William S. Kachele, Jr. v. Superior Court of California, County of San Diego

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-02778
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM S. KACHELE, JR., Case No.: 26-cv-2778-BJC-MSB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING 13 v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 6] AND (2) 14 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 15 Defendants. ORDER [ECF NO. 8] 16 17 On May 1, 2026, Plaintiff William S. Kachele, Jr., proceeding pro se, filed a 18 Complaint alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 19 and Rehabilitation Act against Defendant Superior Court of California. ECF No. 1. On 20 May 26, 2026, Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. ECF No. 6. 21 Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, and Defendant filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 25, 27. 22 On May 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining 23 Order (“TRO”) requesting that the Court enjoin Defendant from enforcing any writ of 24 possession entered against him. ECF No. 8. On June 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Notice of 25 Third-Party Trust Property Interest Supplement to Ex Parte Application for TRO. ECF 26 No. 9. On June 2, 2026, Defendant filed an opposition to the TRO. ECF No. 10. On June 27 23, 2026, Defendants filed a Reply to the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 13. 28 1 For the reasons outlined below, the Court Grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 2 and Denies Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO. 3 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 4 Plaintiff is a 67-year-old dentist who operated his dental practice at 751 Rancheros 5 Drive, Suite 3, San Marcos, California 92069 for approximately 21 years. On January 3, 6 2026, an unlawful detainer (“UD”) case was filed against Plaintiff in the Superior Court of 7 California, County of San Diego. On April 23, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a Confidential 8 Request for Disability Accommodations pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 1.100 9 to the ADA Coordinator for the San Diego Superior Court. Plaintiff requested that he be 10 permitted to participate in all hearings by sworn written declaration or affidavit. In the 11 alternative, Plaintiff sought a medical continuance for 90 days from the date of the request 12 due to his medical history that includes a quadruple coronary artery bypass graft surgery 13 and a myocardial infarction (heart attack). Plaintiff’s treating cardiologist executed a 14 sworn declaration that stated Plaintiff was not medically cleared to participate in stressful 15 litigation and required a minimum of 90 days restricted activity before he could safely 16 participate in any legal proceedings. On April 24, 2026, the judge presiding over the 17 unlawful detainer case denied Plaintiff’s request because it contained improper ex parte 18 information about the subject matter or merits of the proceedings, it was untimely, it failed 19 to afford an opportunity for the opposing party to be heard, and it fundamentally altered 20 the nature of the proceedings. Motion to Dismiss ECF No. 6-1 at 1. 21 On May 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed the present action requesting that this Court issue a 22 declaration that Defendant’s practices violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and 23 constitute retaliation under the ADA, that Defendant failed to discharge its duties under 24 Rule 1.100, and that the declaration by Plaintiff’s cardiologist establishes his disability 25 status. Plaintiff further seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to issue a response to his 26 27 28 1 Rule 1.100 request through the ADA Coordinator, provide Plaintiff with reasonable 2 accommodation, and refrain from entering adverse rulings against Plaintiff based on his 3 physical absence. 4 On May 15, 2026, the Superior Court conducted a trial without Plaintiff present and 5 entered judgment against him. On May 27, 2026, the Superior Court issued a writ of 6 possession of the real property. ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 6. Plaintiff now seeks a temporary 7 restraining order preventing the enforcement of the writ of possession against the subject 8 property. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A. Motion to Dismiss 11 Defendant seeks dismissal of the complaint for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim as 12 required under FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 13 1. 12(b)(1) 14 A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) based 15 on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). An attack may be facial, 16 where the inquiry is confined to the allegations in the complaint, or factual, where the court 17 looks beyond the complaint to extrinsic evidence. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 18 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in 19 a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a 20 factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would 21 otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 22 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “A plaintiff has the burden of establishing the elements required for 23 standing[.]” Takhar v Kessler, 76 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 1996). 24 2. 12(b)(6) 25 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss 26 on the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 28 sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive 1 a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 2 to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 3 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); 4 Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 5 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 6 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible 7 claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and 8 common sense.” Id. at 663-64. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 9 relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If Plaintiff “ha[s] not 10 nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the complaint “must be 11 dismissed.” Id. at 570. 12 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must 13 “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light 14 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 15 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008)(quoting Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. Beaumont, 506 16 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2007). But courts are not “required to accept as true allegations that 17 are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 18 Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden 19 State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 20 B. Temporary Restraining Order 21 The issuance of a TRO “should be restricted to serving [the] underlying purpose of 22 preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 23 Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974); see also Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. 24 v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]he legal standards applicable to 25 TROs and preliminary injunctions are ‘substantially identical.’” Babaria v. Blinken, 87 26 F.4th 963, 976 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th 27 Cir. 2017)). The Ninth Circuit has prescribed the following equitable criteria for 28 determining whether to grant injunctive relief: 1 (1) the likelihood of the moving party’s success on the merits; (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to the moving party if relief is not granted; (3) 2 the extent to which the balance of hardships favors the respective parties; and 3 (4) in certain cases, whether the public interest will be advanced by granting the preliminary relief. 4

5 Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Swift Transp. Co., 367 F.3d 1108, 1111 6 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Miller ex. rel. N.L.R.B. v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 456 7 (9th Cir. 1994)). “The moving party must show either (1) a combination of probable 8 success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) the existence of serious 9 questions going to the merits, the balance of hardships tipping sharply in its favor, and at 10 least a fair chance of success on the merits.” Owner Operator, 367 F.3d at 1111. District 11 courts possess discretion regarding the grant or denial of preliminary relief. Env’t Prot. 12 Info. Ctr. v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020). Injunctive relief is “an 13 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 14 entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to the 17 Younger abstention doctrine and the Anti-Injunction Act, which generally bar federal 18 courts from interfering with pending state court proceedings.” Mot. at 1. In addition, 19 Defendant claims the complaint must be dismissed because it fails to allege sufficient facts 20 to state cognizable ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the Superior Court. Id. 21 A. Younger Abstention 22 The Younger abstention doctrine reflects a “longstanding public policy against 23 federal court interference with state court proceedings.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 24 43 (1971). Younger abstention applies “when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) 25 are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state’s interest in enforcing the orders 26 and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants 27 to raise federal challenges.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 28 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 593-94 1 (2013); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2004)). “If these ‘threshold 2 elements’ are met, [courts] then consider whether the federal action would have the 3 practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an exception to Younger 4 applies.” Id. (citing Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 978, 983–84). 5 Defendant argues that all of the Younger prongs are established here because the 6 unlawful detainer case is ongoing, the present action involves the important state interest 7 of enforcing the judgments of the courts, and Plaintiff has the ability to raise his allegations 8 in the unlawful detainer case via a writ of mandate or appeal of final judgment. ECF No. 9 6-1 at 6-7. Plaintiff counters that the bad faith and extraordinary circumstances exceptions 10 to the Younger doctrine apply because the state proceedings are being conducted in bad 11 faith as evidenced by the denial of his disability accommodation and the entry of judgment 12 against him in his absence. ECF No. 7 at 4. In addition, he claims that “[d]irecting Plaintiff 13 to seek appellate relief from the same institution whose conduct is being challenged in 14 federal court does not constitute an adequate state forum.” Id. at 5. He further argues that 15 Younger abstention does not apply where, like here, a disabled litigant is denied 16 “reasonable accommodation necessary to access judicial proceedings.” Id. at 6. 17 Under the present circumstances, the Younger factors are satisfied. First, the 18 unlawful detainer action is “ongoing” because it was initiated “after the federal complaint 19 [was] filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the 20 federal court.” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975). Next, the present case involves 21 the “state’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts” because Plaintiff 22 is asking this Court to review and enjoin the Superior Court’s determination on his request 23 for accommodations and interfere with the judgment in the unlawful detainer action. 24 ReadyLink Healthcare, 754 F.3d at 759. Third, the unlawful detainer action implicates 25 important state interests, because it is coupled with “the state judiciary's interest in the 26 operation of the judicial system.” Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th 27 Cir. 2013). Finally, Plaintiff may raise his claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in 28 the unlawful detainer action by way of a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Rule 1 1.100(g)(2), or he can appeal the final judgment. In fact, Plaintiff filed an appeal in the 2 unlawful detainer action which is currently pending. Declaration of Patrick Goode, ECF 3 No. 10-1 ¶ 6. The threshold elements are therefore satisfied. 4 The Court next considers whether this federal action would “have the practical effect 5 of enjoining the state proceedings.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc., 754 F.3d at 759. The 6 Court concludes that allowing the present action to proceed would have this effect because 7 Plaintiff requests an injunction requiring Defendant Superior Court to issue a response to 8 Plaintiff’s ADA request via its ADA Coordinator, require that the Superior Court provide 9 Plaintiff with reasonable accommodations consistent with his cardiologist’s declaration, 10 and prohibit the Superior Court from entering adverse rulings against Plaintiff. ECF No. 11 1 at 20-21. If the Court granted the requested relief, it would have the practical effect of 12 enjoining the ongoing unlawful detainer action in state court. 13 Finally, there is no exception to the Younger doctrine that applies. Here, Plaintiff 14 claims that the actions of the Superior Court were taken in bad faith and that extraordinary 15 circumstances exist that create a threat of irreparable injury. “[A]n exception to abstention 16 applies if the state proceedings demonstrate ‘bad faith, harassment, or some other 17 extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate.’” Baffert v. Cal. 18 Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 2003)(citing Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 19 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1992). “[B]ad faith ‘generally means that a prosecution has been brought 20 without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.’” Id. Here, there is no 21 evidence that the Superior Court’s actions were taken in bad faith under this standard. 22 There is also no support for Plaintiff’s contention that the irreparable harm exception 23 applies. The exception is applied only in “extraordinary circumstances where the danger 24 of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.” World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. 25 v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1987). Generally, courts have determined 26 that the irreparable harm exception applies only in situations where there has been or is a 27 deprivation of a person's physical liberty that “cannot be fully vindicated after trial.” Bean 28 v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2021)(finding irreparable harm exception 1 applied where Plaintiff’s “right to avoid forcible administration of antipsychotic 2 medications cannot be fully vindicated after trial.”) Accordingly, no exception to the 3 Younger abstention doctrine applies. 4 Plaintiff argues that there is no adequate state forum due to institutional conflict. 5 However, under Rule 1.100(g)(2), Plaintiff was entitled to file a petition for writ of mandate 6 in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court. He cites no authority for the proposition 7 that a state appellate court’s review of the Superior Court’s determination will necessarily 8 be insufficient simply because they are both state court entities. 9 Finally, there is no merit to Plaintiff’s contention that his access to courts claim under 10 the ADA overrides Younger abstention in this case. Plaintiff cites Tennessee v. Lane, 541 11 U.S. 509 (2004), for the proposition that Younger abstention does not apply to access-to- 12 courts claims under the ADA in federal court. The Court in Lane addressed the claims of 13 two paraplegic individuals who faced physical barriers to their ability to enter courts. Id. at 14 513-14. In holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not render the State immune from 15 suit under the ADA, the Court did not address Younger abstention, nor did it contemplate 16 the possible interference of a district court in a state court’s determination under the ADA 17 in an ongoing unlawful detainer action. Id. at 517. For these reasons, Lane is unhelpful to 18 Plaintiff. 19 For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Younger abstention applies and 20 the Court is divested of authority to review Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court of 21 California in San Diego in his unlawful detainer action. Lacking jurisdiction, the Court 22 refrains from addressing Defendant’s claims regarding the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s ADA 23 and Rehabilitation Claims. 24 B. Anti-Injunction Act 25 Even if Younger abstention did not apply, the Court would be prohibited from 26 addressing Plaintiff’s claims under the Anti-Injunction Act (“Act”). A federal may not 27 enjoin “proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or 28 where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.’” 28 1 U.S.C. § 2283. “Rooted firmly in constitutional principles, the Act is designed to prevent 2 || friction between federal and state courts by barring federal intervention in all but the 3 narrowest of circumstances.” Sandpiper Vill. Condo. Ass‘n., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 4 F.3d 831, 842 (9th Cir. 2005). “The Act's mandate extends not only to injunctions 5 || affecting pending proceedings, but also to injunctions against the execution or enforcement 6 || of state judgments.” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007). 7 ||“Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by 8 ||intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state 9 ||appellate courts and ultimately [the Supreme] Court.” Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of 10 || Locomotive Eng ’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970). 11 Here, the Act prevents this Court from exercising jurisdiction. Plaintiff seeks to have 12 Court enjoin the state court’s “entering of any finding of non-appearance, default, or 13 |/other adverse merits ruling against Plaintiff in the State Court Action on the basis of 14 || Plaintiff's medically compelled physical absence.” ECF No. 1 at 21. Because the relief 15 || Plaintiff seeks would interfere with state court proceedings, the Act prohibits this Court 16 || from adjudicating his claims.” 17 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 18 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, □□□□□□□□□□□ 19 || TRO is DENIED, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court 20 directed to close the case. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 30, 2026 Dagon Chalo Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks United States District Judge 25 2oi}o020tti<“i‘< OO! 27 ||* Because the Court finds that Younger abstention and the Anti Injunction Act apply, 28 Plaintiff's request for a TRO fails because he has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED.