1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM TANIELIAN, Case No.: 1:23-cv-01384-KES-CDB 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWING SCREENING OF 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 J. GUERRERO, 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff William Tanielian is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 On December 12, 2023, the formerly assigned magistrate judge issued a screening order. 21 (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff was directed to complete and return a Notice on How to Proceed form within 22 14 days and was advised that if he chose to file a first amended complaint, he must do so no later 23 than January 11, 2024. (Id. at 10.) 24 On December 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed both the notice (Doc. 11) and a first amended 25 complaint (Doc. 12). 26 On October 6, 2025, this action was reassigned to the undersigned as the referred 27 magistrate judge. (Doc. 14.) // 1 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 4 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 5 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 6 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 7 it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 8 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 9 III. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 10 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 11 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 12 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 13 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 14 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 15 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 16 quotation marks & citation omitted). 17 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 18 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 19 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 20 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 21 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 22 conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 23 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 24 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 25 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 26 theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 27 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 1 quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 2 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 3 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 4 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 5 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 6 B. Linkage and Causation 7 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 8 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 9 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 10 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 11 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 12 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 13 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 14 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 15 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 16 IV. DISCUSSION 17 A. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 18 Plaintiff’s complaint is comprised of a form complaint (Doc. 12 at 1-5), a separate, typed 19 “Civil Rights Complaint” (id. at 6-12) and numerous exhibits (id. at 13-42). Plaintiff names J. 20 Guerrero, a correctional officer at California State Prison, Corcoran (CSP-COR), as the sole 21 defendant in this action. (Id. at 1-2, 7.) He seeks compensatory damages totaling $125,000, 22 punitive damages, a jury trial, costs of litigation and attorney’s fees,1 and any other relief deemed 23 just and proper. (Id. at 11-12.) 24 B. The Factual Allegations 25 Plaintiff alleges he was working as a dishwasher in the 3B yard dining hall at CSP-COR 26 on December 21, 2022. (Doc. 12 at 7.) Plaintiff contends he takes medication in the morning “that 27 1 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, is not entitled to attorney’s fees. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991). 1 requires him to leave his assigned job to receive his medication” at the yard’s medical clinic. (Id.) 2 On that date, just after 7 a.m., Plaintiff sought permission from the assigned supervisor, 3 Defendant Guerrero, to retrieve his medication “at the 3B clinic window.” (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff 4 alleges Guerrero became agitated, threatening and intimidating Plaintiff by slamming his hand on 5 the desk and yelling loudly “at Plaintiff, ‘shut the hell up!’” (Id. at 8.) 6 On January 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Guerrero for staff 7 misconduct. (Doc. 12 at 8.) Plaintiff contends the grievance “was classified as Staff Misconduct: 8 Substandard Performance.’” (Id.) It was referred to an outside agency for review and Plaintiff 9 asserts he exhausted his related administrative remedies on January 31, 2023. (Id.) Next, Plaintiff 10 alleges he received a memorandum on April 19, 2023, from the CSP-COR warden indicating the 11 grievance had been sustained.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM TANIELIAN, Case No.: 1:23-cv-01384-KES-CDB 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWING SCREENING OF 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 J. GUERRERO, 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff William Tanielian is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 On December 12, 2023, the formerly assigned magistrate judge issued a screening order. 21 (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff was directed to complete and return a Notice on How to Proceed form within 22 14 days and was advised that if he chose to file a first amended complaint, he must do so no later 23 than January 11, 2024. (Id. at 10.) 24 On December 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed both the notice (Doc. 11) and a first amended 25 complaint (Doc. 12). 26 On October 6, 2025, this action was reassigned to the undersigned as the referred 27 magistrate judge. (Doc. 14.) // 1 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 4 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 5 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 6 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 7 it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 8 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 9 III. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 10 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 11 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 12 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 13 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 14 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 15 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 16 quotation marks & citation omitted). 17 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 18 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 19 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 20 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 21 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 22 conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 23 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 24 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 25 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 26 theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 27 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 1 quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 2 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 3 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 4 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 5 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 6 B. Linkage and Causation 7 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 8 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 9 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 10 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 11 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 12 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 13 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 14 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 15 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 16 IV. DISCUSSION 17 A. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 18 Plaintiff’s complaint is comprised of a form complaint (Doc. 12 at 1-5), a separate, typed 19 “Civil Rights Complaint” (id. at 6-12) and numerous exhibits (id. at 13-42). Plaintiff names J. 20 Guerrero, a correctional officer at California State Prison, Corcoran (CSP-COR), as the sole 21 defendant in this action. (Id. at 1-2, 7.) He seeks compensatory damages totaling $125,000, 22 punitive damages, a jury trial, costs of litigation and attorney’s fees,1 and any other relief deemed 23 just and proper. (Id. at 11-12.) 24 B. The Factual Allegations 25 Plaintiff alleges he was working as a dishwasher in the 3B yard dining hall at CSP-COR 26 on December 21, 2022. (Doc. 12 at 7.) Plaintiff contends he takes medication in the morning “that 27 1 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, is not entitled to attorney’s fees. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991). 1 requires him to leave his assigned job to receive his medication” at the yard’s medical clinic. (Id.) 2 On that date, just after 7 a.m., Plaintiff sought permission from the assigned supervisor, 3 Defendant Guerrero, to retrieve his medication “at the 3B clinic window.” (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff 4 alleges Guerrero became agitated, threatening and intimidating Plaintiff by slamming his hand on 5 the desk and yelling loudly “at Plaintiff, ‘shut the hell up!’” (Id. at 8.) 6 On January 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Guerrero for staff 7 misconduct. (Doc. 12 at 8.) Plaintiff contends the grievance “was classified as Staff Misconduct: 8 Substandard Performance.’” (Id.) It was referred to an outside agency for review and Plaintiff 9 asserts he exhausted his related administrative remedies on January 31, 2023. (Id.) Next, Plaintiff 10 alleges he received a memorandum on April 19, 2023, from the CSP-COR warden indicating the 11 grievance had been sustained. (Id.) 12 Next, Plaintiff asserts that just weeks after filing the grievance, on February 5, 2023, 13 Defendant Guerrero singled him out for being disruptive for advising other inmates about 14 “dumping food in the drain of Plaintiff’s station.” (Doc. 12 at 8.) That same date, Guerrero issued 15 Plaintiff a rules violation report (RVR) for disruptive behavior; Guerrero did not issue an RVR to 16 “the other inmates involved in the dispute.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends Guerrero’s issuance of the 17 RVR to him was retaliatory. (Id.) 18 On March 10, 2023, during the RVR hearing, Plaintiff stated: “’I was still [upset] after 19 speaking with the inmates in the dining hall about dumping food in the sink.’” (Doc. 12 at 9.) 20 Plaintiff contends the senior hearing officer, A. Fernandez,2 construed Plaintiff’s comment to be a 21 guilty plea, and in doing so, attempted “to negate Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation”3 by Guerrero. 22 (Id.) He maintains it created the “appearance of a ‘Legitimate Correctional Goal’” as concerns the 23 issuance of the RVR. (Id.) 24 Plaintiff alleges he “has been and still is deathly afraid of the actions and retaliation by” 25 Defendant Guerrero, who “has continuously instigated and incited other 3B Dining Hall worker 26 2 This individual is not named as a defendant in the action. 27 3 The exhibits attached reveal Plaintiff filed two grievances against Guerrero: the first concerning the events on 1 inmates to harass and badger Plaintiff.” (Doc. 12 at 9.) Plaintiff contends he has suffered 2 emotional distress in the form of weight loss, headaches, vomiting, “and psychological pains and 3 anguish” because of Guerro’s actions. (Id. at 9, 10.) 4 C. Plaintiff’s Claims4 5 First Amendment: Retaliation 6 Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances and lawsuits and 7 retaliation against prisoners for exercising this right is a constitutional violation. Rhodes v. 8 Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2005). A claim for First Amendment retaliation in the 9 prison context requires: (1) that a state actor took some adverse action against the plaintiff (2) 10 because of (3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the plaintiff’s 11 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) “the action did not reasonably advance a 12 legitimate correctional goal.” Id. at 567-68. To prove the second element, retaliatory motive, 13 plaintiff must show that his protected activities were a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind 14 the defendant’s challenged conduct. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). 15 Plaintiff must provide direct or circumstantial evidence of defendant’s alleged retaliatory motive; 16 mere speculation is not sufficient. See McCollum v. CDCR, 647 F.3d 870, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2011); 17 accord, Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014). In addition to demonstrating 18 defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s protected conduct, circumstantial evidence of motive may 19 include: (1) proximity in time between the protected conduct and the alleged retaliation; (2) 20 defendant’s expressed opposition to the protected conduct; and (3) evidence that defendant’s 21 reasons for the challenged action were false or pretextual. McCollum, 647 F.3d at 882. 22 Liberally construing the first amended complaint and accepting all facts as true at 23 screening, Plaintiff states a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant 24 Guerrero. He contends Guerrero issued a RVR to Plaintiff shortly after Plaintiff filed a grievance 25 against Guerrero following an earlier incident. Plaintiff alleges he fears Guerrero’s retaliatory 26
27 4 In the form complaint, Plaintiff identified Claim 1 as “1st Amendment Violation: Retaliation & Tom Bane Civil Rights Act Violation: Threats/Coercion in Retaliation.” (Doc. 12 at 3.) In the separate typed complaint, Plaintiff 1 behavior and his continued efforts to incite other inmates to harass Plaintiff. Plaintiff further 2 alleges Guerrero’s issuance of the RVR did not advance any legitimate penological goal, 3 particularly where Guerrero issued the RVR only to Plaintiff following a dispute involving other 4 inmates. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68; McCollum, 647 F.3d at 882. 5 California’s Bane Civil Rights Act/Government Claims Act 6 The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act is a state statute which protects individuals from threats, 7 intimidation, coercion or related attempts to do so while exercising their rights under the 8 Constitution. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b)-(c); Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820, 9 843 (2004); see Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1218 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted) 10 (stating Bane Act created cause of action for interference or attempted interference by threat, 11 intimidation, or coercion with exercise or enjoyment of rights under Constitution); Monzon v. City 12 of Murrieta, 978 F.3d 1150, 1165 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming dismissal of Bane Act claims for lack 13 of proof that officers either interfered or attempted to interfere with any constitutional rights using 14 threats, intimidation, or coercion). 15 “To state a claim under the Bane Act, a plaintiff must allege ‘(1) interference with or 16 attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference 17 or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation, or coercion.’” Guillen v. Carrillo, No. 18 1:19-cv-00946 DAD HBK, 2022 WL 902883, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (quoting Lull v. 19 Cnty. of Sacramento, No. 2:17-cv-1211- TLN EFB (PS), 2019 WL 1014592, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 20 Mar. 4, 2019)). A defendant’s mere negligent conduct cannot support a claimed violation of the 21 Bane Act. Shoyoye v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 958 (2012) (stating legislature 22 meant for statute to address interference with constitutional rights involving more egregious 23 conduct than mere negligence). 24 And, under California law, in order to state a tort claim against a public entity or public 25 employee under state law, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the presentment of claims 26 requirements of the California Government Claims Act. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 945.4, 950.2; 27 Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988); Fisher v. Pickens, 1 The Act’s claims presentation requirements apply to state prisoners. Cal. Gov't Code § 2 945.6(c). “Before a civil action may be brought against a public entity [or public employee], a 3 claim must first be presented to the public entity and rejected.” Ocean Servs. Corp. v. Ventura 4 Port Dist., 15 Cal. App. 4th 1762, 1775 (1993); Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4 (generally barring suit 5 “until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by 6 the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board”). Claims for “injury to person 7 or to personal property” must be presented within six months after accrual. See Cal. Gov't Code § 8 911.2(a); City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 738 (2007). A claimant who misses 9 the six-month limitations deadline may file a written application with the public entity for leave to 10 present the late claim within one year of the date of accrual of the cause of action, stating the 11 reason for the delay. Cal. Gov't Code § 911.4. The claimant has six months after a denial of the 12 application to file a petition in the Superior Court for an order relieving the claimant of section 13 945.4. Cal. Gov't Code § 946.6. 14 In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff contends he timely complied with the 15 requirements of the California Government Claims Act and attached a copy of his government 16 claim form dated May 11, 2023. The form references “retaliation” and “infliction of emotional 17 distress w/injury.” Liberally construing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff plausibly alleges a 18 violation of the Bane Act by asserting Defendant Guerrero interfered with his Constitutional right 19 to file a grievance, retaliating against Plaintiff by issuing a RVR to Plaintiff only following a 20 dispute involving several inmates and that Guerrero’s interference was accomplished by threats, 21 intimidation or coercion. Hughes, 31 F.4th at 1218 n.1; Guillen, 2022 WL 902883, at *8. 22 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 23 Plaintiff also contends Guerrero’s retaliatory conduct “was an Intentional Infliction of 24 Emotional Distress causing injury….” (Doc. 12 at 10.) Although not appearing as a separate state 25 law claim in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, out of an abundance of caution, the Court 26 considers a state law intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim here. 27 To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under California law, a 1 causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s 2 suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the 3 emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 4 704 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050 (2009)). The 5 conduct must be “so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible [bounds] of decency, 6 and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Butler v. 7 Rueter, No. 2:22-cv-01301 KJN P, 2023 WL 1991591, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2023) (quoting 8 Mintz v. Blue Cross of Cal., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1594, 1607 (2009)). 9 Liberally construing the first amended complaint and accepting its facts as true, Plaintiff 10 fails to state an IIED claim. The Court finds the conduct attributed to Defendant Guerrero is 11 neither extreme nor outrageous. Rather, Guerrero telling Plaintiff to “’shut the hell up’” on one 12 occasion and his later issuance of a RVR on another occasion are more akin to insults, indignities, 13 threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or trivialities. Hughes, 46 Cal.4th at 1051 (“Liability for 14 intentional infliction of emotional distress does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 15 annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities”); see Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 16 992 (9th Cir. 1991) (where supervisor “screamed and yelled in the process of criticizing 17 [plaintiff's] performance, threatened to throw her out of the department and made gestures she 18 interpreted as threatening,” conduct was merely rude and insensitive and could not support IIED 19 claim); Gibson v. Dzurenda, No. 3:18-cv-00190-MMD-WGC, 2020 WL 8611152, at *6 (D. Nev. 20 Aug. 28, 2020) (permitting plaintiff to proceed on First Amendment claim that correctional 21 officer improperly opened his legal mail outside of his presence, which resulted in a leak of 22 Plaintiff’s confidential PREA report and subjected Plaintiff to be a target for retaliatory assault, 23 but dismissing related IIED claim for lack of extreme and outrageous conduct), R&R adopted, 24 2020 WL 8611118 (Oct. 20, 2020).5 25 5 Compare Morse v. Cnty. of Merced, No. 1:16-cv-00142-DAD-SKO, 2016 WL 3254034, at *13 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 26 2016) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and stating: “Here, the conduct alleged by plaintiff in his complaint goes far beyond “mere insults” or indignities. Taking those allegations as true, the individual defendants knowingly 27 misrepresented information in order to arrest him and charge him with murder, apparently in order to exact political retribution against plaintiff's father, a local politician who had been critical of the Sherriff's Department. A jury could 1 D. Screening Summary 2 The Court finds Plaintiff states a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, as well as a 3 | plausible Bane Act violation, against Defendant Guerrero. However, to the extent Plaintiff 4 | intended to assert an WED claim against Guerrero, he fails to state such a claim. The undersigned 5 | will recommend this action proceed on Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation and Bane Act 6 | violation claims, and that any other claims be dismissed. 7 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 For the reasons given above, this Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 9 1. This action PROCEED on Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation and Bane Act 10 claims against Defendant Guerrero; and 11 2. Any other claims asserted in Plaintiff's first amended complaint be DISMISSED. 12 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 13 || Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days 14 | after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 15 | objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to 16 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without 17 | leave of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the 18 | Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the 19 | exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise 20 | reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be 21 | disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 22 | U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result 23 | in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 24 | ITIS SO ORDERED. 29 Dated: _ November 26, 2025 | Ww VV KD 26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28