Williams Appeal

256 A.2d 623, 434 Pa. 274, 1969 Pa. LEXIS 445

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 9, 1969
• Docket: Appeals, 489
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by.

Mr. Justice Cohen,

This is an action resulting from challenges to the validity of certain absentee ballots in the November 7, 1967, General Election held in Northumberland County. In the contest for the third member of the Board of County Commissioners, appellee (Kehler) led the appellant (Williams). Both candidates challenged the counting of certain absentee ballots before the Election Board. From an adverse ruling of the Board, Kehler took an appeal which was heard by a special court en banc appointed by this Court. Williams filed a motion to dismiss that appeal on the basis that it was filed beyond the statutory filing period. The special court found otherwise and Williams appeals the refusal to grant Ms motion to dismiss and from other rulings of the court.

The written order of the Election Board disposing of the challenges was filed Thursday, February 29, 1968. Kehler took his appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County on Monday, March 4, 1968. The Election Code allows two days for taking an appeal from the decision of the Board.¹ The dispute arises as to computation of days elapsed where the final day upon which the appeal may be filed falls on a Saturday. Appellant contends that the Election Code of 1937, P. L. 1333, Art. I, §103, 25 P.S. §2603, which does not exclude a terminal Saturday in the counting, is the applicable statute. Appellee and the lower court maintain that the 1959 amendment to the-Statutory Construction Act of 1937, P. L. 1019, Art. Ill, §38, 46 P.S. §538, has superseded the Election Code and that the exclusion of a terminal Saturday in the 1959 amendment permits the appellee to file his appeal on the following Monday. We agree.

The Statutory Construction Act, as amended, 1959, August 11, P. L. 691, §1, reads: “When any period of time is referred to in any law, such period in all cases, . . . shall he so computed as to exclude the first and include the last day of such period. Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the computation.”

The meaning of this statutory language is clear. It refers to “any law” and “all cases.” This section supersedes the computation method on all previously effective laws. No express repealer of the method of computation used in the Election Code is required because §66 of the Statutory Construction Act, P. L. 1019, Art. IV, 46 P.S. §566, provides that the law with the latest date of enactment is to prevail if an irreconcilable conflict exists between laws passed at different legislative sessions. Appellee filed within the required two days when he filed his appeal on Monday, March 4. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the Statutory Construction Act and the expressed legislative intent.

While unnecessary to decide this case, an examination of legislative history further substantiates our position. The original statute passed to regulate the computation of time, Act of June 20, 1883, P. L. 136, covered not only laws but also rules, orders, decrees of court and ordinances, resolutions, and by-laws of municipal or other public and private corporations. The 1883 Act was an attempt to govern the computation of time in a broad spectrum of matters. The legislature re-enacted part of the 1883 Act pertaining to “laws” by incorporating it into the Statutory Construction Act of 1937. It also, reenacted that part of the 1883 Act into the Election Code of 1937. When the 1959 legislature amended the Statutory Construction Act at 1959, P. L. 691, so as to exclude Saturday as a terminal date, it also amended the' 1883 Act at 1959, P. L. 692, so as to exclude Saturday as a terminal date in rules, orders, decrees, ordinances, resolutions, and by-laws. Thus there was a meticulous attempt to cover all the situations in which Saturday is the terminal day by changing the computation of time. It was a careful attempt to update the 1883 Act and make uniform the broad spectrum of matters covered therein. This. would leave no room for excluding the Election Code from the legislative scheme. The Election Code which patterned itself in this respect from the Statutory Construction Act is not to be exalted over the entire legislative pattern.

Since the second day following the Board’s order was Saturday, March 2, 1968, appellee had until Monday, March 4, 1968, to file. For this reason the lower court did not err in refusing to grant appellant’s motion to dismiss.

We have reviewed the other contentions of the appellant and conclude that the determination of the Special Court of Common Pleas en banc, appointed by Chief Justice John C. Bell to preside in all matters arising from the election of November 7, 1967, is correct. ■

Orders affirmed.

1 Act of June 3, 1937, P. L. 1333, §1407, 25 P.S. §3157.