Williams v. Alvarado

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 3, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01501
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 LANCE WILLIAMS, Case No.: 24-cv-01501-WQH-LR

13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 14 vs. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT 15 M. ALVARADO, Correctional Counselor; FOR FAILING TO STATE A N. ERICKSON, Correctional Officer; A. 16 CLAIM PURSUANT TO RENDON, Correctional Officer, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 17 Defendants. 18 [ECF No. 2] 19 HAYES, Judge: 20 Before the Court is a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by 21 Plaintiff Lance Williams, a former state prisoner who is proceeding without counsel. (ECF 22 No. 1.) Williams seeks to sue three Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) 23 officials for damages based on claims that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights while 24 he was incarcerated there in August 2019. (Id. at 2‒4, 8.) Williams has not prepaid the $405 25 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a motion to proceed 26 in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) 27 For the reasons explained, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion, but dismisses 28 his complaint as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 1 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 5 although the $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. 6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 7 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 8 pay the entire fee only if he seeks and the court grants him leave to proceed IFP pursuant 9 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); 10 Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP 11 application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] 12 [a]re paid.”). Section 1915(a)(2) requires all persons seeking to proceed without full 13 prepayment of fees to file an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets possessed and 14 demonstrates an inability to pay. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 15 2015). 16 “Unlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis must pay 17 the full amount of filing fees in civil actions and appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison 18 Litigation Reform Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002)). As defined 20 by the PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is 21 accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 22 criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or 23 diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). 24 However, persons who file suit after having been released from custody are no 25 longer “prisoners” as defined by the PLRA, and are therefore not subject to 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)’s pre-suit administrative exhaustion requirement, or 28 27 U.S.C. § 1915(g)’s “three-strikes” provision. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 28 Cir. 2000) (person confined under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Law, while “a 1 ‘prisoner’ within the meaning of the PLRA when he served time for his conviction, [ ] 2 ceased being a ‘prisoner’ when he was released from the custody of the Department of 3 Corrections”); Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928, 934‒35 (9th Cir. 2017) (former prisoner 4 incarcerated when he filed his civil rights action but released by the time he filed an 5 amended complaint was not subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement); Moore v. 6 Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that § 1915(g)’s 7 three-strikes rule does not apply to a civil action or appeal filed after former prisoner was 8 released on parole). 9 Plaintiff’s litigation history while imprisoned “can only be described as prolific.” 10 See Williams v. Allison, 2022 WL 17630818, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2022) (noting 11 Williams’s filing of over 40 cases in the Eastern District of California since 2014). As a 12 consequence, Williams has been barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) from proceeding IFP while 13 incarcerated both in this Court as well as in the Eastern and Central Districts of California. 14 See, e.g., Williams v. Dep’t of Just., Bureau of Crim. Info & Analysis, 2018 WL 5630514, 15 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018) (“Plaintiff Lance Williams, identified as CDCR #AG-2394, 16 while he has been incarcerated, … has had at least seven prior prisoner civil actions or 17 appeals dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a 18 claim upon which relief may be granted.”); Williams v. Vera, 2022 WL 228973, at *1–2 19 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2022) (cataloguing Williams’s prior strikes), report and 20 recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4238909 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2022); Williams v. 21 Hernandez, No. 2:20-cv-08280-PA-kk (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2020) (ECF No. 6) (denying 22 Williams leave to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(g)). 23 However, it appears Plaintiff now resides in Hawthorne, California, and was released 24 from CDCR custody on parole sometime before he filed his complaint and IFP motion in 25 this case. Therefore, the filing fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and § 1915(g)’s “three 26 strikes” bar do not apply. See Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 27 scope of § 1915 is narrowed to plaintiffs who are in custody as the result of a conviction 28 or who [are] detained for an alleged criminal law violation[.]”); Moore, 657 F.3d at 892. 1 For non-prisoner litigants, “[a]n affidavit in support of an IFP application is 2 sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the 3 necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. “[A] plaintiff seeking IFP status must 4 allege poverty ‘with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.’” Id. (quoting United 5 States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). In his IFP application, Williams 6 attests he has no assets and has earned no income during the past 12 months. (See ECF No. 7 2 at 1‒3.) He claims $3,800 in total monthly expenses for rent/home-mortgage payments, 8 food, clothing, transportation, and laundry, and relies “on the county for food stamps.” (Id. 9 at 4–5.) Based on these sworn representations, the Court finds Williams cannot afford to 10 pay the $405 filing fee for this case and GRANTS his Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 11 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).1 12 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING 13 A. Legal Standard 14 Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preliminary review 15 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this statute, the Court must sua sponte dismiss 16 an IFP case which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from 17 defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017). “The 18 purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not 19 bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 20 (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 21 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 22 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 23

24 25 1 The Court reserves the right to revoke Williams’s IFP privileges in this case at any time should it discover 26 his sworn IFP affidavit is false and/or was submitted in bad faith. See, e.g., Williams v. Jalijali, 2023 WL 4743019, at *2‒3 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A); Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 27 n.8) (revoking Williams’s IFP status due to his failure to include $7,600 in income and other settlement proceeds credited to his prison trust account), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5956974 28 1 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 2 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) require a 3 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 4 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 5 quotations omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals 6 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 7 suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a 8 context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 9 and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the 10 defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 11 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 12 However, “courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 13 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 14 B. Factual Allegations 15 Williams alleges that while he was incarcerated at RJD on August 26, 2019, 16 Correctional Officers Alvarado, Erickson, and Rendon violated his Eighth Amendment 17 rights by failing to promptly respond to his complaints of chest pain, numbness, and a nose 18 bleed. (ECF No. 1 at 2‒3.) Williams contends he was ignored and ridiculed for more than 19 an hour until he passed out, fell off a chair, and hit his head. (Id. at 3.) Williams claims that 20 while he “was coming back to life,” he overheard Erickson refer to him by using a racial 21 epithet, refuse to call a “man down” code, and say “that’s what he gets for filing all that 22 paperwork and lawsuits on me.” (Id. at 3‒4.) Williams further alleges Alvarado accused 23 him of faking and that the A-Yard Sergeant refused to issue a medical alarm, although he 24 was eventually “accosted” by medical staff and transported to an emergency room for 25 “numerous tests and pain reduction.” (Id. at 4.) 26 C. Discussion 27 Williams filed this case on August 22, 2024, but his cause of action arose five years 28 before. Because his complaint contains only claims that are untimely on its face, and he 1 fails to allege facts sufficient to show he is entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling, 2 Williams’s case is subject to sua sponte dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which 3 relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). 4 “A claim may be dismissed [for failing to state a claim] on the ground that it is barred 5 by the applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on 6 the face of the complaint.’” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 7 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 8 997 (9th Cir. 2006)). “‘A complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt 9 that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.’” 10 Id. (quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)); 11 see also Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1993) (where the 12 running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of a complaint, dismissal for 13 failure to state a claim is proper, so long as Plaintiff is provided an opportunity to amend 14 in order to allege facts which, if proved, might support tolling); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 15 Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 788 (9th Cir. 2000) (court may 16 raise the defense of statute of limitations sua sponte). 17 Section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitation; therefore, federal courts apply 18 the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 19 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); 20 Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Before 2003, California’s statute of 21 limitations was one year. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Effective January 1, 2003, the limitations 22 period was extended to two. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1). The law of the forum 23 state also governs tolling. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (citing Hardin v. 24 Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538‒39 (1989)); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (where the federal court 25 borrows the state statute of limitation, the federal court also borrows all applicable 26 provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law). 27 Under California law, the statute of limitations for prisoners serving less than a life 28 sentence is tolled for an additional two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a); Johnson v. 1 California, 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, 543 U.S. 499 2 (2005). Accordingly, the effective statute of limitations for most California prisoners is 3 three years for claims accruing before January 1, 2003 (one year limitations period plus 4 two years statutory tolling), and four years for claims accruing thereafter (two year 5 limitations period plus two years statutory tolling). 6 Unlike the length of the limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983 7 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” 8 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; Hardin, 490 U.S. at 543‒44 (federal law governs when a § 1983 9 cause of action accrues). “Under the traditional rule of accrual ... the tort cause of action 10 accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or omission 11 results in damages.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391. Put another way, “[u]nder federal law, a 12 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the 13 basis of the action.” Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 14 (9th Cir. 1999). 15 In this case, the “wrongful acts” alleged to have been taken against Williams 16 occurred five years before he filed his complaint on August 22, 2024. Thus, they fall 17 outside California’s statute of limitations—even if the Court presumes he remained 18 incarcerated for 2 years following the August 2019 incident and is entitled to statutory 19 tolling pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). Wallace, 591 U.S. at 391; see also 20 Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (tolling statute of limitations 21 “for a maximum of 2 years” during a prisoner’s incarceration); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. 22 Specifically, Williams alleges Defendants failed to promptly respond to his complaints and 23 refused to immediately summon medical attention on August 26, 2019. Based on these 24 allegations, the Court concludes Williams had “reason to know” of his injuries on the date 25 he alleges he was injured, nearly five years before he filed suit. See Maldonado, 370 F.3d 26 at 955. 27 Williams’s claims could be considered timely if, in his Complaint, he alleged facts 28 sufficient to show the limitations period may be equitably tolled. See Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1 1276‒77. Generally, federal courts also apply the forum state’s law regarding equitable 2 tolling. Fink, 192 F.3d at 914; Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 3 1988). Under California law, however, he must meet three conditions to equitably toll the 4 statute of limitations: (1) he must have diligently pursued his claim; (2) his situation must 5 be the product of forces beyond his control; and (3) Defendants must not be prejudiced by 6 the application of equitable tolling. See Hull v. Cent. Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic, 28 Cal. 7 App. 4th 1328, 1335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Addison v. State, 21 Cal.3d 313, 316–17 (Cal. 8 1978); Fink, 192 F.3d at 916. 9 As currently pleaded, however, the Court finds Williams has failed to plead any facts 10 which, if proved, would support any plausible claim for equitable tolling. See Cervantes, 5 11 F.3d at 1277; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, because it is clear from the face of Williams’s 12 pleading that his claims against all Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations, his 13 complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which section 14 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112. 15 D. Leave to Amend 16 While Williams’s complaint is untimely, the Court grants him leave to amend. See 17 Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not 18 dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 20 could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 21 Cir. 2012)); Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1277 (noting that a time-barred action may not ordinarily 22 be dismissed at pleading stage without leave to amend unless “some fact, evident from the 23 face of the complaint, support[s] the conclusion that the plaintiff could not prevail, as a 24 matter of law, on the equitable tolling issue.”). 25 III. CONCLUSION 26 Based on the foregoing, the Court: 27 (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2); 28 (2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon 1 || which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1); and 2 (3) GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 3 || which to file an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted. 4 || Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original 5 || pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint 6 || will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 7 || Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 8 || supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 9 || (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended 10 || pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 11 If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, the Court will enter 12 |/a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on his failure to state a claim upon 13 || which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and his failure to 14 || prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 15 || F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity 16 |/to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into 17 || dismissal of the entire action.”). 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 || Dated: February 3, 2025 Nitta Ze. Ma 20 Hon, William Q. Hayes 1 United States District Court 22 23 24 25 26 27 28