Williams v. Baca

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: September 29, 2022
• Docket: 3:19-cv-00575
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 MATTHEW WILLIAMS, Case No. 3:19-cv-00575-MMD-CLB

7 Petitioner, ORDER v. 8 ISIDRO BACA, et al., 9 Respondents. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Respondents have answered Petitioner Matthew Williams’ pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 13 petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his state criminal conviction by jury. (ECF 14 No. 45.)1 As discussed below, the Court denies the petition. (ECF Nos. 10, 12.) 15 II. BACKGROUND 16 In May 2016, a jury convicted Williams of eluding a police officer. (ECF No. 23-8.)2 17 Affirming Williams’ conviction, the Nevada Court of Appeals summarized the evidence 18 presented at trial: 19 The jury heard testimony that Trooper Duncan Dauber activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop after determining Williams’ car 20 was traveling above the speed limit. Trooper Dauber was wearing his 21 highway patrol uniform and driving a blue Harley-Davidson motorcycle with highway patrol markings. The emergency lights consisted of four red and 22 blue lights that illuminated toward the front and six red and blue lights that illuminated toward the back. 23 Trooper Dauber kept the motorcycle idling and the emergency lights 24 activated when he got off the motorcycle to approach the passenger side of 25 Williams’ car. He ran Williams’ California identification card through the dispatch center and learned there was a warrant for Williams’ arrest. And 26 27 1Williams filed a reply in support of the petition. (ECF No. 59.) 28 2Exhibits referenced in this order are exhibits to Respondents’ motion to dismiss hands up. 2 Williams looked down the road, looked at the trooper in the rear- 3 view mirror, put his car into drive, and drove away on a road that had other 4 traffic. Trooper Dauber was able to reholster his handgun, store his citation gear, plug into the motorcycle’s radio, put his gloves on, turn on the siren, 5 and start pursuing Williams within a matter of seconds. He eventually lost sight of Williams’ car and slowed down to 85 miles per hour to see if Williams 6 had melded in with the traffic.

7 Trooper Dauber found Williams’ car abandoned in the westbound 8 fast lane of the Mount Rose Highway. The car had extensive damage to its right side and its airbags had deployed—these conditions did not exist 9 during the initial traffic stop. There were scuff marks where the car had hit a concrete barrier and been deflected back through an intersection, and 10 there were yaw marks where the car had travelled through the intersection. Trooper Dauber set up traffic control to prevent people from running into the 11 back end of the car, and he and another trooper later pushed the car out of 12 the way to open the lane to traffic. 13 (ECF No. 24-16 at 3-4.) 14 Initially, a grand jury indicted Williams on January 27, 2016. (ECF Nos. 22-2, 22- 15 3.) Williams filed a pretrial habeas corpus petition challenging the sufficiency of the 16 evidence. (ECF No. 22-19.) The state district court held a hearing and denied the petition. 17 (ECF No. 23-5, 23-11.) 18 After trial and at sentencing, the state district court adjudicated Williams a habitual 19 criminal and sentenced him to a term of five to 20 years. (ECF No. 23-20.) Judgment of 20 conviction was entered on August 10, 2016. (ECF No. 23-19.) 21 Williams appealed, and the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and 22 sentence on November 14, 2017. (ECF No. 24-16.) The Nevada Court of Appeals 23 affirmed the denial of Williams’ state post-conviction habeas corpus petition on 24 September 10, 2019. (ECF No. 25-29.) 25 Williams dispatched this federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in September 26 2019. (ECF No. 10.) He filed what the Court deemed as a supplement in February 2020. 27 (ECF No. 12 at 2-10.) Respondents have now answered the remaining claims. 28 /// 2 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 3 Act (AEDPA), provides the legal standards for this Court’s consideration of the petition in 4 this case: 5 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 6 respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim ― 7 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 8 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 9 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 10 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 11 12 The AEDPA “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner 13 applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court 14 convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 15 693-94 (2002). This Court’s ability to grant a writ is limited to cases where “there is no 16 possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with 17 [Supreme Court] precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). The 18 Supreme Court has emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the 19 state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 20 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (describing 21 the AEDPA standard as “a difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating 22 state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 23 doubt”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 24 A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, 25 within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts 26 the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “if the state court confronts 27 a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] 28 and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court’s] precedent.” 2 Bell, 535 U.S. at 694). 3 A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established 4 Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “if the state court 5 identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but 6 unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. 7 at 74 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). The “unreasonable application” clause requires 8 the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous; the state court’s 9 application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable. Id. (quoting 10 Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). 11 To the extent that the state court’s factual findings are challenged, the 12 “unreasonable determination of fact” clause of § 2254(d)(2) controls on federal habeas 13 review. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). This clause 14 requires that the federal courts “must be particularly deferential” to state court factual 15 determinations. Id. The governing standard is not satisfied by a showing merely that the 16 state court finding was “clearly erroneous.” Id. at 973. Rather, AEDPA requires 17 substantially more deference: 18 . . . [I]n concluding that a state-court finding is unsupported by substantial evidence in the state-court record, it is not enough that we would 19 reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision. Rather, we must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying 20 the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record. 21 22 Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972. 23 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), state court factual findings are presumed to be 24 correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The petitioner bears the burden 25 of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to habeas relief. See 26 Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181. 27 /// 28 /// 2 Nevada Highway Patrol Trooper Duncan Dauber was the sole witness. (ECF No. 3 22-2 at 7-20.) He testified that on January 29, 2016, he pulled Williams over for speeding 4 in Reno, Nevada. When he ran Williams’ license through dispatch, he learned that 5 Williams had an active warrant out of California. Officer Dauber drew his gun and told 6 Williams to put his hands in the air. Williams looked in his rear-view mirror, put the car in 7 drive and sped away. When Dauber located Williams’ vehicle, it was stopped in the fast 8 lane of a highway, there were tire skid marks though an intersection and he could see 9 based on the tire marks and the damage to the car that it had collided with the highway 10 wall. Williams was not in the vehicle. The grand jury returned an indictment for eluding an 11 officer. (Id. at 21.) 12 The district attorney made a record at the close of the proceedings: 13 Yesterday I received a letter from the retained counsel for Matthew Williams: Lee Hotchkin. He informed me that the defendant, or at least the 14 target, was considering testifying at the Grand Jury. However, if he did, the defense attorney intended to appear with him. 15

16 Before they started the Grand Jury, I checked the hall and the area, to see if the target was there, or his attorney was there, and no one was 17 present.

18 Again, when I went out to get my first witness, I didn’t see the attorney, nor did I see the target at that time. 19

20 I was informed prior to this return calendar today, at around 4:29 p.m., from Kaili Lane, that the target was downstairs. And I told her at that point 21 that the proceeding had finished. 22 (Id. at 23.) 23 V. INSTANT PETITION 24 a. Ground 1 25 Williams contends that his trial counsel, Lee Hotchkin, was ineffective in violation 26 of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to appear at the grand jury 27 proceeding. (ECF No. 10 at 4-8.) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (“IAC”) claims are 28 governed by the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 2 assistance of counsel has the burden of demonstrating that (1) the attorney made errors 3 so serious that he or she was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth 4 Amendment, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Williams, 529 5 U.S. at 390-91 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To establish ineffectiveness, the 6 defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 7 reasonableness. See id. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a 8 reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 9 proceeding would have been different. See id. A reasonable probability is “probability 10 sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Additionally, any review of the 11 attorney’s performance must be “highly deferential” and must adopt counsel’s perspective 12 at the time of the challenged conduct, in order to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. 13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. It is the petitioner’s burden to overcome the presumption that 14 counsel’s actions might be considered sound trial strategy. See id. 15 Ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland requires a showing of deficient 16 performance of counsel resulting in prejudice, “with performance being measured against 17 an objective standard of reasonableness, . . . under prevailing professional norms.” 18 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 19 When the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on a challenge to a guilty plea, 20 the Strickland prejudice prong requires a petitioner to demonstrate “that there is a 21 reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 22 would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 23 If the state court has already rejected an ineffective assistance claim, a federal 24 habeas court may only grant relief if that decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable 25 application of, the Strickland standard. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). 26 There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 27 reasonable professional assistance. See id. 28 2 court’s decision on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as “doubly deferential.” 3 Cullen, 563 U.S. at 190 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)). The 4 Supreme Court emphasized that: “We take a ‘highly deferential’ look at counsel’s 5 performance . . . through the ‘deferential lens of § 2254(d).’” Id. (internal citations omitted). 6 Moreover, federal habeas review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is limited 7 to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen, 8 563 U.S. at 181-84. The United States Supreme Court has specifically reaffirmed the 9 extensive deference owed to a state court's decision regarding claims of ineffective 10 assistance of counsel: 11 Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards 12 created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n.7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 13 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), and when the two apply in tandem, review is “doubly” so, Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123. The Strickland standard is a general 14 one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. 556 U.S. at 124. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating 15 unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is whether there is any 16 reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard. 17 18 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. “A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance of 19 counsel must apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the 20 ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 104 (quoting Strickland, 466 21 U.S. at 689). “The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to 22 incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not whether it deviated from best 23 practices or most common custom.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 24 Specifically, Williams claims in ground 1 that he had told Hotchkin he wished to 25 testify and was in the courthouse during the grand jury proceedings waiting for his counsel 26 to call him to testify, but counsel never appeared. Williams claims that Hotchkin could 27 have had the prosecutor instruct the grand jury that another district attorney had agreed 28 to charge Williams with a misdemeanor, offered specific instructions regarding “a lesser 2 a constitutional right to remain silent. (ECF No. 10 at 7.) 3 Williams filed a pretrial habeas corpus petition. (ECF Nos. 22-19, 22-20.) He 4 argued that the State failed to provide reasonable notice of the grand jury hearing. (ECF 5 No. 22-20 at 4-6.) At the hearing on the petition, Hotchkin told the court that Williams first 6 went to Justice Court and was told he did not need to appear there. Hotchkin maintained 7 that he had been in his office the day of the grand jury proceedings trying to locate 8 Williams. Later that day, Williams was found waiting in the correct building for Hotchkin 9 and the grand jury proceedings. The state district court disagreed that improper notice 10 was provided: 11 [T]he State faxed a Notice of Grand Jury Investigation and Right to Testify to Defendant’s counsel on January 20, 2016. The State also mailed 12 a copy of the notice to Williams. The State received a letter from defense counsel dated January 25, 2016, indicating that he had received the Notice 13 of Grand Jury, and that Williams was considering testifying. The grand jury 14 proceedings in this case were conducted on January 27.

15 Under these facts, the court finds that the State complied with the provisions of NRS 172.241(2). Notably, there were five judicial days 16 between when the State faxed the notice on January 20, when the grand jury proceedings commenced on January 27. Further defense counsel’s 17 letter of January 25 indicates that the notice was actually received. 18 Accordingly, the court finds that Williams was provided proper notice of the grand jury proceedings. 19 20 (ECF No. 23-11 at 3.) 21 Williams also argued that defense counsel could have ensured the prosecutor 22 informed the jury of his right to remain silent. (ECF No. 22-19 at 6-9.) 23 The state district court noted that the State failed to inform jurors of this right: 24 Williams next argues that in violation of NRS 172.095(1) the State failed to “[i]nform the grand jurors that the failure of a person to exercise his right 25 to testify as provided in NRS 172.241 must not be considered in their decision of whether or not to return an indictment.” The State acknowledges 26 that this instruction was not given to the grand jury for this specific case. 27 Nonetheless, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that the grand jury is instructed on the right of a defendant not to testify when they are 28 dictates of NRS 172.095. 2 3 (ECF No. 23-11 at 4.) 4 The state district court also rejected Williams’ argument that the grand jury should 5 have been instructed on lesser included offenses: 6 Despite any other arguments raised by Williams including the failure to instruct the grand jury on lesser included offenses, the court finds that the 7 testimony presented to the grand jury was sufficient to establish probable cause that Williams committed the crime of eluding a police officer. Notably, 8 the State was not required to instruct the grand jury of the existence of any 9 lesser included offenses. 10 (Id. at 5.) 11 Trooper Dauber also testified at trial, along with two other officers who responded 12 when Dauber called for backup. (ECF No. 23-6.) Williams appealed. (ECF No. 23-24.) 13 Affirming the conviction, the Nevada Court of Appeals addressed and rejected Williams’ 14 underlying complaints about the grand jury proceedings: 15 First, Williams claims the district court erred by denying his pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the State failed to provide 16 reasonable notice of the time and place of the grand jury proceeding. However, the record demonstrates Williams received timely notice of the 17 grand jury proceeding and the notice instructed him to contact the district 18 attorney if he wished to testify before the grand jury. Williams did not inform the district attorney he wished to testify before the grand jury, so the district 19 attorney was not required to forward any additional information. See NRS 172.241(2)(b); Davis v. Eighth Judicial Dist, Court, 129 Nev. 116, 120, 294 20 P.3d 415, 418 (2013). Based on this record, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Williams’ pretrial habeas petition 21 22 (ECF No. 24-16 at 2.) 23 In affirming the denial of Williams’ state post-conviction petition, the Nevada Court 24 of Appeals concluded that he could not demonstrate prejudice: 25 The district court found the State presented sufficient evidence at the grand jury proceedings to demonstrate probable cause that Williams 26 committed the charged offense. See Sheriff, Clark Cty, v. Burcham, 124 Nev. 1247, 1257-58, 198 P.3d 326, 332-33 (2008) (at the grand jury level, 27 the State need only provide slight or marginal evidence). The district court 28 determined Williams failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions because he failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a the proceedings. The district court’s factual findings are supported by 2 substantial evidence, and we conclude the district court did not err by dismissing this claim without first holding an evidentiary hearing. 3 4 (ECF No. 25-29 at 3.) 5 The state trooper involved testified credibly before the grand jury. Hotchkin argued 6 at the hearing on the pretrial habeas petition that Williams was not eluding the officer but 7 merely fled because he feared for his life. This implausible argument did not persuade 8 the state district court. Williams has not shown deficiency, and he cannot show prejudice. 9 He has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a different result before the grand 10 jury. Therefore, he has failed to demonstrate that the Nevada Court of Appeals’ decision 11 was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 12 2254(d). Federal habeas relief is denied as to ground 1. 13 b. Ground 2 14 Williams argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by vindictively seeking 15 habitual criminal treatment in retaliation for Williams rejecting two guilty plea offers. (ECF 16 No. 10 at 11-12.) 17 Williams took the stand at his sentencing hearing. He stated that after he rejected 18 the first guilty plea offer, the State filed the notice of intent to seek habitual criminal 19 treatment. (ECF No. 23-20 at 13-16.) Williams speculated that the State pursued habitual 20 criminal enhancement in retaliation for Williams rejecting the first plea offer. The state 21 district court denied Williams’ motion to strike the notice of habitual criminal, finding no 22 retaliatory purpose. (Id. at 57.) 23 The Nevada Court of Appeals agreed with the state district court that there was no 24 retaliation: 25 Third, Williams claims the district court erred by denying his motion to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek habitual criminal adjudication. 26 Williams argues the habitual-criminal-adjudication notice was filed after he refused to accept the State’s plea offers and it violated the due process 27 prohibition against vindictive prosecution. Williams asserts the State’s first 28 plea offer allowed him to plead without any risk of a habitual criminal enhancement but the State’s second plea offer included a habitual criminal based upon the timing of this and the notice and the documents presented 2 in that regard.” The record supports the district court’s finding, and we conclude it did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’ motion to strike. 3 See generally Schmidt v. State, 94 Nev. 665, 666, 584 P.2d 695, 696 (1978) 4 (“[W]e construe the prosecutor’s conduct as merely presenting the appellant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which 5 he was plainly subject to prosecution. Such a mode of behavior cannot be viewed as violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.”). 6 7 (ECF No. 24-16 at 4-5.) 8 Williams presents no credible basis for his claim of retaliation. There is simply 9 nothing in the record to support his contention. He has failed to demonstrate that the 10 Nevada Court of Appeals’ decision on federal ground 2 was contrary to, or involved an 11 unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. 12 Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 13 the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 14 Accordingly, ground 2 is denied. 15 c. Grounds 3 & 6 16 In ground 3, Williams contends that the state district court did not make 17 individualized determinations of every crime necessary to adjudicate him a habitual 18 criminal and that the 20-year-maximum sentence imposed was disproportionate. (ECF 19 No. 10 at 15-17.) In ground 6, Williams asserts that the state district court violated his 20 Eighth Amendment rights by adjudicating him a habitual criminal. (ECF No. 12 at 7-8.) 21 The state district court reviewed all the judgments of conviction that the State 22 submitted in support of its position that habitual criminal treatment was warranted. (ECF 23 No. 23-20 at 50-56.) Hotchkin objected to several but had no objection with respect to at 24 least two prior judgments of conviction. (Id.) 25 The state district court explained the sentence it imposed: 26 All right. I have reviewed the PSI, the criminal history. I was the judge for the trial. I saw the evidence presented there, and at this hearing. I’ve 27 considered the age of the defendant, and the nature and gravity and duration of his prior criminal conduct. Based upon those factors, I do find 28 that it is just and proper to find Mr. Williams to be a habitual criminal. I would note that, in addition to the priors presented here in court, he’s 2 essentially had an unabated criminal history since he turned 18, and a history of noncompliance, with the exception of an 11-month period right in 3 the middle. And since that time, and even since this arrest in this court, he’s 4 continued to pick up felony cases. So I do believe it is just and proper that he be adjudicated as a habitual criminal. 5 6 (Id. at 58.) 7 The Nevada Court of Appeals rejected Williams’ contentions that his sentence 8 violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment: 9 Fourth, Williams claims his habitual criminal adjudication and 5- to 20-year prison sentence constitute cruel and unusual punishment because 10 he has long suffered from drug addiction, he has predominately committed theft or property offenses, he was only sent to prison one time and paroled 11 one time, and the instant offense did not justify a habitual criminal 12 adjudication. Regardless of its severity, a sentence that is within the statutory limits is not “cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing 13 punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience.” Blume v. State, 14 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting CuIverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. 15 Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining the 16 Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it forbids only an extreme sentence that is grossly 17 disproportionate to the crime). Williams’ sentence falls within the parameters of NRS 207.010(1)(a), and he does not allege this statute is 18 unconstitutional. We note the record demonstrates Williams has at least two prior felony convictions and evidence of those prior convictions was 19 presented to the district court at sentencing. And we conclude Williams’ 20 sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his crime and history of recidivism and it does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See 21 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (plurality opinion); see generally Arajakis v. State, 108 Nev. 976, 983, 843 P.2d 800, 805 (1992) (“NRS 22 207.010 makes no special allowance for non-violent crimes or for the 23 remoteness of convictions.”). 24 (ECF No. 24-16 at 5-6.) 25 The State argued at sentencing that, with this conviction, Williams would be a 14- 26 time convicted felon. (ECF No. 23-20 at 55.) The prosecutor urged that the habitual 27 treatment was not a punishment for the crime of eluding, itself, but for Williams’ recidivism 28 and constant criminal conduct. (Id.) Hotchkin argued that though Williams has a serious 2 from treatment for addiction. (Id. at 43-49.) The court concluded that Williams’ criminal 3 history, including the fact that he picked up new cases since the eluding incident, 4 warranted habitual criminal treatment. Williams has failed to demonstrate that the Nevada 5 Court of Appeals’ decision on federal grounds 3 or 6 were contrary to, or involved an 6 unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. 7 Supreme Court, or were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 8 the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 9 Accordingly, grounds 3 and 6 are both denied. 10 Therefore, the petition is denied in its entirety. 11 VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 12 This is a final order adverse to the petitioner. As such, Rule 11 of the Rules 13 Governing Section 2254 Cases requires this Court to issue or deny a certificate of 14 appealability (COA). Accordingly, the Court has sua sponte evaluated the claims within 15 the petition for suitability for the issuance of a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Turner v. 16 Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2002). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue only when the petitioner “has 17 made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” With respect to claims 18 rejected on the merits, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find 19 the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 20 McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 21 (1983)). For procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate 22 (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and (2) 23 whether the court's procedural ruling was correct. See id. 24 Having reviewed its determinations and rulings in adjudicating Williams’ petition, 25 the Court finds that none of those rulings meets the Slack standard. The Court therefore 26 declines to issue a COA for its resolution of Williams’ petition. 27 VII. CONCLUSION 28 It is therefore ordered that the petition (ECF Nos. 10, 12) is denied. 1 It is further ordered that a certificate of appealability is denied. 2 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 3 DATED THIS 29" Day of September 2022.

° wkaNDA MD 6 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14