IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA23-826
Filed 16 April 2025
Durham County, No. 22 CVD 500264
ADRIAN YOLANDA WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,
v.
JESSICA GRACE CABRERA, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 5 December 2022 by Judge Doretta L.
Walker in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 April
2024.
Bull City Legal Services, by Lynne M. Kay, for Defendant-Appellant.
No brief filed on behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee.
CARPENTER, Judge.
Jessica Grace Cabrera (“Defendant”) appeals from the trial court’s 5 December
2022 domestic violence protective order (the “Order”) entered in favor of Adrian
Yolanda Williams (“Plaintiff”). On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by
entering the Order and granting Plaintiff certain additional relief. After careful
review, we affirm the Order as modified.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
Plaintiff and Defendant met in California in 2016 and began a relationship. In
August 2017, Defendant adopted an emotional support animal (“ESA”); a dog named WILLIAMS V. CABRERA
Opinion of the Court
Chaco. In August 2020, Plaintiff adopted an ESA; a dog named Melo. On 25 October
2020, Plaintiff and Defendant married in California. Then, in 2021, Plaintiff and
Defendant moved to North Carolina with Chaco and Melo.
From August 2022 until 14 September 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant attended
therapy to “work[] on their relationship.” But, on 15 September 2022, Defendant
informed Plaintiff that she was unhappy and wanted to end their marriage. At this
time, the parties began discussing how they would resolve custody of Chaco and Melo.
Plaintiff suggested a “coparenting” arrangement in which the parties would share
custody of Chaco and Melo according to an agreed-upon visitation schedule.
On 21 September 2022, while at home, Plaintiff brought up “coparenting”
again and asked if he could take Chaco and Melo to California for three days on a
trip. Defendant said no. Plaintiff asked Defendant to “not make th[e] situation any
worse than it had to be,” but Defendant did not change her mind. Plaintiff then exited
the home and called a friend, Lakyia Jones. Jones suggested that Plaintiff attempt
to locate the ESA paperwork for Melo.
Back inside the home, Plaintiff could not find the ESA paperwork, so he
confronted Defendant. Plaintiff discovered Defendant in the bathroom with the door
locked. Plaintiff knocked and asked Defendant if she would open the door, but
Defendant refused. Then Plaintiff stepped outside, called the Durham Police
Department’s non-emergency line for assistance in “resolv[ing] the situation in a
peaceful manner,” and waited for police to arrive.
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A few hours later, Defendant exited the home with Chaco and Melo. At that
point, Plaintiff was outside on the phone with Jones. Plaintiff informed Defendant
that the police were on their way to discuss the ESA paperwork. Defendant said, “So
what?” and proceeded to get in her car with Chaco and Melo. As Plaintiff stood in the
driveway behind Defendant’s car, Defendant reversed and struck Plaintiff’s body.
Plaintiff banged on the back of the car, yelling at Defendant. Plaintiff fell to the
ground, temporarily lost possession of his phone, and incurred a minor laceration to
his right index finger. Meanwhile, Defendant drove away with Chaco and Melo.
Plaintiff remained on the phone with Jones for the duration of the incident.
When police arrived, Plaintiff did not tell the officer about the incident with
Defendant and the car. The responding officer accompanied Plaintiff while he packed
up and removed some of his personal belongings from the home. The following day,
Plaintiff removed the remainder of his belongings. Approximately a week later,
Defendant moved into a new residence.
On 10 October 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint and motion for a domestic
violence protective order (“DVPO”). That same day the trial court issued an ex parte
DVPO. On 5 December 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine
whether to issue a one-year DVPO. After the hearing, the trial court entered the
Order. In the Order, the trial court concluded that Defendant committed acts of
domestic violence on 21 September 2022 by: (1) attempting to cause and intentionally
causing bodily injury to Plaintiff; and (2) placing Plaintiff in fear of imminent serious
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bodily injury. The trial court also concluded there was a danger of serious and
immediate injury to Plaintiff.
To support its conclusions, the trial court found that “Defendant bumped into
[P]laintiff with her car and took off with his ESA causing him to fear for his emotional
health. Additionally, [Plaintiff] had injury to his finger.” The trial court, in this
section of the Order, incorporated Plaintiff’s complaint as further findings of fact
stating “[s]ee complaint incorporated herein.”
The Order required that Defendant refrain from cruelly treating or abusing an
animal owned, possessed, kept or held as a pet by either party and posting or
commenting about Plaintiff on social media. Additionally, the trial court granted
custody of Melo to Plaintiff. On 21 December 2022, Defendant filed written notice of
appeal.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2) (2023).
III. Issues
The issues are whether the trial court erred by entering the Order and granting
Plaintiff certain discretionary relief.
IV. Analysis
A. DVPO
First, Defendant argues it was improper for the trial court to incorporate
Plaintiff’s complaint as additional findings of fact because the evidence did not
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support every allegation in Plaintiff’s complaint. Additionally, Defendant asserts the
trial court erred by entering the Order because its conclusions were not supported by
its findings or competent evidence. While we agree with Defendant that the trial
court’s incorporation of Plaintiff’s complaint was improper, we nonetheless conclude
the error was not prejudicial under the facts of this case. The trial court’s additional
findings contained on the face of the Order are supported by competent evidence and
are sufficient to support the conclusion that an act of domestic violence occurred.
1. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial court’s order issuing a DVPO to determine “whether
there was competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether
its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.” Kennedy v. Morgan, 221
N.C. App. 219, 220–21, 726 S.E.2d 193, 195 (2012) (quoting Hensey v. Hennessy, 201
N.C. App. 56, 59, 685 S.E.2d 541, 544 (2009)). Findings of fact supported by
competent evidence are binding on appeal. Hensey, 201 N.C. App. at 59, 685 S.E.2d
at 544.
2. Incorporation of Complaint
As an initial matter, we address the trial court’s incorporation of Plaintiff’s
complaint as further findings of fact. As a general rule, “[i]n all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury . . . the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (2023). Under Rule 52, the trial court’s findings of
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fact must contain the “ ‘specific ultimate facts sufficient for an appellate court to
determine that the judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.’ ”
Shomette v. Needham, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2025) (quoting Williamson
v. Williamson, 140 N.C. App. 362, 363–64, 536 S.E.2d 337, 338 (2000)). Although
“verbatim recitations of the testimony” do not qualify as findings of fact “because they
do not reflect a conscious choice between the conflicting versions of the incident in
question,” Shomette, ___ N.C. App. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (quoting In re Green, 67
N.C. App. 501, 505 n.1, 313 S.E.2d 193, 195, n.1, (1984)), a trial court may recite
testimony in its findings so long as it “ ‘ultimately makes its own findings, resolving
material disputes,’ ” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 408, 831 S.E.2d 54, 59 (2018) (quoting
In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 446, 615 S.E.2d 704, 708 (2006)).
For an ex parte DVPO, however, this Court has relaxed the application of Rule
52 by permitting the trial court to incorporate pleadings in lieu of making its own
“findings and conclusions that fully satisfy the requirements of [Rule 52].” Hensey,
201 N.C. App. at 63, 685 S.E.2d at 547 (explaining that ex parte DVPOs are meant to
be “entered on relatively short notice in order to address a situation in which quick
action is needed in order to avert a threat of imminent harm”).
The issuance of a one-year DVPO does not implicate the same level of
expediency as an ex parte DVPO, meaning the trial court is required, as in any other
civil bench trial on the merits, to comply with Rule 52. See Hensey, 201 N.C. App. at
62, 685 S.E.2d at 546 (noting the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in “all actions and
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proceedings of a civil nature” including an action brought under Chapter 50B). The
trial court must “find the ultimate facts essential to support the conclusions of law”
by utilizing “processes of logical reasoning, based on the evidentiary facts.” In re
Harton, 156 N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003) (quoting In re Anderson,
151 N.C. App. 94, 95, 564 S.E.2d 599, 601 (2012) (internal quotations omitted)). It is
well settled that reciting testimony as findings of fact fails to demonstrate processes
of logical reasoning required by Rule 52. See Williamson, 140 N.C. App. at 363–64,
536 S.E.2d at 338. It follows that the trial court’s mere recitation or wholesale
incorporation of allegations from a pleading is similarly inadequate under Rule 52.
See id. at 363–64, 536 S.E.2d at 338. Indeed, allegations in a complaint have been
subject to less scrutiny and are less reliable than testimonial evidence.
Put simply, the trial court fails to resolve the material disputes in the evidence
where it wholly incorporates a plaintiff’s complaint without demonstrating “processes
of logical reasoning” required by Rule 52. See In re Harton, 156 N.C. App. at 660, 577
S.E.2d at 337. Moreover, by employing this disfavored method of fact finding, the
trial court runs the risk of improperly delegating its fact-finding duty. See In re J.S.,
165 N.C. App. 509, 511, 598 S.E.2d 658, 660 (2004), superseded on other grounds by
statute, 2013 N.C. Sess. Law 129, § 25 (N.C. 2013); Jay v. Jay, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___
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S.E.2d ___ (2025) (Carpenter, J., dissenting).1 Ultimately, without adequate findings,
this Court cannot properly assess whether issuance of a DVPO is supported by
competent evidence. See Williamson, 140 N.C. App. at 363–64, 536 S.E.2d at 338.
In the instant case, to support its conclusion that Defendant committed acts of
domestic violence, the trial court found that: “Defendant bumped into [P]laintiff with
her car and took off with his ESA causing him to fear for his emotional health.
Additionally, [Plaintiff] had injury to his finger.” The trial court also purported to
incorporate Plaintiff’s complaint as further findings of fact. The trial court did not
demonstrate processes of logical reasoning, such as annotating, striking through, or
otherwise expounding upon Plaintiff’s complaint before incorporating it as further
findings. This falls short of the requirements of Rule 52. See Williamson, 140 N.C.
App. at 364, 536 S.E.2d at 339; In re Harton, 156 N.C. App. at 660, 577 S.E.2d at 337.
Accordingly, it was improper for the trial court to incorporate Plaintiff’s complaint as
further findings of fact.
3. Grounds for DVPO
Notwithstanding this error, we analyze the trial court’s remaining findings of
fact appearing on the face of the Order. Although sparse, they are sufficiently
1 In a recent case, a majority panel of this Court upheld a one-year DVPO which incorporated
the plaintiff’s complaint as further findings of fact. Jay, ___ N.C. App. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. The Court distinguished Hensey but did not explicitly take a position on the incorporation issue, deferring to the trial court’s credibility determination in concluding that the evidence supported the findings. Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (citing Hensey v. Hennessy, 201 N.C. App. 56, 685 S.E.2d 541 (2009)).
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detailed to identify the basis for an act of domestic violence.
“To support entry of a DVPO, the trial court must make a conclusion of law
‘that an act of domestic violence occurred.’” Kennedy v. Morgan, 221 N.C. App. 219,
223, 726 S.E.2d 193, 196 (2012) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B–3(a) (2011)). “The
conclusion of law must be based upon the findings of fact.” Id. at 223, 726 S.E.2d at
196. “While the trial court need not set forth the evidence in detail it does need to
make findings of ultimate fact which are supported by the evidence; the findings must
identify the basis for the ‘act of domestic violence.’” Id. at 224, 726 S.E.2d at 196
(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B–3(a) (2011)). The trial court is required to grant a
DVPO if it concludes that at least one act of domestic violence has occurred. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50B–3(a) (2023). In other words, because a single act of domestic violence
is sufficient, the trial court’s issuance of a DVPO will be upheld if the findings support
at least one act of domestic violence. See Keenan v. Keenan, 285 N.C. App. 133, 136,
877 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2022).
Here, the trial court concluded Defendant committed acts of domestic violence,
including: (1) attempting to cause and intentionally causing bodily injury to the
Plaintiff; and (2) placing Plaintiff in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. To
support its conclusions, the trial court found that: “Defendant bumped into [P]laintiff
with her car and took off with his ESA causing him to fear for his emotional health.
Additionally, [Plaintiff] had injury to his finger.”
During the hearing, Plaintiff testified that Defendant “reversed her vehicle
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into my physical body.” Plaintiff also testified to “banging on the back window [of
Defendant’s car] screaming her name and asking her to stop.” After being hit by the
car, Plaintiff incurred an injury to his index finger. Plaintiff’s testimony supports the
trial court’s finding that “Defendant bumped into Plaintiff with her car” and that
Plaintiff “had injury to his finger.” These findings, in turn, support the trial court’s
conclusion that Defendant committed an act of domestic violence by causing bodily
injury to Plaintiff. Thus, notwithstanding the trial court’s improper incorporation of
Plaintiff’s complaint into the Order, the trial court did not prejudicially err by
granting the DVPO because its remaining findings support the conclusion that an act
of domestic violence occurred. See Kennedy, 221 N.C. App. at 223, 726 S.E.2d at 196.
We hold the trial court must find facts in accordance with the requirements of
Rule 52, demonstrating processes of logical reasoning in its resolution of material
conflicts in the evidence, when granting or denying a plaintiff’s request for a one-year
DVPO. Where a trial court incorporates a pleading in its findings of fact, our
reasoning applies with equal force regardless of whether the pleading was verified or
unverified.
B. Discretionary Relief
Next, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by granting Plaintiff certain
additional relief. Specifically, Defendant argues the trial court lacked authority to:
(1) grant Plaintiff custody of Melo; (2) order that Defendant refrain from cruelly
treating or abusing an animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a pet by either party
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residing in the household; (3) order that Defendant refrain from posts or comments
about Plaintiff on social media; and (4) grant Plaintiff the care, custody, and control
of an animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a pet by either party residing in the
household. Defendant relies on her primary argument here, arguing that because
entry of the DVPO was improper, Plaintiff was not entitled to additional relief. We
disagree.
Our review of the relevant caselaw does not reveal a clear standard of review
for evaluating Defendant’s specific challenge. Section 50B–3(a) provides a non-
exhaustive list of “types of relief” that the trial court “may” include in a DVPO after
concluding that an act of domestic violence has occurred. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B–3(a).
When this Court examines an appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s grant of
discretionary relief in a civil no contact order—a distinct but related concept—we
review for abuse of discretion. See Angarita v. Edwards, 278 N.C. App. 621, 633, 863
S.E.2d 796, 805 (2021) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering
the defendant to obtain a mental-health evaluation in a no-contact order). It logically
flows that any additional permissive relief the trial court grants in a DVPO involves
an exercise of discretion. Accordingly, we conclude abuse of discretion is the
appropriate standard of review.
A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is either manifestly unsupported
by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.
White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (citing Clark v. Clark,
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301 N.C. 123, 271 S.E.2d 58 (1980)). When issuing a DVPO, the trial court does not
have “ ‘unfettered discretion to order a broad range of remedies’ ” simply because the
trial court believes the relief is “ ‘necessary for the protection of any party or child.’ ”
Russell v. Wofford, 260 N.C. App. 88, 94, 816 S.E.2d 909, 913 (quoting State v. Elder,
368 N.C. 70, 73, 773 S.E.2d 51, 52 (2015)). Stated differently, although the trial court
has broad discretion under section 50B–3(a) to impose additional relief, it cannot
exercise “unfettered discretion” in doing so. See id. at 94, 816 S.E.2d at 913.
Here, after concluding Defendant committed acts of domestic violence, the trial
court ordered that Defendant refrain from cruelly treating or abusing an animal held
as a pet by either party and posting or commenting about Plaintiff on social media.
The trial court also awarded Plaintiff custody of Melo.
Section 50B–3 expressly provides that the trial court may direct a party to
refrain from cruelly treating or abusing an animal possessed by the parties. See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50B–3(a)(9)(b1). Section 50B–3(a) further states that the trial court may
provide for possession of personal property, including custody and control of an
animal. Id. at § 50B–3(a)(8). This relief is authorized and warranted in this case.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff custody
of Melo or by ordering that Defendant refrain from cruelly treating or abusing any
animal possessed by the parties.
Section 50B–3 does not explicitly provide that the trial court may require a
party to refrain from posting about another party on social media, but the list of
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possible relief is non-exhaustive. In other words, it is possible for the trial court to
require a party to refrain from posting threatening language about another party on
social media if the facts justify such relief. That being said, the directive in the
instant case is overbroad and not reasonably tailored to the facts at hand. Because
the trial court’s social media directive was arbitrary, we strike that portion of the
Order.
V. Conclusion
In sum, the trial court did not prejudicially err by entering the Order and did
not abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff custody of Melo or ordering that
Defendant refrain from engaging in animal cruelty. The trial court’s directive that
Defendant refrain from posting about Plaintiff on social media is stricken from the
Order. Accordingly, we affirm the Order as modified.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
Judges WOOD and GORE concur.
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