Williams v. Colby

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 18, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-04022·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RASHON WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-4022 (LTS) SRG COLBY, GRIEVANCE ORDER OF DISMISSAL COORDINATOR; OFFICER THOMPSON, ORANGE COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained in the Orange County Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. Because Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his religious freedom, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). By order dated June 3, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead his claims under RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Rashon Williams brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. The Court construes the complaint as

asserting claims that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA. Plaintiff names as Defendants Sergeant E. Colby, who Plaintiff identifies as a Grievance Coordinator at the Orange County Jail; Correction Officer Thompson; and “Orange County Law Enforcement.” (ECF 1, at 3.) Plaintiff states that the events giving rise to his claims occurred in Block B of the Orange County Jail on April 28, 2022. The complaint states, “My 1st Amendment Right to Freedom of Speech, Religion & Grievance were violated by the two said Defendants,” and refers the Court to various attachments to the complaint. (Id. at 4.) The following allegations are taken from the attachments to Plaintiff’s complaint. An April 30, 2022, letter addressed to “Grievance Coordinator,” states that on the evening of April

28, 2022, Plaintiff was “practicing my religion on peace making my prayer as I am a faithful Muslim.”2 (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff heard “a loud voice with complete disrespect, racism & prejudicial antagonizing mimics with mockery toward my Muslim prayer, language & religion.” (Id.) He stopped his prayer and “looked out my cell with dis[g]ust” and discovered that the voice was coming from Officer Thompson. (Id.) Plaintiff called Thompson to his cell, but Thompson “had nothing to say not even as much as an apology.” (Id.) The following morning Plaintiff

2 Plaintiff writes with irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. complained of Thompson’s behavior to Lieutenant Moreno and requested action be taken. Plaintiff also requested to “speak to mental health due to the mental anguish inflicted” on him by Thompson. (Id.) Plaintiff also attaches to the complaint a “Sworn Affidavit of Witnesses” signed by twelve other inmates corroborating Plaintiff’s allegations that Thomson was “mocking” Plaintiff while he was in act of praying. (See id. at 10.)

Plaintiff also attaches a May 9, 2022, “Grievance Coordinator’s Decision” signed by Defendant Sergeant Colby denying Plaintiff’s grievance regarding Thompson’s behavior on the grounds that “there was no evidence found to substantiate [Plaintiff’s] claims.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff includes a handwritten note on the decision stating, “no hearing was conducted nor were witnesses questioned. Clear abuse of power” by Colby. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff attaches a May 9, 2022, letter addressed to “Your Honor” in which he alleges that Colby violated his “1st Amendment right to grievance” because “no proper investigation was conducted” and neither Plaintiff nor any of his witnesses were called to testify. (Id. at 14.)

Plaintiff alleges that because of Defendants’ actions, he has suffered mental anguish including “intense & extreme anxiety & discomfort.” (Id.

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