Williams v. Hill, Harris & Co.

190 So. 157, 1939 La. App. LEXIS 314
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 29, 1939
DocketNo. 5922.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 190 So. 157 (Williams v. Hill, Harris & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Hill, Harris & Co., 190 So. 157, 1939 La. App. LEXIS 314 (La. Ct. App. 1939).

Opinion

DREW, Judge.

The lower court in a well written opinion has correctly set forth the issues of this case and found the facts and arrived at the proper legal conclusion. The opinion is as follows:

“This is a suit for damages arising out of an alleged illegal provisional seizure. The aggregate amount sued for is $1652.50, itemized as follows:
1. For embarrassment, humiliation and mental pain' and suffering . $ 500.00
2. For inconvenience and physical discomfort sustained by plaintiff and his family. 500.00
3. For injuries and damage to petitioner’s credit. 500.00
4. Storage and drayage... 2.50
5. Attorney’s fees. 150.00
Total. $1652.50
“The defendant had leased one of its dwelling’ houses in the City of Alexandria to a Mrs. G. O. Lowell, said dwelling con *159 sisting oí some five bedrooms and located at Texas Avenue and Harris Street, said City.
“Plaintiff alleges that he had subleased from Mrs. Lowell one of the rooms in said dwelling at a monthly rental of $8.00, payable in semi-monthly sums of $4.00 each in advance, and that he owed no rent at the time. Hill, Harris & Company, Inc., provisionally seized plaintiff’s property along with the'property of Mrs. Lowell in satisfaction for rent due by Mrs. Lowell.
“Mrs. Lowell having bécome delinquent in her rent payments, defendant Company, on May 19, 1938, seized the following property belonging to plaintiff and located within the room occupied by him and his family under said sub-lease from Mrs. Lowell, to-wit: 1 vanity dresser; 1 Philco radio; 1 2-piece living room suite, composed of couch and chair; 1 large cqngo-leum rug, and 1 ice box. It is alleged that the couch seized was being used by him and his family as their bed on which they slept.
“It is alleged that plaintiff’s rent being paid in advance on May 6, 1938, up to May 21, 1938, the defendant company had no right to seize his said property in payment of a rent claim against Mrs. Lowell.
“It is alleged that said seizure was made in plaintiff’s absence at work, and that his wife was present and vehemently protested against the seizure, but without avail; that his said property was removed from the premises on the same day it was seized, and when plaintiff arrived from his work he found his wife out on the street completely distraught and in a state of hysteria.
“Plaintiff alleges that it was late in the day, and it was with great difficulty that he finally arranged for another house near by which he and his wife and child had to occupy by sleeping on the floor which was quite filthy and badly infested with mosquitoes; that it was not until late next day that he was able to secure another house to move to and it was not until the 25th of the month (May) that he was able to secure the release of his said seized furniture from defendant and moved to the house he had secured from another party, and then had to pay $2.50 drayage charges to have it moved from the storage where defendant had had it moved to, to be kept in custody, or rather that said furniture had been so moved and stored by Mr. Blalock, the City Marshal, in the execution of the writ of provisional seizure. Plaintiff also alleges that he was compelled to secure the service of an attorney in order to get his furniture released. He also alleges that as a result of the seizure of his furniture, his credit was greatly impaired.
“Defendant filed exceptions of no cause or right of action along with its answer of general denial, and at the suggestion of its counsel, the exceptions were referred to the merits.
“Trial of the case was proceeded with to the point where it developed that plaintiff had secured from Mrs. Lowell one of the rooms in the dwelling house which the latter had under lease from defendant company, said one single room not constituting an apartment, nor was the dwelling as a whole an apartment house. All of the rooms appeared to have a common entrance from the outside and the same used by all the occupants in common. At this point the defendant urged its exceptions on the ground that since the building did not appear to be an apartment house there could be no relationship o.f lessee and sublessee between the plaintiff and Mrs. Lowell, but that plaintiff should be deemed as merely a roomer in the building, and that under the law the property of a roomer in a leased dwelling is subject to the rent of the lessee of such building. After considering the law as applied to the circumstances in this case, the court overruled the exceptions for the reason that it appeared from the evidence that plaintiff and his family had full control over the particular room occupied by them, to the exclusion of any supervision or control thereof by Mrs. Lowell, and in such cases it appears to be the law that the relation of lessee and sublessee exists. See Pembrook v. Goldman, La.App., 176 So. 888; and Revised Civil Code, art. 2692.
“While there is some dispute as to whether plaintiff had in fact paid his rent in advance to Mrs. Lowell for the room in question, taking the testimony as a whole on that point, the court thinks that it fairly preponderates in favor of plaintiff. The court will, therefore, conclude that plaintiff had, in fact, paid on May 6, 1938, the sum of $4.00 to Mrs. Lowell as rent to cover the period of two weeks in advance, which would extend to the 21st of the month.
“Under the provisions of article 2706 of the Civil Code, the lessor’s right of pledge extends to the property of the under-tenant *160 only when the latter is indebted unto the tenant for rent at the time when the lessor chooses to exercise his right. Under the evidence, therefore, Hill, Harris & Co., Inc., had no such right of pledge on the 19th day of May upon plaintiff’s property on the leased premises, and the seizure was, in the opinion of the court, illegal.
“Article 295 of the Code of Practice plainly states that a privilege holder shall be personally responsible for all damages suffered by the defendant in provisional . seizure, should the seizure have been wrongfully obtained. The defendant in the present case makes some contention that plaintiff did not notify defendant, nor the Marshal making the seizure, that his rent was paid up in advance. Mr. Harris, President of the defendant company, testified that he came to the premises late the afternoon of the day the seizure was made and was present when the Marshal made the seizure; that, while he did not go into the house, Mrs'. Williams, plaintiff’s wife, came to the front and talked with him, and that she did not say anything about the rent having been paid. Mr. Blalock, the Marshal, testified that while he was back in the room he heard a conversation between Mrs. Williams and Mrs. Lowell, who was present, concerning rent and heard Mrs. Lowell state that she could furnish a receipt, but that he did not understand from the conversation that any rent had been paid, or else he would not have seized the plaintiff’s property. Mrs. Williams and Mrs. Lowell both testified that Mrs.

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Bluebook (online)
190 So. 157, 1939 La. App. LEXIS 314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-hill-harris-co-lactapp-1939.