RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0206-MR
WILLIAM STOLL APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE J. B. HINES, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CR-00647
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE AND NO. 2025-CA-0454-MR
WILLIAM STOLL APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE J. B. HINES, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CR-00647
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CALDWELL, L. JONES, AND KAREM, JUDGES. CALDWELL, JUDGE: Pursuant to his conditional Alford1 plea, William Stoll appeals from a judgment of the Warren Circuit Court sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment, probated for five years, for third-degree burglary. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The victim in this case reported seeing Stoll loading items into a trailer attached to a bicycle near an open window to the victim’s dwelling. Stoll was indicted for burglary in the second degree, criminal mischief in the third degree, and being a persistent felony offender (“PFO”). Although Stoll had appointed counsel, he submitted numerous pro se letters and motions to the trial court. The focus of most of those submissions was Stoll’s belief that the proceedings against him were fatally flawed due to alleged improprieties such as perceived issues with the victim’s identification of Stoll and misconduct by the arresting officer.
However, Stoll also submitted a lengthy handwritten motion in letter form asking the trial court to appoint different counsel. Stoll asserted counsel was “forcing” him to represent himself because counsel refused to follow Stoll’s chosen defense strategy. For example, Stoll asserted counsel refused to file a
1 Stemming from North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), an Alford plea is “[a] guilty plea that a defendant enters as part of a plea bargain without admitting guilt.” Alford plea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
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motion for a Franks hearing and told Stoll that what he (Stoll) really wanted was a Faretta hearing.2 At a subsequent hearing, Stoll asked the trial court if it had read his letter. The court noncommittally stated Stoll had written many letters. The court later said the Department of Public Advocacy (“DPA”) had been appointed to represent Stoll and once the DPA had chosen which of its attorneys would represent Stoll then “that’s that.” The court’s comments constitute an implicit denial of Stoll’s written motion without having first allowed Stoll a meaningful opportunity to orally address the court on that written motion.
Later that day, Stoll stated that he would agree to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer if he could do so via a conditional Alford plea which reserved his ability to appeal from the denial of his pro se motions. Despite having recently asked the trial court for different counsel, Stoll remarked that he believed his counsel had done a “good job.” The next day, the trial court accepted Stoll’s
2 Based on Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978), a Franks hearing is “[a] proceeding in which a defendant seeks to suppress evidence based on the falsity of an affiant’s declaration. • The defendant must establish that (1) the affiant deliberately misstated or omitted facts, and (2) the falsehood was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks hearing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Based on Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975), a Faretta hearing “requires that a defendant seeking self-representation be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, so that the record will establish that he [or she] knows what he [or she] is doing and his [or her] choice is made with eyes open.” Commonwealth v. Terry, 295 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (brackets added). The basic purpose of a Faretta hearing is to ensure that a defendant has “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] right to counsel.” Id. at 823 (brackets added).
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conditional Alford plea. During the plea colloquy, Stoll expressed satisfaction with his attorney’s representation. In accordance with the plea agreement between Stoll and the Commonwealth, the trial court sentenced Stoll to five years on the amended charge of burglary in the third degree, probated for five years, and dismissed the PFO and criminal mischief charges.
Roughly two months later, Stoll filed appeal No. 2025-CA-0206-MR.
Because that appeal was filed more than thirty days after the entry of the final judgment, we issued a show cause order requiring Stoll to show why the appeal should not be dismissed. Via counsel, Stoll submitted an untimely show cause response and motion for belated appeal, but those were returned to counsel because they were untimely. Counsel then filed a motion for belated appeal, which was docketed as Case No. 2025-CA-0454-MR. We granted the motion for belated appeal and consolidated Case Nos. 2025-CA-0206-MR and 2025-CA-0454-MR. We shall resolve both appeals in this Opinion.
ANALYSIS
The conditional guilty plea was not specific as to which of Stoll’s pro se arguments he wished to present on appeal. However, the sole issue Stoll raises in his brief is his assertion that the trial court committed reversible error by not holding a hearing on his motion for different appointed counsel.
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Our Supreme Court has outlined the standards governing resolution of motions for new appointed counsel as follows:
“[A] defendant who is represented by a public defender or appointed counsel does not have a constitutional right to be represented by any particular attorney, and is not entitled to the dismissal of his counsel and the appointment of substitute counsel except for adequate reasons or a clear abuse by counsel.”
Henderson v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Ky.
1982) (citations omitted). “When an indigent defendant seeks to change his appointed counsel, he carries the burden of demonstrating to the court that there exists ‘good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable conflict.”’ Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 70, 81 (Ky. 2011) (quoting Shegog v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 101, 105 (Ky. 2004)). The Court has “further described good cause as ‘(1) a complete breakdown of communications between counsel and defendant; (2) a conflict of interest; and (3) where the legitimate interests of the defendant are being prejudiced.’” Stinnett, 364 S.W.3d at 81 (quoting Deno v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 753, 759 (Ky. 2005) (citing Baker v.
Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 325, 326-27 (Ky. App.
1978))). Whether there is such “good cause” for substitute counsel is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. “Accordingly, the bar is set high for a defendant to force appointed counsel off the case.”
Stinnett, 364 S.W.3d at 81. “[M]ere dissatisfaction with appointed counsel’s performance is insufficient to support a motion to support his removal.” Id.
Henderson v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 651, 668–69 (Ky. 2018) (some citations omitted; brackets in Henderson).
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Our Supreme Court has declined to mandate a “specific procedure”
which courts must always utilize to resolve motions for new appointed counsel. Masters v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.3d 751, 768 (Ky. 2025). Instead, “so long as the trial court allows the defendant to state on the record the reasons why he seeks substitution of counsel, the trial court may exercise discretion to determine how extensive the hearing needs to be in light of the factual circumstances of each individual case.” Grady v. Commonwealth, 325 S.W.3d 333, 346 (Ky. 2010).
Instead of explaining on the merits how he had shown good cause sufficient to surmount the high bar required to receive substitute appointed counsel, Stoll focuses on the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on his motion. Specifically, Stoll argues the trial court failed to comply with our Supreme Court’s holding that “[t]he trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire into the source and nature of a criminal defendant’s expressed dissatisfaction with counsel.” Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Ky. 2010).
Padgett is materially distinguishable from the case at hand. In Padgett, a defendant orally requested to fire his attorneys during trial and proceed pro se because the attorneys declined to call certain witnesses. Id. Though Padgett ultimately changed his mind and decided to “keep his attorneys[,]” he argued on appeal “that the trial court failed to hold a proper hearing on his counsel’s
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inadequate performance.” Id. Padgett thus does not involve a motion for substitution of appointed counsel.
In addition, the portion of Padgett relied upon by Stoll does not otherwise entitle him to relief. Padgett’s motion to fire his attorneys was made orally during a trial. Id. Thus, the only way the trial court in Padgett could have explored the basis for, and merit of, Padgett’s motion to proceed pro se was to allow Padgett to orally address the court. That scenario is far different than the one at hand in which Stoll sought entirely new counsel instead of proceeding pro se and had presented his reasons therefor in writing to the court, meaning that he had already made the court aware of the “source and nature” of his “dissatisfaction with counsel.” Id.
Stoll moreover has not shown what additional information he could have orally presented which he did not include, or could not reasonably have included, in his written motion. In other words, Stoll’s oral rationale would almost certainly have been cumulative or redundant to his written rationale.3
3 Indeed, though the Commonwealth does not directly raise it as a basis for affirming the trial court, a reasonable argument could perhaps be made that Stoll waived or forfeited his request for substitute counsel by volunteering in open court that he believed counsel had done a “good job” and by stating under oath during the plea colloquy that he was satisfied with counsel’s performance. Such “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Dorsey v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). We decline to address further whether Stoll has waived or forfeited the issue, despite his conditional Alford plea, because it is plain that Stoll is otherwise not entitled to relief.
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As we construe it, the upshot of applying Padgett to motions to substitute appointed counsel is only that a trial court must allow a defendant to explain on the record why he or she desires new appointed counsel. If a defendant files a written motion for substitution of appointed counsel, the defendant has presented the “source and nature” of the defendant’s “dissatisfaction with counsel” to the court. The trial court must then evaluate the written motion to determine if it contains a facially plausible basis for relief. If the motion contains a facially plausible basis for appointment of new counsel, the court must explore the matter further, such as holding a hearing at which the defendant’s current counsel may be required to respond to the defendant’s motion. Of course, a trial court has the discretion to determine the scope and format of any such hearing. See, e.g., Henderson, 563 S.W.3d at 669.
On the other hand, if the written motion does not contain a facially plausible basis for relief, the trial court may summarily deny it without holding an in-court hearing. We reject Stoll’s argument that the distinguishable facts and circumstances of Padgett (or other cases) invariably require the already overworked trial courts of this Commonwealth to conduct a functionally useless hearing before resolving a manifestly frivolous written motion for new appointed counsel. See, e.g., 56 AM. JUR. 2D Motions, Rules, and Orders § 32 (May 2026 Update) (providing that, albeit in a civil law context, “even when a hearing is
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requested, a hearing need not be held if [a] motion for relief clearly is without substance and is merely an attempt to burden the court with frivolous contentions”).
If a defendant makes an oral request for new appointed counsel during a hearing, the trial court must allow the defendant to state the “source and nature” of the defendant’s “dissatisfaction with counsel.” Padgett, 312 S.W.3d at 343. If the oral reasons given by the defendant lack a facially plausible basis for relief, the court may summarily deny the motion. If the oral remarks present a facially plausible basis for relief, the court should conduct a hearing in the scope and manner it finds to be most appropriate. See, e.g., Schell v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000662-MR, 2008 WL 203036, at *3 (Ky. Jan. 24, 2008) (unpublished) (holding in a case involving an oral request for new appointed counsel that “[s]o long as the trial court allows the defendant to state on the record the reasons why he seeks substitution of counsel, the trial court may exercise discretion to determine how extensive the hearing needs to be in light of the factual circumstances of the individual case. In particular, where the defendant’s allegations, even if assumed to be true, would not establish good cause for substitution of counsel, we would not mandate a procedure requiring the trial court
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to delve further by questioning defense counsel. This is especially true where doing so might expose defense strategy.”).4 We now apply that analytical framework to these facts. First, we agree with Stoll to the very limited extent that a trial court retains the ability to appoint different counsel than the person chosen by the DPA. Though we have the utmost respect for the hardworking public advocates whose work is vital to ensuring the fairness of our criminal justice system, there are rare occasions when a defendant is entitled to a different appointed counsel.
Substantively, however, we discern no error in the trial court’s perfunctory denial of Stoll’s written motion because the motion did not contain a facially plausible basis for relief. Stoll did not show a complete breakdown in communications between himself and counsel. On the contrary, Stoll describes himself and counsel as continuing to communicate in his motion, albeit with some disagreements, which undermines any allegation there had been a total breakdown in communication.
As our Supreme Court has held, albeit in a different factual context, “many tactical and strategic decisions in the course of trial and appeal belong
4 Although not binding, we conclude Schell provides an example of the appropriate framework for resolving oral motions for substitution of appointed counsel. We also conclude our framework for resolving written motions for substitution of appointed counsel is consistent with Schell. We also note our Supreme Court recently cited Schell with approval in its published opinion in Masters, 724 S.W.3d at 768 n.13.
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solely to counsel,” and so a defendant “may not force his lawyer to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those points . . . .” Commonwealth v. Tigue, 459 S.W.3d 372, 385 (Ky. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Ky. 2011) (“An attorney cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a non-meritorious claim.”). Here, since the charges against Stoll were not based on an affidavit or search warrant, Stoll’s adamant insistence on a Franks hearing was improper and Stoll’s appointed counsel’s refusal to seek such a hearing did not provide a plausible, proper basis for appointment of different counsel.
Also, Stoll’s motion itself showed that counsel’s decision to not request a pretrial hearing to contest the charges by, for example, attacking the allegedly infirm identification of Stoll by the victim or the arresting officer’s alleged misconduct was a matter of counsel’s chosen defense strategy. The motion states that counsel had informed Stoll that counsel did not “want to reveal his cards to [sic] soon . . . .” Trial Court Record (“R.”) at 107.
Similarly, though doubtlessly upsetting to Stoll, the allegation in his motion of unnamed DPA personnel’s rude behavior and abruptly hanging up on Stoll, apparently on one occasion, is manifestly insufficient to merit new appointed counsel. Finally, Stoll also tersely alleged in the motion that counsel had a conflict
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of interest, but the motion does not facially, plausibly explain how or why such an irreconcilable conflict exists.
In sum, Stoll’s motion for new counsel was frivolous because it did not contain a facially plausible basis for relief. Thus, under these facts (and bearing in mind that Stoll had already presented the reasons for his discontent with counsel on the record via his written motion), we affirm the trial court’s denial of Stoll’s motion without having first conducted an in-court hearing.
We have examined the parties’ briefs but have determined that any arguments presented therein which we have not discussed are irrelevant, redundant, or without merit. Schell, 640 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Ky. App. 2021).
For the foregoing reasons, the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joshua M. Reho Russell Coleman Louisville, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Aaron Reed Baker Jenny L. Sanders Frankfort, Kentucky Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky