Belo v. Williams Stephens

25 S.W.2d 700
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 8, 1930
DocketNo. 10468.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 25 S.W.2d 700 (Belo v. Williams Stephens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Belo v. Williams Stephens, 25 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

VAUGHAN, J,

This is an a-ppeal from a judgment rendered on the 3d day of May, A. D., 1928, in favor of appellees, Walter L. Williams and Arthur P. Stephens, partners composing the firm of'Williams & Stephens, against appellant, Mrs. Helen P. Belo, for the sum of $5,-000, with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent, per annum from date of judgment. The following abridged statement of appel-lees’ pleadings is sufficient to present the grounds of their cause of action against appellant.

Appellees, real estate agents, transacting business under the firm name of Williams & Stephens, in the city of Dallas, sued appellant upon an alleged implied contract to pay a commission for appellees having procured One Will R. Sparkman as lessee of property owned by appellant, in the city of Dallas, alleging that they interested said Sparkman in said property and so notified appellant, and as a result thereof negotiations were entered into between said parties,'which terminated in appellant leasing to said Sparkman the property described in appellees’ pleadings under a lease contract dated November 24,1925, for a term of 50 years at a rental of ⅜650 per month; that the commission appellees claimed was impliedly agreed to be paid by appellant to appellees by reason of appellant having inquired of appellees what such commission would be, and, after being informed of the amount and time of payment thereof, appellant entered into the negotiations which resulted in said lease being executed without objection to the amount of commission to be paid or terms thereof; and in the alternative appellees alleged that the commission sued for was the reasonable value of the services rendered and the usual and customary amount paid for such services in the city of Dallas at that time. Appellant’s defense was presented by general denial, and special denials, viz.: That appellees, nor either of them, were the efficient and procuring cause of the lease contract alleged to have been made; that while she never employed appellees, or either of them, to secure a tenant or to make a lease of the property described in appellees’ petition, she did enter negotiations with' ap-pellee Williams concerning an offer to lease said property, made by Loudermilk-Sparkman Company; that such negotiations were made long prior to the making of said 50-year lease, terminating without satisfactory results having been accomplished for appellant, and that said 50-year lease was long thereafter made through new and independent negotiations; and by special pleas, in effect that in response to the telegrams pleaded by appellees, appellant came to Dallas in June, *701 1924, and endeavored to consummate a lease and was willing to pay a commission if the lease could have been made; that the proposed lessee was unable to pay the rent as offered and the deal failed; that soon after said failure to lease notice was given that all negotiations were terminated,, that if any efforts were put forth thereafter by appellees to lease said property same were without the knowledge or consent of appellant.

The cause was submitted to a jury on fourteen special issues, and by the answers made thereto the following findings were made: That appellees, Williams & Stephens, were the procuring cause of said lease contract being made between appellant and W. R. Spark-man ; that prior; to July 23, 1924, appellant employed appellees and agreed to pay a commission in the event they leased said property ; that W. R. Sparkman first endeavored to lease from appellees the property involved; that appellant understood, prior to July 23, 1924, and during the negotiations with said Sparkman, prior to that date, that appellees expected to receive compensation from appellant in the event they should bring about the execution of a contract leasing the property in question; that appellant, prior to July 23, 1924, and during the negotiations with said Sparkman to lease him the property involved, and prior to said date, intended or expected to pay appellees for their services in the event they should bring about the execution of a contract leasing the property in question; that Oloyd H. Read, one of appellant’s attorneys, during said period of time, understood that appellees expected to be paid a commission if they procured the execution of a lease contract, and that appellees would be paid a commission by appellant; that appellant, through Oloyd H. Read, on or about July 23, 1924, did not terminate all negotiations with appellees for the leasing of the property in question to said Sparkman; that after July 23, 1924, appellees continued negotiations with Sparkman for the purpose of leasing to him the property in question; that appellant knew of some of the negotiations that took place after July 23, 1924; that appellant authorized them to continue the negotiations for the purpose of leasing the property to said Sparkman; that appellant accepted, ratified, and confirmed such negotiations with W. R. Sparkman by appellees after July 23, 1924; that appellees are entitled to a reasonable commission for services rendered in the leasing of the property in question; that $5,000 is a reasonable compensation due appellees by appellant for the services rendered.

Under the view we take of this cause, it is only necessary to consider appellant’s assignment of error, No. 1, namely: “The court erred in refusing to give the jury the peremptory charge in favor of defendant;” therefore, we shall not consider the effect of the findings of the jury in response to the special issues submitted, leaving that to be accomplished in the discussion of the issues between the parties, as same must be settled 'by a proper application of the rules of law to the following undisputed facts by which the rights of the parties alone can be ascertained and determined. Appellee Williams first met appellant in the early fall of 1922, at the old Belo home on Ross avenue and Pearl street, in the city of Dallas. At this time said ap-pellee attempted to obtain from appellant a listing with appellees of .the property involved, to sell to the Loudermilk-Sparkman Company, engaged in the undertaking business. His efforts were unsuccessful, appellant declining to sell the property to an undertaking establishment under any consideration. In the spring of 1924, said appellee had another conversation with appellant in reference to the sale of said property to Louder-milk-Sparkman Company, in which she informed said appellee that she had changed her mind and would now consent to sell the property to the Loudermilk-Sparkman Company if they still wanted it. Appellee’s efforts to make sale of said property to Louder-milk-Sparkman Company were futile. Mr. Sparkman stated to said appellee that he would have to call the sale off because his attorney, Mr. Milam, and his stockholders, people in the company with him, would not •allow him to buy anything else as long as he had the Maroney property on hand, being property located at the corner of McKinney avenue and Harwood street, which the Loud-ermilk-Sparkman Company had purchased through appellees for $68,000; that, in his second conversation with appellant, appellee Williams stated he was “afraid there would not be much chance to sell the house to them” because they had purchased the Maroney property at the corner of McKinney avenue and Harwood street. The second conversation between appellee Williams and appellant was some time after appellees had sold to Loudermik-Sparkman Company the Maroney property. Said appellee had only the two personal conversations with appellant. In another conversation between .

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Related

Williams v. Belo
41 S.W.2d 22 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1931)

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Bluebook (online)
25 S.W.2d 700, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/belo-v-williams-stephens-texapp-1930.