24-34-cv Williams v. Harry’s Nurses Registry, Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of March, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: JOSEPH F. BIANCO, MICHAEL H. PARK, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
CLAUDIA WILLIAMS, fka CLAUDIA GAYLE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. 24-34-cv
HARRY’S NURSES REGISTRY, INC., HARRY DORVILIER,
Defendants-Appellants. _____________________________________
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Marshall B. Bellovin, Ballon Stoll P.C., New York, New York.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: JONATHAN A. BERNSTEIN, Isaacs Bernstein, P.C., Yardley, Pennsylvania.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granting entry of a preliminary injunction (Pamela K. Chen, Judge).
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the order of the district court granting the request for a preliminary injunction,
entered on December 20, 2023, is AFFIRMED, and the case is REMANDED for further
proceedings.
Defendants-Appellants Harry’s Nurses Registry, Inc. and Harry Dorvilier (together,
“HNR”) appeal from the district court’s order granting Plaintiff-Appellee Claudia Williams’s
motion for a preliminary injunction and directing defendants to remove Williams’s personal
identifying information (“PII”) from HNR’s website and refrain from publishing the PII elsewhere.
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on
appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
More than seventeen years ago, Williams, on behalf of herself and other nurses who were
employed by HNR, brought a collective action in the Eastern District of New York against HNR
for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.,
and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), N.Y. Lab. Law § 650 et seq. See Gayle v. Harry’s Nurses
Registry Inc., No. 07-cv-4672 (NGG) (PK), Complaint (ECF No. 1) (the “Gayle case”). 1 In a
series of orders, the district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on liability and damages,
and also awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs; those orders were reflected in an amended judgment,
dated October 16, 2013. 2 HNR appealed and we affirmed the amended judgment. See generally
Gayle v. Harry’s Nurses Registry, Inc., 594 F. App’x 714, 719 (2d Cir. 2014).
1 As explained below, at the time of that lawsuit, Williams was known by her maiden name, Claudia C. Gayle. 2 The case was initially assigned to United States District Judge Charles P. Sifton and then was re-assigned to United States District Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis.
2 Beginning in 2021, however, HNR has repeatedly challenged the judgment. HNR first
filed a motion in this Court to recall the mandate, which we denied. Gayle v. Harry’s Nurses
Registry Inc., No. 12-4764, Order dated Feb. 1, 2021 (ECF No. 177). HNR then went to the district
court and moved to reopen the case, which Judge Garaufis denied. Gayle v. Harry’s Nurses
Registry Inc., No. 07-cv-4672 (NGG) (PK), Order dated May 13, 2021. HNR appealed that ruling;
we dismissed the appeal as frivolous and referred HNR’s then-counsel to the Second Circuit
Grievance Panel for filing a frivolous appeal. Gayle v. Harry’s Nurses Registry Inc., No. 21-1463,
Order dated Mar. 16, 2022 (ECF No. 151). HNR then moved the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation to transfer the Gayle case and two other cases against them to the Southern District of
Mississippi, which the panel denied as moot. In re: Harry’s Nurses Registry, Inc., MDL No. 3020,
Order dated Aug. 25, 2021 (ECF No. 4). HNR then filed another motion to recall the mandate in
this Court, which we again denied. Gayle v. Harry’s Nurses Registry Inc., No. 12-4764, Order
dated Nov. 2, 2023 (ECF No. 188).
In or around 2022, HNR also published posts on its website challenging the validity of the
outcome in the Gayle case. For example, it published posts titled “Fraudulent judgment and scam
involving CHARLES SIFTON and Jonathan Bernstein [plaintiffs’ counsel] in Gayle case,” and
“Stealing the money, under ghost that is the power of the ghost by judgment Nicholas G. Garaufis
and Judge Charles P. Sifton.” Supp. App’x at 18, 21. Although the posts are rather difficult to
comprehend, they assert, among other things, that “Jonathan Bernstein, a private attorney, colluded
with Claudia Gayle, a purportedly fictitious individual, to initiate fraudulent summonses and
complaints at the federal court,” and that this Court’s ultimate affirmance in favor of plaintiffs
“seems to have been influenced by Bernstein’s potent affiliations and political connections.” Id.
at 30. Around the same time, HNR published a post on its website accusing Williams of
3 perpetrating identity fraud, being “an interstate scammer,” and “one of the most brilliant criminals
that ever lived.” Id. at 5. The post also displayed a copy of Williams’s Social Security card, which
contained her unredacted Social Security number, and copies of her driver’s licenses, which
showed her unredacted date of birth. Id. at 6.
In September 2023, Williams filed this instant action, alleging retaliation under the FLSA,
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), and NYLL, N.Y. Lab. Law § 215. In November 2023, Williams moved for
a preliminary injunction requiring HNR to remove her PII—namely, her Social Security number
and date of birth—from its website. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. This
interlocutory appeal followed.
“We review de novo the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s legal conclusions in deciding to grant a motion
for a preliminary injunction, but review its ultimate decision to issue the injunction for abuse of
discretion.” Yang v. Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “A district court ‘abuses’ or ‘exceeds’ the discretion accorded to it when (1) its
decision rests on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision—though
not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be
located within the range of permissible decisions.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Borough
NY Med. Prac. P.C., 120 F.4th 59, 79 (2d Cir. 2024) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
“In general, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [(1)] [s]he is
likely to succeed on the merits, [(2)] that [s]he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, [(3)] that the balance of equities tips in h[er] favor, and [(4)] that an injunction
is in the public interest.” Daileader v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London Syndicate 1861, 96
F.4th 351, 356 (2d Cir. 2024) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
4 However, where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to require “the non-movant to take some action,” the
plaintiff is required to “show a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits and make a
strong showing of irreparable harm.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
I. Standing
As a threshold matter, we address HNR’s cursory contention that Williams lacks standing
to seek a preliminary injunction. Although we typically deem arguments raised in a “perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation” to be waived, Tolbert v.
Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), we have an independent duty to
consider whether subject matter jurisdiction exists even when “no party has called the matter to
the court’s attention,” Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa P.C. v. Dupont, 565
F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2009).
To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (i) that [s]he suffered an injury in fact that is
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the
defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). “When a preliminary injunction is sought, a plaintiff’s
burden to demonstrate standing ‘will normally be no less than that required on a motion for
summary judgment.’” Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Lujan
v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 907 n.8 (1990)). Thus, a plaintiff “must set forth by affidavit
or other evidence specific facts, which . . . will be taken to be true,” to demonstrate standing. Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The only standing issue here is whether Williams
has sufficiently shown that she suffered an injury in fact. We conclude that she has done so.
5 First, in assessing whether an alleged injury is “concrete,” we ask “whether the alleged
injury to the plaintiff has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a
basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” TransUnion LLC, 59 U.S. at 424 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)). Here, Williams’s alleged core injury is the intentional and
ongoing exposure of her PII to the public. As we have previously held, such an injury is concrete
because of the “close relationship” between a “data exposure injury and the common law analog
of public disclosure of private facts.” Bohnak v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc., 79 F.4th 276, 287
(2d Cir. 2023); see Restatement (Second) Torts § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of . . . privacy,
if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”); see also TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 425
(recognizing the “disclosure of private information” as an injury “with a close relationship to [a]
harm[] traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts”).
This concrete injury is also “actual.” Because the alleged injury “falls squarely within the
scope of an intangible harm the Supreme Court has recognized as ‘concrete,’” we do not need to
“take further steps to evaluate whether [any] third parties used the information in ways that
harmed” Williams. Bohnak, 79 F.4th at 285–86 (emphasis omitted). In other words, because
HNR’s intentional and ongoing public disclosure of Williams’s PII is itself an “actual injury
redressable by the court,” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it is
unnecessary, for standing purposes, to evaluate the imminence of any future harm that HNR’s
action poses to Williams.
6 Finally, we find unconvincing HNR’s suggestion that Williams’s alleged injury is not
particularized. “For an injury to be particularized, it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). HNR
argues that Williams has no personal stake in removing the PII because it does not belong to her.
We find this argument unpersuasive. Insofar as HNR’s contention that the PII did not belong to
Williams is predicated on the fact that the posted Social Security card and driver’s licenses are
under the names “Claudia Cecile Gayle,” “Claudia C. Gayle,” and “Claudia C. Mathias,” Williams
proffered a number of documents that clearly support the finding by the district court that those
are her own former names. In short, at this stage, HNR has failed to provide any basis to challenge
Williams’s evidence demonstrating that the published PII belongs to her.
Accordingly, we conclude that Williams has set forth a concrete, actual, and particularized
injury that is sufficient to support standing.
II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA makes it unlawful “to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under” the FLSA’s provisions. 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3). The NYLL similarly bars an employer from “discharg[ing], threaten[ing],
penaliz[ing], or in any other manner discriminat[ing] or retaliat[ing] against any employee” for
making an NYLL complaint. N.Y. Lab. Law § 215. Under the McDonnell Douglas “three-step
burden-shifting framework,” a plaintiff alleging retaliation under the FLSA and NYLL “must first
establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing (1) participation in protected activity known
to the defendant, like the filing of a FLSA lawsuit; (2) an employment action disadvantaging the
plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
7 action.” Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); see Wilson v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., No. 21-1971,
2022 WL 17587564, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 13, 2022). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
“the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-[retaliatory] reason for the
employment action.” Mullins, 626 F.3d at 53 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If
the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff must produce “sufficient evidence to support a rational
finding that the legitimate, non-[retaliatory] reasons proffered by the defendant were false, and that
more likely than not [retaliation] was the real reason for the employment action.” Id. at 53–54
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
HNR does not contest that it was aware of Williams’s protected activity but argues that the
alleged retaliatory conduct was neither an employment action that disadvantaged her nor was
causally related to her protected activity, and thus the district court erred in finding a likelihood of
success on the retaliation claim. We disagree.
First, we find no basis to disturb the district court’s determination that HNR’s posting of
allegedly false statements, along with Williams’s identifying information in this particular case,
constituted an employment action that disadvantaged Williams. “An employment action
disadvantages an employee if it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting similar charges.” Mullins, 626 F.3d at 53 (alterations adopted) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). HNR does not argue that, as a general matter, posting false statements
about an employee along with her PII on the internet cannot constitute a retaliatory employment
action. Instead, it contends that the alleged conduct cannot be retaliatory against Williams because
“the identifying information posted on the internet did not belong to [Williams].” Appellant’s Br.
at 9. As discussed supra, however, Williams put forth evidence that the PII was her own. The
8 district court credited this evidence, noting that “there seems to be a perfectly reasonable and
innocent explanation having to do with [Williams] having married or remarried or change[d] her
own last name, thus explaining the changes in her identification documents.” App’x at 208. At
the same time, the district court discounted HNR’s proffered investigative evidence that the PII
was not Williams’s, noting it was “not convinced that [the investigation] shows what [HNR] thinks
it does” because it “is really a broad brush exercise that really doesn’t prove much without [a]
much more rigorous examination.” Id. at 244. Nothing in the record suggests that this factual
determination was clearly erroneous. 3
We find similarly unavailing HNR’s contention that the district court erred in rejecting
HNR’s argument that it never “intended to retaliate against [Williams] by posting information [it]
believed in good faith did not belong to [Williams].” Appellant’s Br. at 9 (emphasis in original).
The district court concluded that whether the information actually belonged to Williams “is less
relevant to the intent” inquiry, App’x at 220, because, essentially, “the sequence, timing and nature
of events” surrounding the publication of the information reinforces that its predominant purpose
was to get back at Williams, see Mullins, 626 F.3d at 54. More specifically, the district court found
that “sufficient evidence based on defendant[s’] own words in the postings, [their] rantings about
having lost at the district court and Court of Appeals level, and [their] railing against all of the
participants in that process, even the judges . . . makes it so clear that . . . at least the primary
purpose was to get back at everybody involved in this,” including Williams. App’x at 231. Based
3 We emphasize that in the preliminary injunction context, “there should generally be an evidentiary hearing when essential facts are in dispute.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 120 F.4th at 83. However, “[a] party may, of course, waive its right to an evidentiary hearing.” Charette v. Town of Oyster Bay, 159 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 1998). HNR did not seek an evidentiary hearing below, nor does it now appeal the district court’s failure to hold such a hearing. Accordingly, any argument regarding the lack of an evidentiary hearing is waived.
9 on the evidentiary record before the district court, we discern no clear error in that factual
determination.
On appeal, HNR does not even attempt to rebut Williams’s prima facie case by proffering
any legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the publication of Williams’s PII. Before the district
court, the only reason it advanced was to dissuade other employees from “commit[ting] identity
fraud to obtain employment.” Id. at 228. However, the district court rejected this as a legitimate
reason for the action, pointing out that “[t]here is no reason [HNR] has to use this forum in this
way to police . . . who applies to [HNR] and whether they provide [HNR] with truthful
information” because HNR can privately verify the employment information it receives. Id. at
232. In any event, the district court alternatively held that, even assuming arguendo that the
rationale articulated by HNR was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for posting Williams’s PII,
it “couldn’t be plainer” that retaliation was the “overriding, if not sole purpose.” Id.
In sum, having reviewed the district court’s analysis, we conclude that Williams
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the retaliation claim based on the record.
III. Irreparable Harm
“A showing of irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction.” Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he moving party must show that
there is a continuing harm which cannot be adequately redressed by final relief on the merits and
for which money damages cannot provide adequate compensation.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 120 F.4th at 80 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Brenntag Int’l Chems.,
Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that irreparable harm exists
10 “where, but for the grant of equitable relief, there is a substantial chance that upon final resolution
of the action the parties cannot be returned to the positions they previously occupied”).
Here, Williams made a strong showing of irreparable harm. As the district court observed,
“the misuse of [Williams’s PII] by the defendant[s] to post it long after the plaintiff is no longer
working there, for no legitimate employment purpose, is . . . the injury,” and such an injury
“satisfies both standing, and also demonstrates irreparable harm.” App’x at 245. The district court
reasoned that, so long as Williams’s PII remains publicly displayed on HNR’s website, she suffers
an ongoing harm that cannot be adequately remedied by a retrospective award of monetary
damages, especially when it exposes Williams to “identity theft and misuse of personal
information.” Id. at 216. Under the particular circumstances presented here, the district court
acted within its discretion in determining that such harm should be redressed at this juncture by a
preliminary injunction, rather than at the conclusion of the case by final relief through monetary
damages, because the continued display of Williams’s PII subjects her “to a perpetual risk of
identity theft or fraud.” McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Assocs., LLC, 995 F.3d 295, 302 (2d Cir.
2021). In other words, because, due to HNR’s alleged conduct, Williams’s PII is readily accessible
by any malevolent actor with mere internet access, there is a “substantial chance” that she may not
be able to return to the position she previously occupied—namely, one where her information has
not been misappropriated for identity theft or fraud. Brenntag Int’l Chems., 175 F.3d at 249. The
district court reasonably determined that the continuing harm in this case will cease only if HNR
is ordered to remove Williams’s PII from its website and enjoined from disclosing the information
elsewhere.
HNR argues that, because Williams’s PII had already been publicly disclosed in one of
HNR’s prior court filings, and Williams did not seek a preliminary injunction until two months
11 after filing her complaint, those delays undercut her showing of irreparable harm. We are
unpersuaded. To be sure, “[d]elay in seeking enforcement of [a plaintiff’s] rights . . . tends to
indicate at least a reduced need for such drastic, speedy action.” Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756
F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985). Thus, we have declined to find irreparable harm in cases where the
delay created a “fair inference” that “[plaintiffs] were well aware of their rights and had concluded
that they were not violated.” Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 39 (2d Cir.
1995). Here, the record reflects that Williams’s counsel was not aware of HNR’s public disclosure
of Williams’s PII in HNR’s prior court filing in the Gayle case. Even if Williams’s counsel was,
or should have been, aware of this disclosure, nothing in the record suggests that Williams herself
was aware of it; and, in any event, the injury alleged in this case pertains to HNR’s internet
postings, not its previous filing. The record also reflects good reason for the two-month period
between the filing of the complaint and the motion for a preliminary injunction. In October 2023,
a little over a month after the complaint was filed, Williams’s counsel contacted HNR’s counsel in
an effort to have HNR remove the PII from its website without court involvement. After receiving
no response to Williams’s October 30, 2023 correspondence on the matter, Williams promptly
moved for preliminary relief in November 2023. In short, there is an insufficient basis to infer that
Williams sat on her rights in a way that indicates “a reduced need for . . . drastic, speedy action.”
Citibank, N.A., 756 F.2d at 276.
IV. Balance of Hardships and Public Interest
We also find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that this “is just not
. . . a close case about the harms and the balance of hardships.” App’x at 232. As noted above,
Williams had established both a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. By
contrast, the district court found that HNR has no “real or genuine or . . . non-delusional reason”
12 to post Williams’s PII on its website. Id. at 246. We reach the same conclusion with respect to
assessing the public interest, which requires courts to consider “the public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction,” Yang, 960 F.3d at 135–36, and “ensure that
[the] injunction does not cause harm to the public interest,” SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 673
F.3d 158, 163 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012). In particular, the district court determined that “it’s not against
the public interest[] to take down these accusations [from the website],” App’x at 247, especially
where the district court found “there has been some reckless disregard for [Williams’s] privacy
rights, as well as the truth of the matter,” id.
On appeal, HNR’s sole argument as to these requirements is to suggest in cursory fashion
that, because it purportedly has “a significant collection of evidence indicating that the identifying
information at issue is not [Williams’s],” and “[Williams] has failed to disprove such evidence, the
balance of hardships and public interest weigh in favor of denying [Williams’s] motion for a
preliminary injunction.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. However, given that we have already determined
that the district court did not commit clear error in crediting Williams’s evidence establishing that
the identifying information at issue belonged to her, HNR has failed to provide any basis to disturb
the district court’s determination that Williams had also satisfied the balance of hardships and
public interest prongs of the preliminary injunction standard.
* * *
13 We have considered HNR’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting Williams’s motion for a preliminary
injunction and REMAND for further proceedings on the merits.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court