Williams v. CCA

• Court: District Court, D. Kansas
• Decided: August 5, 2022
• Docket: 5:22-cv-03157
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

CARL WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 22-3157-JWL-JPO

CCA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Carl Williams is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights case while housed at USP Leavenworth, in Leavenworth, Kansas. The Court entered a Notice of Deficiency (Doc. 2) advising Plaintiff that his Complaint was deficient because it was not submitted on a Court-approved form, and because he failed to either pay the filing fee or submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Notice directed Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies by September 2, 2022. The Court will provisionally grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, Plaintiff is still directed to submit either the filing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis by the Court’s September 2, 2022 deadline. Plaintiff has submitted a two-page handwritten pleading that he titles as a “Habeas Corpus Petition.” However, Plaintiff alleges cruel and unusual punishment and the use of excessive force. Claims asserting Eighth Amendment violations are challenges to conditions of confinement. See Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding that “a prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate release or a shortened period of confinement, must do so through an application for habeas corpus” while “a prisoner who challenges the conditions of his confinement must do so through a civil rights

action”) (citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that the defendants are correctional officers employed by CCA. Plaintiff alleges that the officers “acted in a rude, angry, malicious manner on each instance.” (Doc. 1, at 1.) Although Plaintiff alleges that the “attached documentation” will show that the Defendants applied force maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm, no attachments were filed with his Complaint. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the officers that did not use force are liable for their nonfeasance and failure to act. Id. Plaintiff names as defendants: CCA; CO (fnu) Leon; CO (fnu) May; CO (fnu) Strong; CO (fnu) Ramos-Rivera; and CO (fnu) Brown. Plaintiff asks the Court to provide him with the

proper forms and to have his disciplinary record redacted to reflect that he did not break any rules or regulations. Id. at 2. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the

complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). III. DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court recognized in Bivens an implied damages action to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017). Although the Supreme Court has recognized a remedy under Bivens for Eighth Amendment violations, Plaintiff is unable to assert a Bivens claim against the Defendants in this case. Plaintiff names CCA and several CCA employees as Defendants. The Supreme Court has held that a Bivens action does not lie against a private corporation that manages a private prison. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63, 71–73 (2001) (holding that Bivens action does not lie against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons). The Supreme Court has also held that a Bivens remedy is not available to a prisoner seeking damages from the employees of a private prison for violation of the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120–21 (2012) (refusing to imply the existence of a Bivens action where state tort law authorizes alternate action providing deterrence and compensation). In Minneci, the Supreme Court stated:

[W]here . . . a federal prisoner seeks damages from privately employed personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where the conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct is of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law (such as the conduct involving improper medical care at issue here), the prisoner must seek a remedy under state tort law. We cannot imply a Bivens remedy in such a case.

Minneci, 565 U.S. at 131. The Supreme Court reasoned that “a critical difference” between cases where Bivens liability applied and those where it did not was “employment status,” i.e., whether the defendants were “personnel employed by the government [or] personnel employed by a private firm.” Id. at 126. CCA is a private corporation contracting with the United States Marshals Service, a federal law enforcement agency. Defendants are private employees of a private corporation. The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that private actors performing governmental functions should be considered federal agents for the purposes of Bivens liability. Id. at 126–27. The Supreme Court held in Minneci that the “ability of a prisoner to bring state tort law damages action[s] against private individual defendants means that the prisoner does not ‘lack effective remedies.’” Id. at 125 (citing Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72). They reasoned that “in the case of a privately employed defendant, state tort law provides an ‘alternative, existing process’ capable of protecting the constitutional interests at stake.” Id. (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)). They explained that, “[s]tate-law remedies and a potential Bivens remedy need not be perfectly congruent” and even if “state tort law may sometimes prove less generous than would a Bivens action,” this fact is not a “sufficient basis to determine state law inadequate.” Id. at 129 (finding that “federal law as well as state law contains limitations”). The Supreme Court also found “specific authority indicating that state law imposes general tort duties of reasonable care (including medical care) on prison employees in every one

of the eight States where privately managed secure federal facilities are currently located.” Id. at 128. “[I]n general, state tort law remedies provide roughly similar incentives for potential defendants to comply with the Eighth Amendment while also providing roughly similar compensation to victims of violations.” Id. at 130. In fact, Kansas is another state whose tort law reflects the “general principles of tort law” recognized in Minneci and set forth in the (Second) Restatement of Torts §§ 314A(4), 320 (1963–64). See Camp v. Richardson, No. 11- 3128-SAC, 2014 WL 958741, at n.12 (D. Kan. 2014) (citing Estate of Belden v. Brown Cty., 261 P.3d 943 (Kan. App. 2011) (setting forth remedies available in Kansas)). Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has previously stated that “the presence of an alternative

cause of action against individual defendants provides sufficient redress such that a Bivens cause of action need not be implied.” Crosby v. Martin, 502 F. App’x 733, 735 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005)). The Tenth Circuit found that where plaintiff “has an alternative cause of action against the defendants pursuant to Kansas state law, he is precluded from asserting a Bivens action against the defendants in their individual capacities,” and he is “barred by sovereign immunity from asserting a Bivens action against the defendants in their official capacities.” Crosby, 502 F. App’x at 735 (citing Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that an official-capacity claim “contradicts the very nature of a Bivens action. There is no such animal as a Bivens suit against a public official tortfeasor in his or her official capacity.”)). Plaintiff’s remedy against CCA and its employees, if any, is an action in state court for negligence or other misconduct. See Harris v. Corr. Corp. of Am. Leavenworth Det. Ctr., No. 16-3068-SAC-DJW, 2016 WL 6164208, at *3 (D. Kan. 2016) (stating that plaintiff has

remedies for injunctive relief in state court and citing Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1104–05 (individual CCA defendants owed a duty to protect to plaintiff that if breached, would impose negligence liability); Lindsey, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 (Kansas law generally provides an inmate with a remedy against CCA employees for negligence and for actions amounting to violations of federal constitutional rights.); see also Menteer v. Applebee, 2008 WL 2649504, at *8–9 (D. Kan. June 27, 2008) (plaintiff’s state law negligence claim found to be equally effective, alternative cause of action to Bivens claim). In addition, “[i]n Kansas, a prisoner may attack the terms and conditions of his or her confinement as being unconstitutional through a petition filed under K.S.A. 60-1501.” Harris, 2016 WL 6164208, at *3 (citing Jamerson v. Heimgartner, 326 P.3d

1091, at *1 (Kan. App. June 20, 2014) (unpublished)). Because Plaintiff has an alternative cause of action against Defendants pursuant to Kansas state law, he is precluded from asserting a Bivens action in federal court. Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal. Plaintiff asserts that he is bringing this action against Defendants in their official capacities. However, as noted above, an official-capacity claim “contradicts the very nature of a Bivens action. There is no such animal as a Bivens suit against a public official tortfeasor in his or her official capacity.” Crosby, 502 F. App’x at 735 (citing Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1099 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that “a Bivens claim can be brought only against federal officials in their individual capacities” and “cannot be asserted directly against the United States, federal officials in their official capacities . . . or federal agencies”) (citing Farmer, 275 F.3d at 963 (federal officials) and F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1994) (federal agencies)). Plaintiff has also failed to allege any personal involvement by the Defendants and refers to “officers” in general. “Liability under . . . Bivens requires personal involvement. . . . Plaintiffs

must establish that each defendant caused plaintiffs to be subjected to [the challenged constitutional violation].” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1231 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff also mentions his disciplinary record and seeks to have it redacted. Plaintiff has failed to provide any factual allegations regarding his disciplinary proceedings. He does not indicate when the proceedings were held, whether any of the Defendants were involved, or whether or not the proceedings resulted in the loss of good conduct time. To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint references attached documentation, the Court is not in receipt of additional documentation.

Although Plaintiff does not appear to be seeking money damages for this claim, the Supreme Court has made clear that “a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,’ unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). This rule applies not only when the prisoner challenges his conviction but also when he challenges punishments imposed as a result of prison disciplinary infractions. Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648); see also Coleman v. United States Dist. Court of New Mexico, 678 F. App’x 751, 754 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“Though Heck dealt with only § 1983 actions, the doctrine has since been expanded . . . [and] now applies to both state and federal officials, meaning it applies both to § 1983 claims and to Bivens claims.”) (citations omitted). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to have his disciplinary record expunged, such a claim must be brought as a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Buhl v. Hood, 81 F.

App’x 273, 274 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (citing see, e.g., Hamm v. Saffle, 300 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002) (construing § 2254 habeas corpus action challenging prison disciplinary proceeding as action brought under § 2241); Easter v. Saffle, 51 Fed. Appx. 286, 288–89 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that where claims necessarily imply invalidity of punishment imposed by disciplinary proceeding, they cannot be brought under § 1983) (unpublished); Caserta v. Kaiser, No. 00–6108, 2000 WL 1616248, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000) (noting that determination of “issues concerning prison disciplinary proceedings,” are properly brought under § 2241) (unpublished); Blum v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98–1055, 1999 WL 638232, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 1999) (recognizing federal prisoner’s challenge to disciplinary proceeding brought

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241) (unpublished); Reed v. Smith, No. 97–6341, 1999 WL 345492, at **1–2 (10th Cir. June 1, 1999) (challenge to federal prison disciplinary proceeding not cognizable in Bivens action, but rather belongs under habeas corpus) (unpublished); Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493, 1494–95 (10th Cir. 1987) (construing civil rights complaint as also invoking § 2241 jurisdiction where prisoner challenged disciplinary proceedings)). Generally, a federal prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before commencing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Williams v. O’Brien, 792 F.2d 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); see also Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The exhaustion of available administrative remedies is a prerequisite for § 2241 habeas relief, although we recognize that the statute itself does not expressly contain such a requirement.”) (citation omitted)). Plaintiff has not indicated whether or not he has exhausted administrative remedies. IV. Response and/or Amended Complaint Required Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for

the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a complete and proper amended complaint upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein.1 Plaintiff is given time to file a complete and proper amended complaint in which he (1) raises only properly joined claims and defendants; (2) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for a federal constitutional violation and show a cause of action in federal court; and (3) alleges sufficient facts to show personal participation by each named defendant. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the prescribed time that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein, this matter will be decided based upon the current deficient Complaint and may be dismissed without further notice for failure to state a claim. The Court

will direct the Clerk to provide Plaintiff with a form for filing an amended complaint pursuant to Bivens, and a form for filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff is provisionally granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

1 To add claims, significant factual allegations, or change defendants, a plaintiff must submit a complete amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. An amended complaint is not simply an addendum to the original complaint, and instead completely supersedes it. Therefore, any claims or allegations not included in the amended complaint are no longer before the court. It follows that a plaintiff may not simply refer to an earlier pleading, and the amended complaint must contain all allegations and claims that a plaintiff intends to pursue in the action, including those to be retained from the original complaint. Plaintiff must write the number of this case (22-3157-JWL-JPO) at the top of the first page of his amended complaint and he must name every defendant in the caption of the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff should also refer to each defendant again in the body of the amended complaint, where he must allege facts describing the unconstitutional acts taken by each defendant including dates, locations, and circumstances. Plaintiff must allege sufficient additional facts to show a federal constitutional violation. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until September 2, 2022, in which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable John W. Lungstrum, United States District Judge, why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is also granted until September 2, 2022, in which to file a complete and proper amended complaint to cure all the deficiencies discussed

herein. The Clerk is directed to send § 1331 and § 2241 forms and instructions to Plaintiff. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated August 5, 2022, in Kansas City, Kansas. S/ John W. Lungstrum JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE