Williams 267365 v. Galaz

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedOctober 11, 2024
Docket4:24-cv-00328
StatusUnknown

This text of Williams 267365 v. Galaz (Williams 267365 v. Galaz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams 267365 v. Galaz, (D. Ariz. 2024).

Opinion

1 WO JL 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Berry Williams, No. CV-24-00328-TUC-SHR 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Unknown Galaz, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 On July 8, 2024, Plaintiff Berry Williams, who is confined in the Arizona State 16 Prison Complex-Tucson (ASPC-Tucson), filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). In 18 a July 23, 2024 Order, the Court denied the deficient Application to Proceed with leave to 19 refile within 30 days. 20 On July 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a new Application to Proceed In Forma 21 Pauperis (Doc. 8). The Court will grant the Application to Proceed and dismiss the 22 Complaint with leave to amend. 23 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 24 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. § 1915(b)(1). The 26 Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing fee will be 27 collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited to 28 Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. § 1915(b)(2). 1 The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to 2 collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 3 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 5 against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 6 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 7 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 8 relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 9 relief. § 1915A(b). 10 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 11 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 12 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 13 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 14 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 15 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 16 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 17 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 18 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 19 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 20 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 21 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 22 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 23 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 24 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 25 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 26 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 27 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 28 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 1 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 2 If the Court determines a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a 3 pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the 4 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Here, the 5 Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim, but because it may 6 possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 7 III. Complaint 8 In his single-count Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from ASPC-Tucson 9 Winchester Unit Lieutenant Keefe and Correctional Officers (COs) II Galaz and Rivera. 10 Plaintiff asserts an excessive force claim, purportedly under the Fourth Amendment. He 11 alleges he was selected for a random cell search, which Defendants Galaz and Rivera 12 conducted. Plaintiff asserts that as he began to step out of his cell, Defendant Galaz “began 13 to get more aggressive” and yelled at Plaintiff to “cuff up.” Plaintiff claims he asked why 14 he needed to be cuffed for a random cell search, and Defendant Galaz reached for Plaintiff’s 15 left arm and tightly squeezed it while telling Plaintiff to “cuff up.” Plaintiff alleges he 16 asked Defendant Galaz if he could put on his shoes. Plaintiff asserts Defendant Galaz 17 grabbed Plaintiff’s right hand and squeezed the left handcuff, cutting off circulation to his 18 left hand. Plaintiff claims he yelled at Defendant Galaz, “[T]he handcuffs are to[o] tight,” 19 and Defendant Rivera replied, “[Q]uit crying.” Plaintiff alleges non-party Officer 20 Bustamonte told Defendants Galaz and Rivera he would take Plaintiff to the yard office. 21 Plaintiff asserts Officer Bustamonte loosened the handcuffs, noticed bruises on Plaintiff’s 22 left hand, and requested medical assistance. 23 IV. Failure to State a Claim 24 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show (1) acts by the defendants 25 (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and 26 (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 27 2005) (citing Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 28 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege he suffered a specific injury as a 1 result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link 2 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371– 3 72, 377 (1976). 4 A. Defendant Keefe 5 Plaintiff does not connect any of the allegations in the Complaint to Defendant 6 Keefe. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Keefe, who will be dismissed. 7 B. Defendant Rivera 8 Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant Rivera is that after Plaintiff yelled at 9 Defendant Galaz that the handcuffs were too tight, Rivera told Plaintiff to “quit crying.” 10 That is insufficient to state a claim for any constitutional violation. Moreover, Plaintiff 11 does not allege he suffered any injury due to any conduct by Rivera. The Court will 12 therefore dismiss Defendant Rivera. 13 C. Defendant Galaz 14 Plaintiff’s excessive force claim arises under the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth 15 Amendment, as he asserts.

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Related

Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Respublica v. Doan
1 U.S. 86 (Supreme Court, 1784)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
Williams 267365 v. Galaz, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-267365-v-galaz-azd-2024.