Williams v. Belo

41 S.W.2d 22
CourtTexas Commission of Appeals
DecidedJuly 22, 1931
DocketNo. 1290-5766
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 41 S.W.2d 22 (Williams v. Belo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Commission of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Belo, 41 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Super. Ct. 1931).

Opinion

RYAN, J.

This suit invplves the rights of plaintiffs in error to a real estate broker’s commission because of a iease dated November 24, 1925, made by Mrs. Belo to Will R. Sparkman, of cfertain property in the city of Dallas, for a term of fifty years, the total consideration therefor being $390,000, payable in certain instalments as specified in the lease contract.

In answer to special issues Submitted to them, a jury in the trial court found: That Williams- & Stephens, or -either of them, were the procuring cause of said lease contract; that Mrs.' Belo, prior to July 23, 1924, em? ployed them, or either of them, to lease the property in question and agreed to pay a commission in the event they so leased it; that Sparkman, lessee, first endeavored to lease such property from Williams'& Stephens; that'Mrs. Belo understood prior to July 23, 1924, and during the negotiations with Spark-man, prior to that date, that Williams & Stephens expected to receive compensation from her if they should bring about a lease contract on said property, and she intended or expected to pay them for their services in that event; that Cloyd: H-. Read (Mrs'. Belo’s attorney and adviser) also prior to .July 23, 1924,' understood that plaintiffs (Williams & Stephens) expected to be paid a commission if they procured a lease on said property, and [23]*23lie (Bead) expected and understood that Mrs. Belo would pay such commission.

The jury found further that Mrs. Belo, through Cloyd H. Bead, did not, on or about July 23, 1924, terminate all negotiations with Williams & Stephens, looking to a lease of the property in question, to Sparkman; that they continued such negotiations with Sparkman, after July 23, 1924, and this was known to Mrs. Belo, who authorized plaintiffs to continue such negotiations, after J'uly 23, 1924, and ratified and confirmed such negotiations after that date.

The jury found also that plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable commission for the services they rendered in the leasing of said property to Sparkman, and that $5,000 is such a reasonable commission.

Judgment was accordingly rendered in favor of the plaintiffs^ Williams & Stephens, and against Mrs. Belo for the sum of $5,000 with interest from date of judgment and all costs of suit.

The Court of Civil Appeals held that under the undisputed material facts the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor of Mrs. Belo, reversed the judgment below, and rendered judgment in her favor. 25 S.W.(2d) 700.

The Court of Civil Appeals had authority to reverse the judgment of the trial court on the preponderance of the evidence, but it could not render the judgment, if, discarding all adverse evidence and giving credit to all evidence favorable to the plaintiffs, and indulging every legitimate conclusion favorable to the plaintiffs which might have been drawn from the facts proved, a jury might have found in favor of the plaintiffs. Wininger v. Railway, 105 Tex. 56, 143 S. W. 1150.

The effect of the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals is that there was no evidence of probative value supporting the jury’s findings, and it therefore becomes a question of law, to consider which we must review the evidence as adduced on the trial. Marshburn v. Stewart, 113 Tex. 518, 254 S. W. 942, 260 S. W. 565; Beck v. Texas Co., 105 Tex. 303, 148 S. W. 295; Tweed v. Telegraph Co., 107 Tex, 247, 166 S. W. 696, 177 S. W. 957.

Williams, plaintiff in error, testified that he had been in the real estate business in Dallas since 1S95; that he met Mrs. Belo by appointment at his solicitation, in the early fall of 1922, having learned that she desired to sell the property in question; that he informed her that he was sure he could sell said property to the Loudermilk-Sparkman people, undertakers; that she then refused to sell to an undertaking establishment under any circumstances.

He testified further that again in the fall of 1923 or spring of 1924 Mrs. Belo advised him that she had changed her mind and would notv consent to sell the property to the Loudermilk-Sparkman Company, if they still wanted it, and she told him to go ahead and try to sell to them; that he then took the matter up with Mr. Sparkman, of the Louder-milk-Sparkman Company, who finally made him a lease proposition which he wired to Mrs. Belo, who was then in New York City; that he furnished Mr. Sparkman with estimates upon the value of the property between the 1st and 15th of November, 1925.

In May, 1924, Williams wired Mrs. Belo and Mr. Morrison, her son-in-law, in Ne,w York, as follows: “The deal with Womens Club here is off; I can get straight 99 year lease payable in advance yearly at $650 per month from Loudermilk-Sparkman Co. Must have answer as soon as possible.” On May 26, 1923, Mrs. Belo wired Mr. Cloyd H. Bead, her attorney at Dallas, Tex., as follows: “A wire from Williams reads I can get 99 year lease payable in advance yearly at $650 per month from Loudermilk-Sparkman and Co. Are you sure I can make a 99 year lease on entailed property and what would I have to pay in Federal Tax on such a lease. I will do nothing without your advice. If you think favorably I will. You see Williams and make it clear to him you are my attorney and advisor in all things and then wire me your advice. Also whether I could have until Nov. 1 to vacate.”

The plaintiff in error testified further: “After I sent the telegram to Mrs. Belo advising her that I could get a ninety-nine year lease on her property from Loudermilk-Spark-man Company, Mr. Bead ’phoned me to come up to his office in a few days — I would say, probably a week after that. I went up there and he told me he had received a letter from Mrs. Belo regarding the leasing of the property to Mr. Sparkman, 'and talked over the proposition with him, and he said, you better get Mr. Sparkman up there and go on through the proposition and see what there was to it. Then I made an appointment with Mr,. Spark-man and Mr. Bead and got Mr. Sparkman up there, together, going into this lease proposition with Mr. Bead. I was present in that conference; I was up there fifteen or twenty minutes. Mr. Sparkman and I did not leave together; I left Mr. Sparkman there talking with Mr. Bead on the proposition. I had an appointment and had to leave. I left Mr. Bead and Mr. Sparkman going over the proposition. As to whether I took Sparkman, to Mr. Bead’s office, I made an appointment with him and met him there.

“The next morning I went back up to Mr. Bead’s office and talked to him, and he told me he and Mr. Sparkman had made up a lease he felt would be satisfactory to Mrs. Belo. As to what I mean by ‘made up,’ I judge from that remark that they came to some agreement on the lease proposition. -

[24]*24“Mr. Read told me then that they had come to an agreement which he thought would he satisfactory to Mrs: Belo, and that she wanted to know what my commission would be in the deal and in regard to the lease and so forth, and he dictated a telegram for me to send to Mrs. Belo. I remember I said to her in that telegram what the lease was and that my commission would be five thousand dollars.

“I did have a discussion with Mr. Read at the time as to what my commission would be or what it should be; Mr. Read stated that the commission was a good, big commission, and he didn’t know how Mrs. Belo was going to take it because Mr. Sparkman wasn’t paying very much money, cash, in the trade.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
41 S.W.2d 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-belo-texcommnapp-1931.