Belo v. Williams Stephens

25 S.W.2d 700
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided February 8, 1930·No. No. 10468.·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

VAUGHAN, J,

This is an a-ppeal from a judgment rendered on the 3d day of May, A. D., 1928, in favor of appellees, Walter L. Williams and Arthur P. Stephens, partners composing the firm of'Williams & Stephens, against appellant, Mrs. Helen P. Belo, for the sum of $5,-000, with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent, per annum from date of judgment. The following abridged statement of appel-lees’ pleadings is sufficient to present the grounds of their cause of action against appellant.

Appellees, real estate agents, transacting business under the firm name of Williams & Stephens, in the city of Dallas, sued appellant upon an alleged implied contract to pay a commission for appellees having procured One Will R. Sparkman as lessee of property owned by appellant, in the city of Dallas, alleging that they interested said Sparkman in said property and so notified appellant, and as a result thereof negotiations were entered into between said parties,'which terminated in appellant leasing to said Sparkman the property described in appellees’ pleadings under a lease contract dated November 24,1925, for a term of 50 years at a rental of ⅜650 per month; that the commission appellees claimed was impliedly agreed to be paid by appellant to appellees by reason of appellant having inquired of appellees what such commission would be, and, after being informed of the amount and time of payment thereof, appellant entered into the negotiations which resulted in said lease being executed without objection to the amount of commission to be paid or terms thereof; and in the alternative appellees alleged that the commission sued for was the reasonable value of the services rendered and the usual and customary amount paid for such services in the city of Dallas at that time. Appellant’s defense was presented by general denial, and special denials, viz.: That appellees, nor either of them, were the efficient and procuring cause of the lease contract alleged to have been made; that while she never employed appellees, or either of them, to secure a tenant or to make a lease of the property described in appellees’ petition, she did enter negotiations with' ap-pellee Williams concerning an offer to lease said property, made by Loudermilk-Sparkman Company; that such negotiations were made long prior to the making of said 50-year lease, terminating without satisfactory results having been accomplished for appellant, and that said 50-year lease was long thereafter made through new and independent negotiations; and by special pleas, in effect that in response to the telegrams pleaded by appellees, appellant came to Dallas in June, *701 1924, and endeavored to consummate a lease and was willing to pay a commission if the lease could have been made; that the proposed lessee was unable to pay the rent as offered and the deal failed; that soon after said failure to lease notice was given that all negotiations were terminated,, that if any efforts were put forth thereafter by appellees to lease said property same were without the knowledge or consent of appellant.

The cause was submitted to a jury on fourteen special issues, and by the answers made thereto the following findings were made: That appellees, Williams & Stephens, were the procuring cause of said lease contract being made between appellant and W. R. Spark-man ; that prior; to July 23, 1924, appellant employed appellees and agreed to pay a commission in the event they leased said property ; that W. R. Sparkman first endeavored to lease from appellees the property involved; that appellant understood, prior to July 23, 1924, and during the negotiations with said Sparkman, prior to that date, that appellees expected to receive compensation from appellant in the event they should bring about the execution of a contract leasing the property in question; that appellant, prior to July 23, 1924, and during the negotiations with said Sparkman to lease him the property involved, and prior to said date, intended or expected to pay appellees for their services in the event they should bring about the execution of a contract leasing the property in question; that Oloyd H. Read, one of appellant’s attorneys, during said period of time, understood that appellees expected to be paid a commission if they procured the execution of a lease contract, and that appellees would be paid a commission by appellant; that appellant, through Oloyd H. Read, on or about July 23, 1924, did not terminate all negotiations with appellees for the leasing of the property in question to said Sparkman; that after July 23, 1924, appellees continued negotiations with Sparkman for the purpose of leasing to him the property in question; that appellant knew of some of the negotiations that took place after July 23, 1924; that appellant authorized them to continue the negotiations for the purpose of leasing the property to said Sparkman; that appellant accepted, ratified, and confirmed such negotiations with W. R. Sparkman by appellees after July 23, 1924; that appellees are entitled to a reasonable commission for services rendered in the leasing of the property in question; that $5,000 is a reasonable compensation due appellees by appellant for the services rendered.

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Belo v. Williams Stephens, 25 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Ct. App. 1930).

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Related

Williams v. Belo
41 S.W.2d 22 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1931)