UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
William Spencer and Spencer Bros. LLC
v. Civil No. 18-cv-1191-LM Opinion No. 2019 DNH 066 New Hampshire State Police, et al.
O R D E R
William Spencer, proceeding pro se, brings 16 claims, each
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the New Hampshire State Police
and certain current and former officers, the New Hampshire
Office of the Attorney General and two of its employees
(collectively, with the New Hampshire State Police and its
officers, the “state defendants”), the Federal Motor Carriers
Safety Administration and three of its employees, and the United
States Department of Transportation and two of its employees.1
Spencer’s suit arises from the circumstances of a traffic stop
and subsequent events. The state defendants move to dismiss the
1 The complaint was brought on behalf of both Spencer and Spencer Brothers LLC. On March 8, 2019, Spencer Brothers LLC moved for a voluntary dismissal of its claims without prejudice. See doc. no. 13. Defendants do not object. Although Spencer Brothers LLC could have voluntarily dismissed its claims without prejudice absent a court order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.1(a)(1)(A)(i), the court grants Spencer Brothers LLC’s motion. claims brought against them.2 Spencer did not file a response to
the state defendants’ motion.3
I. Sovereign Immunity
The state defendants move to dismiss all claims against
them on the ground that they are protected by sovereign immunity
and cannot be sued under § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment bars
suits in federal courts against a state unless the state has
waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has exercised its
power to override sovereign immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
2 The claims against the state defendants are Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, XIV, XV, and XVI.
3 Although Spencer failed to respond, the court cannot grant the motion on that basis alone and must determine whether the complaint states a claim for relief. See Vega-Encarnacion v. Babilonia, 344 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[T]he mere fact that a motion to dismiss is unopposed does not relieve the district court of the obligation to examine the complaint to see whether it is formally sufficient to state a claim.”).
2 be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has held that a state is not a person
within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, Congress has not
abrogated sovereign immunity in civil rights cases brought under
that section. Will, 491 U.S. at 64. Because the state is not a
person and cannot be sued for damages in a § 1983 claim, state
agencies and individuals sued in their official capacities as
officers, employees, or agents of a state are also not persons
for purposes of § 1983. Fantini v. Salem State College, 557
F.3d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 2009) (“It is well settled that neither a
state agency nor a state official acting in his official
capacity may be sued for damages in a section 1983 action.”
(internal alterations, citations, and quotations omitted)).
Count I alleges a § 1983 claim against the New Hampshire
State Police and Count XIV alleges a § 1983 claim against the
New Hampshire Office of the Attorney General. Those claims are
barred by sovereign immunity and are dismissed for the reasons
stated above. In addition, Counts II – VI, XV, and XVI, which
allege § 1983 claims against current and former individual
employees of either the state police or the Attorney General’s
3 Office, are dismissed on the same ground to the extent they are
brought against the individuals in their official capacities.
II. Failure to State a Claim
The only remaining claims against the state defendants are
Counts II – VI, XV, and XVI, to the extent they are asserted
against current or former state officials acting in their
individual capacities. The state defendants move to dismiss
those claims on the ground that they fail to state claims on
which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
determines whether the complaint alleges facts that “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009). That process requires the
court to take the factual allegations in the complaint as true
and to draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 2019).
As mentioned above, Spencer’s suit arises from the
circumstances of a traffic stop and subsequent events. He
states in his complaint that he is bringing a “federal civil
rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Doc. no. 1 at 2.
Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights but
instead “provides a method for vindicating federal rights
4 elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason, a
plaintiff bringing a claim under § 1983 must allege facts that
show the defendants’ conduct violated a federal constitutional
or statutory right. Garcia-Gonzalez v. Puig-Morales, 761 F.3d
81, 87 (1st Cir. 2014). In the absence of specific allegations
that identify what constitutional or statutory right the
plaintiff is alleging the defendants violated, “the Complaint
lacks a ‘short and plain statement of the claim’” and should be
dismissed. Cerullo v. Wall, No. CA 14-364-ML, 2014 WL 7272799,
at *2 (D.R.I. Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).
In each count against the individual state defendants,
Spencer alleges that the actions of each of the named defendants
“constitute outrageous and reckless behavior towards the
Plaintiff, constituting a violation of his civil rights, by
which the Plaintiff has been damaged.” Doc. no. 1 at 17, 18,
21. He does not allege a violation of a specific constitutional
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
William Spencer and Spencer Bros. LLC
v. Civil No. 18-cv-1191-LM Opinion No. 2019 DNH 066 New Hampshire State Police, et al.
O R D E R
William Spencer, proceeding pro se, brings 16 claims, each
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the New Hampshire State Police
and certain current and former officers, the New Hampshire
Office of the Attorney General and two of its employees
(collectively, with the New Hampshire State Police and its
officers, the “state defendants”), the Federal Motor Carriers
Safety Administration and three of its employees, and the United
States Department of Transportation and two of its employees.1
Spencer’s suit arises from the circumstances of a traffic stop
and subsequent events. The state defendants move to dismiss the
1 The complaint was brought on behalf of both Spencer and Spencer Brothers LLC. On March 8, 2019, Spencer Brothers LLC moved for a voluntary dismissal of its claims without prejudice. See doc. no. 13. Defendants do not object. Although Spencer Brothers LLC could have voluntarily dismissed its claims without prejudice absent a court order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.1(a)(1)(A)(i), the court grants Spencer Brothers LLC’s motion. claims brought against them.2 Spencer did not file a response to
the state defendants’ motion.3
I. Sovereign Immunity
The state defendants move to dismiss all claims against
them on the ground that they are protected by sovereign immunity
and cannot be sued under § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment bars
suits in federal courts against a state unless the state has
waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has exercised its
power to override sovereign immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
2 The claims against the state defendants are Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, XIV, XV, and XVI.
3 Although Spencer failed to respond, the court cannot grant the motion on that basis alone and must determine whether the complaint states a claim for relief. See Vega-Encarnacion v. Babilonia, 344 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[T]he mere fact that a motion to dismiss is unopposed does not relieve the district court of the obligation to examine the complaint to see whether it is formally sufficient to state a claim.”).
2 be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has held that a state is not a person
within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, Congress has not
abrogated sovereign immunity in civil rights cases brought under
that section. Will, 491 U.S. at 64. Because the state is not a
person and cannot be sued for damages in a § 1983 claim, state
agencies and individuals sued in their official capacities as
officers, employees, or agents of a state are also not persons
for purposes of § 1983. Fantini v. Salem State College, 557
F.3d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 2009) (“It is well settled that neither a
state agency nor a state official acting in his official
capacity may be sued for damages in a section 1983 action.”
(internal alterations, citations, and quotations omitted)).
Count I alleges a § 1983 claim against the New Hampshire
State Police and Count XIV alleges a § 1983 claim against the
New Hampshire Office of the Attorney General. Those claims are
barred by sovereign immunity and are dismissed for the reasons
stated above. In addition, Counts II – VI, XV, and XVI, which
allege § 1983 claims against current and former individual
employees of either the state police or the Attorney General’s
3 Office, are dismissed on the same ground to the extent they are
brought against the individuals in their official capacities.
II. Failure to State a Claim
The only remaining claims against the state defendants are
Counts II – VI, XV, and XVI, to the extent they are asserted
against current or former state officials acting in their
individual capacities. The state defendants move to dismiss
those claims on the ground that they fail to state claims on
which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
determines whether the complaint alleges facts that “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009). That process requires the
court to take the factual allegations in the complaint as true
and to draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 2019).
As mentioned above, Spencer’s suit arises from the
circumstances of a traffic stop and subsequent events. He
states in his complaint that he is bringing a “federal civil
rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Doc. no. 1 at 2.
Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights but
instead “provides a method for vindicating federal rights
4 elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason, a
plaintiff bringing a claim under § 1983 must allege facts that
show the defendants’ conduct violated a federal constitutional
or statutory right. Garcia-Gonzalez v. Puig-Morales, 761 F.3d
81, 87 (1st Cir. 2014). In the absence of specific allegations
that identify what constitutional or statutory right the
plaintiff is alleging the defendants violated, “the Complaint
lacks a ‘short and plain statement of the claim’” and should be
dismissed. Cerullo v. Wall, No. CA 14-364-ML, 2014 WL 7272799,
at *2 (D.R.I. Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).
In each count against the individual state defendants,
Spencer alleges that the actions of each of the named defendants
“constitute outrageous and reckless behavior towards the
Plaintiff, constituting a violation of his civil rights, by
which the Plaintiff has been damaged.” Doc. no. 1 at 17, 18,
21. He does not allege a violation of a specific constitutional
right or any other right provided under federal law. His
factual allegations also do not include reference to particular
federal rights.
The state defendants attempt to interpret what right
Spencer might intend to rely on for his claims and argue that he
has not alleged actionable violations of those rights. The
5 court will not speculate about what Spencer may have intended.
Instead, the claims are dismissed because they are
insufficiently alleged. However, they are dismissed without
prejudice to allow Spencer to file an amended complaint, if
appropriate, with properly pleaded claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Spencer Brothers LLC’s motion
for voluntary dismissal of its claims (doc. no. 13) is granted.
The state defendants’ motion to dismiss (document no. 9) is
granted as follows:
Counts I and XIV are dismissed, with prejudice. The New
Hampshire State Police and the New Hampshire Office of the
Attorney General are dismissed from the case. All claims
against the individual state defendants (Counts II, III, IV, V,
VI, XV, and XVI) in their official capacities also are dismissed
with prejudice.
Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, XV, and XVI, to the extent they
are brought against the individual state defendants in their
individual capacities, are dismissed without prejudice to
Spencer’s ability to file an amended complaint setting forth
facts sufficient to state a plausible claim against those
defendants. Spencer may file an amended complaint on or before
6 May 7, 2019. Failure to file an amended complaint within this
time frame will result in dismissal with prejudice of Counts II,
III, IV, V, VI, XV, and XVI as against the individual state
defendants in their individual capacities.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge
April 9, 2019
cc: Counsel and Pro Se Party of Record