UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________ ) MICHELLE WILLIAMS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 09-246 (RWR) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michelle Williams brings claims against the
District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Public Schools
(“DCPS”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., challenging a
hearing officer’s dismissal of Williams’ administrative complaint
alleging that DCPS failed to timely conduct and review a
psychoeducational reevaluation of Williams’ daughter, D.W.
Williams also brings a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, alleging that DCPS
discriminated against D.W. on the basis of her disability by
failing to provide a free, appropriate public education (“FAPE”)
to her. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint as to defendant
DCPS and to dismiss Williams’ Rehabilitation Act claim. Because
Williams does not oppose dismissing the complaint as to DCPS and
she has failed to plead a violation of the Rehabilitation Act,
the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted. - 2 -
BACKGROUND
When Williams filed this complaint, D.W. was a student whom
DCPS deemed eligible for special education. (Compl. ¶ 8.) On
June 10, 2008, a multidisciplinary team determined that D.W.
should be subject to a psychoeducational reevaluation. (Id.
¶ 10.) On September 25, 2008, Williams filed an administrative
due process complaint alleging that DCPS failed to timely conduct
that reevaluation. (Id. ¶ 12.) A hearing officer convened an
administrative hearing and dismissed the complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 13-
14.) Williams filed this suit against the District of Columbia
and DCPS, challenging under the IDEA the hearing officer’s
dismissal of her administrative complaint. Williams also alleges
in Count III of her complaint that the District of Columbia
violated § 504 by creating and adhering to a policy, custom, or
practice of refusing to timely conduct evaluations of special
education students. The defendants move to dismiss the § 504
claim and dismiss DCPS as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
DISCUSSION
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint[.]” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.
2002). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, id., and “the court - 3 -
must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren
v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “[O]nce
a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563;
accord Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525
F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But see Tooley v. Napolitano, 586
F.3d 1006, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (declining to reject or address
the government’s argument that Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009), invalidated Aktieselskabet). A complaint should contain
enough factual heft to show an entitlement to relief. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557. That is, a complaint needs to plead “only
enough facts to [nudge] a claim to relief . . . across the line
from conceivable to plausible[.]” Id. at 570. “Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . .
[is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1950.
I. SECTION 504
To state a claim under § 504, a plaintiff must plead
discrimination “‘solely by reason of his [or her] handicap.’”
Walker v. Dist. of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11, 35 (D.D.C. 2001)
(alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794). Not every - 4 -
violation of IDEA also constitutes a violation of § 504.1
Torrence v. Dist. of Columbia, 669 F. Supp. 2d 68, 71 (D.D.C.
2009). Rather, “‘something more than a mere failure to provide
the [FAPE] required by [IDEA] must be shown’” to demonstrate
discrimination solely on the basis of the student’s disability.
Lunceford v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1580 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (quoting Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.
1982) (interpreting the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, a precursor to IDEA)). A plaintiff may satisfy this
requirement by alleging that any failure to provide a FAPE
resulted from either bad faith or gross misjudgment. Torrence,
669 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (citing Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1171).
Several courts in this district have held that plaintiffs
fail to state § 504 claims upon which relief may be granted when
the factual allegations in their complaints do “not show anything
other than a possible denial of FAPE under the IDEA[.]” Id. at
1 IDEA requires that a reevaluation of a child take place if a local educational agency (“LEA”) determines one is warranted. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A). IDEA and its implementing regulations do not set a time frame within which an LEA must conduct a reevaluation after one is requested by a student’s parent. See Herbin ex rel. Herbin v. Dist. of Columbia, 362 F. Supp. 2d 254, 259 (D.D.C. 2005). In light of the lack of statutory guidance, Herbin concluded that “[r]eevaluations should be conducted in a ‘reasonable period of time,’ or ‘without undue delay,’ as determined in each individual case.” Id. (quoting Office of Special Education Programs Policy Letter in Response to Inquiry from Jerry Saperstone, 21 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 1127, 1129 (1995)). Williams’ complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim that DCPS violated this provision of IDEA. - 5 -
72; see also, e.g., Lucas v. Dist. of Columbia, 683 F. Supp. 2d
16, 19 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s § 504 claim on the
ground that the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint did
“not support an allegation that DCPS acted in bad faith or with
gross misjudgment”); Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia, 683 F. Supp. 2d
20, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) (same). These courts also held that the
conclusory assertion that DCPS had a policy, custom, or practice
of refusing to authorize timely evaluations of special education
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________ ) MICHELLE WILLIAMS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 09-246 (RWR) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michelle Williams brings claims against the
District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Public Schools
(“DCPS”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., challenging a
hearing officer’s dismissal of Williams’ administrative complaint
alleging that DCPS failed to timely conduct and review a
psychoeducational reevaluation of Williams’ daughter, D.W.
Williams also brings a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, alleging that DCPS
discriminated against D.W. on the basis of her disability by
failing to provide a free, appropriate public education (“FAPE”)
to her. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint as to defendant
DCPS and to dismiss Williams’ Rehabilitation Act claim. Because
Williams does not oppose dismissing the complaint as to DCPS and
she has failed to plead a violation of the Rehabilitation Act,
the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted. - 2 -
BACKGROUND
When Williams filed this complaint, D.W. was a student whom
DCPS deemed eligible for special education. (Compl. ¶ 8.) On
June 10, 2008, a multidisciplinary team determined that D.W.
should be subject to a psychoeducational reevaluation. (Id.
¶ 10.) On September 25, 2008, Williams filed an administrative
due process complaint alleging that DCPS failed to timely conduct
that reevaluation. (Id. ¶ 12.) A hearing officer convened an
administrative hearing and dismissed the complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 13-
14.) Williams filed this suit against the District of Columbia
and DCPS, challenging under the IDEA the hearing officer’s
dismissal of her administrative complaint. Williams also alleges
in Count III of her complaint that the District of Columbia
violated § 504 by creating and adhering to a policy, custom, or
practice of refusing to timely conduct evaluations of special
education students. The defendants move to dismiss the § 504
claim and dismiss DCPS as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
DISCUSSION
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint[.]” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.
2002). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, id., and “the court - 3 -
must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren
v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “[O]nce
a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563;
accord Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525
F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But see Tooley v. Napolitano, 586
F.3d 1006, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (declining to reject or address
the government’s argument that Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009), invalidated Aktieselskabet). A complaint should contain
enough factual heft to show an entitlement to relief. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557. That is, a complaint needs to plead “only
enough facts to [nudge] a claim to relief . . . across the line
from conceivable to plausible[.]” Id. at 570. “Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . .
[is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1950.
I. SECTION 504
To state a claim under § 504, a plaintiff must plead
discrimination “‘solely by reason of his [or her] handicap.’”
Walker v. Dist. of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11, 35 (D.D.C. 2001)
(alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794). Not every - 4 -
violation of IDEA also constitutes a violation of § 504.1
Torrence v. Dist. of Columbia, 669 F. Supp. 2d 68, 71 (D.D.C.
2009). Rather, “‘something more than a mere failure to provide
the [FAPE] required by [IDEA] must be shown’” to demonstrate
discrimination solely on the basis of the student’s disability.
Lunceford v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1580 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (quoting Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.
1982) (interpreting the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, a precursor to IDEA)). A plaintiff may satisfy this
requirement by alleging that any failure to provide a FAPE
resulted from either bad faith or gross misjudgment. Torrence,
669 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (citing Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1171).
Several courts in this district have held that plaintiffs
fail to state § 504 claims upon which relief may be granted when
the factual allegations in their complaints do “not show anything
other than a possible denial of FAPE under the IDEA[.]” Id. at
1 IDEA requires that a reevaluation of a child take place if a local educational agency (“LEA”) determines one is warranted. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A). IDEA and its implementing regulations do not set a time frame within which an LEA must conduct a reevaluation after one is requested by a student’s parent. See Herbin ex rel. Herbin v. Dist. of Columbia, 362 F. Supp. 2d 254, 259 (D.D.C. 2005). In light of the lack of statutory guidance, Herbin concluded that “[r]eevaluations should be conducted in a ‘reasonable period of time,’ or ‘without undue delay,’ as determined in each individual case.” Id. (quoting Office of Special Education Programs Policy Letter in Response to Inquiry from Jerry Saperstone, 21 Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 1127, 1129 (1995)). Williams’ complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim that DCPS violated this provision of IDEA. - 5 -
72; see also, e.g., Lucas v. Dist. of Columbia, 683 F. Supp. 2d
16, 19 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s § 504 claim on the
ground that the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint did
“not support an allegation that DCPS acted in bad faith or with
gross misjudgment”); Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia, 683 F. Supp. 2d
20, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) (same). These courts also held that the
conclusory assertion that DCPS had a policy, custom, or practice
of refusing to authorize timely evaluations of special education
students did not satisfy –– in the absence of more specific facts
from which the courts could infer such a policy, custom, or
practice –– the requirement that a plaintiff allege bad faith or
gross misjudgment. See Lucas, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 19; Taylor 683
F. Supp. 2d at 22-23.
Here, too, Williams asserts that “DCPS has created and
adhered to a policy, custom or practice of refusing timely to
conduct, review, or authorize funding of evaluations of special
education students in the District of Columbia[.]” (Compl.
¶ 24.) However, Williams does not allege any facts that support
the existence of such a policy, custom, or practice. Williams
alleges only that DCPS failed to timely conduct and review D.W.’s
evaluations, and not, for example, that DCPS failed to timely
conduct and review the evaluations of other special education
students in the District of Columbia. (See id. ¶ 12.) This
allegation alone does not permit an inference of bad faith or - 6 -
gross misjudgment. See Torrence, 699 F. Supp. at 72. Nor do
Williams’ factual allegations provide any other basis for
concluding that DCPS may have discriminated against D.W. solely
on the basis of her disability. Cf. Douglass v. Dist. of
Columbia, 605 F. Supp. 2d 156, 168 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the
complaint “alleges that the District discriminated against
Plaintiff solely based on his disability because it provided only
regular education students [with] the opportunity to . . . work
towards a regular high school diploma, but did not provide the
same opportunity to special education students” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).
II. DCPS
The defendants argue, citing Hinton v. Metro. Police Dep’t,
726 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1989), that DCPS is an agency of the
District of Columbia government and therefore is non sui juris
and not a proper defendant. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5.) In her opposition to the motion
to dismiss, Williams states that she does not oppose dismissing
the complaint with respect to DCPS. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.
to Dismiss at 1.) Thus, DCPS will be dismissed as a defendant.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Williams has not pled facts that support inferences of bad
faith or gross misjudgment in DCPS’ failure to timely evaluate
D.W., or of discrimination otherwise against D.W. solely because - 7 -
of her disability. In addition, DCPS lacks the capacity to be
sued. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion [4] to dismiss be, and
hereby is, GRANTED. Count III of the plaintiff’s complaint is
dismissed, and DCPS is dismissed as a defendant.
SIGNED this 23rd day of March, 2011.
__________/s/_______________ RICHARD W. ROBERTS United States District Judge