiting Jimerson from physically abusing, harassing, stalking, and interfering with Williams, or contacting Williams by “any means.” The order also granted exclusive possession of the residence in question to Williams and prohibited Jimerson from entering or remaining therein. The written judgment indicates that Jimerson was “served in open court.”

¶ 11 On May 8, 2025, Jimerson filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied on May 19, 2025.

¶ 12 Jimerson timely appealed. Subsequently, we took the appeal on the record and her brief only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (reviewing court may take case on appellant’s brief only).

¶ 13 On appeal, Jimerson argues that (1) the trial court erred in concluding that “valid acts of physical abuse, harm, [and] harassment” warranted the order of protection; (2) the trial court improperly “exclude[d]” an order entered by a previous judge and permitted an array of evidentiary and procedural errors; and (3) her self-representation was undermined by a “hostile courtroom.”

¶ 14 As an initial matter, Jimerson’s brief fails to comply with most requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which sets forth mandatory procedural rules that

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govern appellate briefs. For example, in violation of Rules 341(h)(6) and 341(h)(7), Jimerson’s brief fails to set forth a statement of facts containing the facts “necessary to an understanding of the case,” stated “accurately and fairly without argument or comment,” and with “appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). In addition, Jimerson’s brief fails to present arguments supported by legal authority to aid this court in deciding the issues on appeal and does not contain citations to the record. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 15 Supreme court rules are not mere suggestions. SMS Financial CH, LLC v. Feurer, 2025 IL App (1st) 250033, ¶ 40. Pro se litigants must comply with the same procedural rules required of attorneys. Gillard v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 2019 IL App (1st) 182348, ¶ 45. It is axiomatic that this court should “have the issues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument presented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 5. Given Jimerson’s failure to comply with this requirement, it is within this court’s discretion to dismiss her appeal. See Zale v. Moraine Valley Community College, 2019 IL App (1st) 190197, ¶ 32. Notwithstanding, it is clear that Jimerson challenges the circuit court’s grant of an order of protection against her, and we therefore decline to dismiss the appeal on that basis. See Epstein v. Davis, 2017 IL App (1st) 170605, ¶ 22.

¶ 16 That said, meaningful review of the merits of Jimerson’s appeal is hindered by deficiencies in the record. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021) states that the record on appeal shall include the “entire original common law record” and “any report of proceedings prepared in accordance with Rule 323.”

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¶ 17 Jimerson, as appellant, bears the burden of presenting a “sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error” so that this court may evaluate that alleged error. See Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984) (“From the very nature of an appeal it is evident that the court must have before it the record to review in order to determine whether there was the error claimed by the appellant.”). Absent such record, “it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Id. at 392. Any doubts that may arise due to the incompleteness of the record must be resolved against Jimerson. Id.

¶ 18 In this court, Jimerson challenges the trial court’s entry of a plenary order of protection. Specifically, she contends that the trial court erred in concluding that “valid acts of physical abuse, harm, [and] harassment” occurred, that the trial court improperly “exclude[d]” an order entered by a previous judge and permitted an array of evidentiary and procedural errors, and that her self- representation was undermined by a “hostile courtroom.”

¶ 19 The trial court’s written judgment indicates that Jimerson “was served in open court” and judgment was entered after a hearing. Jimerson, however, has not provided a report of proceedings from the hearing in which the court heard Williams’s allegations and evidence was presented. Nor does the record contain an acceptable substitute such as a bystander’s report or agreed statement of facts. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a), (c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Consequently, we cannot determine what evidence, exhibits, and testimony were admitted or excluded at the May 2, 2025, hearing. Nor can we discern the arguments made to the trial court or the court’s reasoning in entering the order of protection.

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¶ 20 Further, Jimerson’s brief alludes to other hearings where she alleges that she was treated unfairly. However, without a report of proceeding or an acceptable substitute, this court has no knowledge of what transpired at those hearings. Thus, the record is insufficient for our review of the merits of Jimerson’s appeal. Due to the insufficiencies of the record, we have no basis for disturbing the trial court’s judgment and must presume that the court’s order conformed with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92; Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156-57 (2005).

¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 22 Affirmed.