NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3910-15T1
WILLIAM RUMBAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
MICHELLE JONES, FRANJ REMICK, LISA REMICK, PIERRE WEIMER, JOSEPHINE WEIMER and MARUEEN MCDONALD,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SONY ELECTRONICS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________________
Argued September 27, 2017 – Decided October 12, 2017
Before Judges Alvarez, Nugent, and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L- 4087-12.
William Rumbas, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Robert J. Hafner argued the cause for respondent (Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Hafner and Elizabeth A. Weill, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this products liability action, plaintiff William Rumbas
appeals from two orders: the first entered judgment on a jury
verdict of no cause for action; the second denied plaintiff's
post-verdict motion seeking a new trial.1 The jury rejected
plaintiff's claim that his television, manufactured by defendant,
malfunctioned and caused the fire that damaged his and three other
condominium units. The trial judge, James P. Savio, rejected
plaintiff's post-verdict motion for a new trial based on a juror's
purported disdain for plaintiff as the result of a landlord-tenant
action plaintiff had filed against the juror's friend ten years
earlier. We agree with Judge Savio's decision and therefore
affirm both orders.
These are the facts relevant to plaintiff's appeal. When
jury selection began, Judge Savio gave the jury panel a preliminary
overview of the case. He informed the jurors of the street address
and municipality where the fire occurred. He told the prospective
jurors:
This is a civil lawsuit where the plaintiffs were owners of property, . . . condominium
1 Although other plaintiffs participated in the trial, Mr. Rumbas is the only plaintiff who appealed. Accordingly, we refer to him as "plaintiff" in this opinion.
2 A-3910-15T1 units . . . . Mr. Rumbas [was] the owner[] of a flat screen television that was located within the property. The flat screen television was manufactured by the defendant . . . .
On March 16, 2012, a fire erupted . . . [and] spread and damaged property of the other plaintiffs. The plaintiffs allege that the fire originated in the television and that the fire was caused by a defectively manufactured television. The plaintiffs seek monetary compensation for the damages to the structures and to the personal property located within the structures that they allege was sustained as a result of the fire itself as well as the suppression of the fire.
The judge had eight jurors, whose names were randomly
selected, sit in the jury box. He asked the eight jurors twenty-
eight preliminary questions. Before asking the questions, Judge
Savio explained to the panel that the twenty-eight questions were
designed to elicit a negative response. He also explained that
as jurors seated in the jury box were excused and replaced by
those from the panel, he would not repeat all twenty-eight
questions. Rather, he would ask the replacement juror if his or
her answer to any of the questions "would be anything other than
'no.'" The judge further instructed the panel that each
prospective juror should assume they would be the next person
picked to replace a juror seated in the jury box. The judge gave
each prospective juror a list of the preliminary questions so they
3 A-3910-15T1 could follow along while the judge questioned those in the jury
box.
Early in the questioning process, the attorneys introduced
their clients. Plaintiff's attorney explained that plaintiff had
to go to a pharmacy but would return soon. After the attorneys
introduced their clients, the judge read a list of potential
witnesses, including plaintiff William Rumbas. The judge asked
the prospective jurors if they knew any of the individuals.
While the judge was questioning the prospective jurors about
the witnesses, plaintiff entered the courtroom. His attorney
announced his arrival: "Excuse me, Your Honor. Mr. Rumbas just
walked in. Can I just introduce him quickly?" Plaintiff's
attorney had plaintiff stand up, and the attorney then introduced
plaintiff to the jury. The court immediately inquired, "Do any
of you know Mr. Rumbas?" None of the jurors seated in the jury
box responded affirmatively.
The court excused more than twenty-five prospective jurors
for various reasons. Juror 4 – the subject of plaintiff's post-
trial motion – was the last juror to be selected before the jury
was sworn. When Juror 4 replaced a previously seated juror, the
judge asked if Juror 4 had heard all of his questions. The juror
responded, "Yes." The court next asked if the juror's answer to
any of the questions would be anything other than no. The juror
4 A-3910-15T1 responded, "No. I also live in [the municipality where the fire
occurred]. Surprisingly, for as small as the town is I really
don't know of this story." After the juror provided biographical
information, each attorney informed the court the seated jurors
constituted an acceptable jury. The jury was then sworn.
Jury selection took place on February 22, 2016. The jury
returned a unanimous verdict of no cause for action on March 1,
2016.2 The court discharged the jury that day. During the course
of the trial, plaintiff raised no issue about Juror 4.
Twenty-nine days after the jury rendered its March 1, 2016
verdict, plaintiff filed a notice of motion "For New Trial." In
support of his motion for a new trial, plaintiff filed a
certification in which he acknowledged the case was tried before
a jury from February 22, 2016, through March 1, 2016. According
to plaintiff, he was "present for a portion of jury selection, the
parties' openings and closings, and for [his own] trial testimony."
Plaintiff averred that he left court to go to a pharmacy
before jury selection began. He stated, "I arrived towards the
end of jury selection, and did not note [Juror 4]." He further
explained that when he testified, he was focused on his attorney
2 The court excused one juror, so seven jurors deliberated and returned the verdict. The verdict was not required to be unanimous. R. 1:8-2(b) and (c).
5 A-3910-15T1 and the questioning, not the jury, and he did not notice Juror 4.
During closing arguments, however, as plaintiff watched the
jurors, one looked familiar, but he could not recall the juror's
name. A few days after the verdict, he realized that the juror
who looked familiar lived a few blocks away from him and disliked
him based on the eviction proceeding plaintiff instituted "several
years ago" against the juror's friend.
Plaintiff further explained that in 2006, he rented a property
to Juror 4's close friend, who worked with the juror. In fact,
plaintiff saw Juror 4 at the rental property "many times." When
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3910-15T1
WILLIAM RUMBAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
MICHELLE JONES, FRANJ REMICK, LISA REMICK, PIERRE WEIMER, JOSEPHINE WEIMER and MARUEEN MCDONALD,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SONY ELECTRONICS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________________
Argued September 27, 2017 – Decided October 12, 2017
Before Judges Alvarez, Nugent, and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L- 4087-12.
William Rumbas, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Robert J. Hafner argued the cause for respondent (Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Hafner and Elizabeth A. Weill, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this products liability action, plaintiff William Rumbas
appeals from two orders: the first entered judgment on a jury
verdict of no cause for action; the second denied plaintiff's
post-verdict motion seeking a new trial.1 The jury rejected
plaintiff's claim that his television, manufactured by defendant,
malfunctioned and caused the fire that damaged his and three other
condominium units. The trial judge, James P. Savio, rejected
plaintiff's post-verdict motion for a new trial based on a juror's
purported disdain for plaintiff as the result of a landlord-tenant
action plaintiff had filed against the juror's friend ten years
earlier. We agree with Judge Savio's decision and therefore
affirm both orders.
These are the facts relevant to plaintiff's appeal. When
jury selection began, Judge Savio gave the jury panel a preliminary
overview of the case. He informed the jurors of the street address
and municipality where the fire occurred. He told the prospective
jurors:
This is a civil lawsuit where the plaintiffs were owners of property, . . . condominium
1 Although other plaintiffs participated in the trial, Mr. Rumbas is the only plaintiff who appealed. Accordingly, we refer to him as "plaintiff" in this opinion.
2 A-3910-15T1 units . . . . Mr. Rumbas [was] the owner[] of a flat screen television that was located within the property. The flat screen television was manufactured by the defendant . . . .
On March 16, 2012, a fire erupted . . . [and] spread and damaged property of the other plaintiffs. The plaintiffs allege that the fire originated in the television and that the fire was caused by a defectively manufactured television. The plaintiffs seek monetary compensation for the damages to the structures and to the personal property located within the structures that they allege was sustained as a result of the fire itself as well as the suppression of the fire.
The judge had eight jurors, whose names were randomly
selected, sit in the jury box. He asked the eight jurors twenty-
eight preliminary questions. Before asking the questions, Judge
Savio explained to the panel that the twenty-eight questions were
designed to elicit a negative response. He also explained that
as jurors seated in the jury box were excused and replaced by
those from the panel, he would not repeat all twenty-eight
questions. Rather, he would ask the replacement juror if his or
her answer to any of the questions "would be anything other than
'no.'" The judge further instructed the panel that each
prospective juror should assume they would be the next person
picked to replace a juror seated in the jury box. The judge gave
each prospective juror a list of the preliminary questions so they
3 A-3910-15T1 could follow along while the judge questioned those in the jury
box.
Early in the questioning process, the attorneys introduced
their clients. Plaintiff's attorney explained that plaintiff had
to go to a pharmacy but would return soon. After the attorneys
introduced their clients, the judge read a list of potential
witnesses, including plaintiff William Rumbas. The judge asked
the prospective jurors if they knew any of the individuals.
While the judge was questioning the prospective jurors about
the witnesses, plaintiff entered the courtroom. His attorney
announced his arrival: "Excuse me, Your Honor. Mr. Rumbas just
walked in. Can I just introduce him quickly?" Plaintiff's
attorney had plaintiff stand up, and the attorney then introduced
plaintiff to the jury. The court immediately inquired, "Do any
of you know Mr. Rumbas?" None of the jurors seated in the jury
box responded affirmatively.
The court excused more than twenty-five prospective jurors
for various reasons. Juror 4 – the subject of plaintiff's post-
trial motion – was the last juror to be selected before the jury
was sworn. When Juror 4 replaced a previously seated juror, the
judge asked if Juror 4 had heard all of his questions. The juror
responded, "Yes." The court next asked if the juror's answer to
any of the questions would be anything other than no. The juror
4 A-3910-15T1 responded, "No. I also live in [the municipality where the fire
occurred]. Surprisingly, for as small as the town is I really
don't know of this story." After the juror provided biographical
information, each attorney informed the court the seated jurors
constituted an acceptable jury. The jury was then sworn.
Jury selection took place on February 22, 2016. The jury
returned a unanimous verdict of no cause for action on March 1,
2016.2 The court discharged the jury that day. During the course
of the trial, plaintiff raised no issue about Juror 4.
Twenty-nine days after the jury rendered its March 1, 2016
verdict, plaintiff filed a notice of motion "For New Trial." In
support of his motion for a new trial, plaintiff filed a
certification in which he acknowledged the case was tried before
a jury from February 22, 2016, through March 1, 2016. According
to plaintiff, he was "present for a portion of jury selection, the
parties' openings and closings, and for [his own] trial testimony."
Plaintiff averred that he left court to go to a pharmacy
before jury selection began. He stated, "I arrived towards the
end of jury selection, and did not note [Juror 4]." He further
explained that when he testified, he was focused on his attorney
2 The court excused one juror, so seven jurors deliberated and returned the verdict. The verdict was not required to be unanimous. R. 1:8-2(b) and (c).
5 A-3910-15T1 and the questioning, not the jury, and he did not notice Juror 4.
During closing arguments, however, as plaintiff watched the
jurors, one looked familiar, but he could not recall the juror's
name. A few days after the verdict, he realized that the juror
who looked familiar lived a few blocks away from him and disliked
him based on the eviction proceeding plaintiff instituted "several
years ago" against the juror's friend.
Plaintiff further explained that in 2006, he rented a property
to Juror 4's close friend, who worked with the juror. In fact,
plaintiff saw Juror 4 at the rental property "many times." When
the juror's friend stopped paying rent, plaintiff was forced to
file an eviction complaint and evict her. In October 2006, he
also obtained a default judgment against the juror's friend.
Thereafter, he filed an application for a wage execution in an
effort to collect the judgment.
Plaintiff asserted in his certification that Juror 4 was
present when officers evicted the juror's friend from the rental
property. Plaintiff also asserted Juror 4 "became extremely
agitated and actually confronted the officers." Plaintiff
concluded his certification by asserting there was no way the
juror would not know his name or remember who he was. He believed
the juror "would harbor bias against [him] which would affect [the
juror's] ability to be an impartial juror in this matter."
6 A-3910-15T1 During argument on the motion, plaintiff requested the court
summon Juror 4 so that plaintiff could question the juror about
the decade-old eviction and any lingering animosity Juror 4 might
have for plaintiff.
Judge Savio denied the motion. Citing applicable case law
as well as Rule 1:16-1, which prohibits parties from examining
jurors except "by leave of court granted on good cause shown,"
Judge Savio determined plaintiff had not met the threshold showing
required to have a court recall a juror after the court has
discharged the jury. The judge pointed out that plaintiff was
unable throughout the trial to recognize Juror 4 and connect her
to proceedings that occurred ten years earlier. Judge Savio found
incongruous plaintiff's assertion that Juror 4 would recognize the
old relationship between plaintiff and the tenant, when plaintiff
himself did not make the connection during the trial. The judge
noted Juror 4 did not respond affirmatively to the question about
whether jurors knew Rumbas.
Judge Savio reasoned that in order to grant plaintiff's
request, he would have to conclude Juror 4 recognized plaintiff,
wanted to get back at him because he had evicted the juror's friend
from an apartment ten years earlier, and for that reason
deliberately misrepresented her answer to a question posed by the
court. In addition, Judge Savio concluded he would have to
7 A-3910-15T1 determine Juror 4 then influenced the six other jurors to decide
the case in favor of defendant.
On appeal, plaintiff reiterates the arguments he made to the
trial court. He asserts Juror 4's "concealment created destructive
uncertainties regarding the impartiality of the ultimate jury
verdict in this case." He also asserts, based upon the facts he
presented in his certification, "juror bias should be presumed."
Defendant responds that plaintiff's motion for a new trial
was untimely. Rule 4:49-1(b) requires that such a motion be filed
no later than twenty days after the return of the verdict.
Defendant further asserts that the time for filing such a motion
may not be enlarged, citing Rule 1:3-4(c). Additionally, defendant
argues that Judge Savio correctly determined plaintiff had failed
to make the strong showing that Juror 4's conduct had the capacity
to affect the verdict.
In reply, plaintiff argues that if not timely under Rule
4:49-1, his motion was timely under Rule 4:49-2 and Rule 4:50. He
reiterates the arguments he made in his original brief.
We affirm the orders entering judgment on the jury verdict
and denying plaintiff's post-verdict motion, substantially for the
reasons expressed by Judge Savio in the oral opinion he delivered
from the bench on April 15, 2016. We add the following brief
comments.
8 A-3910-15T1 Our Supreme Court has stated that "[c]alling back jurors for
interrogation after they have been discharged is an extraordinary
procedure which should be invoked only upon a strong showing that
a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct." State v.
Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 250 (1966). The Court explained that "[i]f
verdicts could be easily set aside as a result of an investigation
into secret jury deliberations, disappointed litigants would be
encouraged to tamper with jurors, to harass them and to employ
fraudulent practices in an effort to induce them to repudiate
their decisions." Ibid.
There are two exceptions to the general prohibition against
calling back jurors. The first occurs when a juror informs other
jurors of facts based on the juror's personal knowledge that have
not been introduced into evidence. The second occurs when a juror
makes comments in the jury room that manifest racial or religious
bigotry against a defendant. Id. at 251-52.
More recently, our Supreme Court has explained that "'[g]ood
cause' under [Rule 1:16-1] refers to some information that enters
jury deliberations and has the capacity for prejudice." Davis v.
Husain, 220 N.J. 270, 286 (2014). Thus, a "showing of good cause
includes information that is communicated to jurors – by another
juror or by an outsider – that is extraneous to the issues that
the jury is deciding, and that would be sufficiently prejudicial
9 A-3910-15T1 to warrant a new trial if such information were considered by the
jury." Ibid.
Here, as Judge Savio determined, plaintiff made no such
showing. Rather, plaintiff speculated that, after ten years, a
juror not only recognized him but maintained such a degree of
animosity that the juror was motivated to both misrepresent answers
to voir dire questions and attempt to influence other members of
the jury. Aside from plaintiff's beliefs, which constitute nothing
more than unsupported speculation, plaintiff produced no evidence
the juror either discussed these feelings with other jurors or in
some other way presented extraneous information during
deliberations.
In short, as Judge Savio concluded, plaintiff made an
insufficient showing under Rule 1:16-1 to warrant the court
summoning and examining any of the jurors.3
Affirmed.
3 In view of our disposition of plaintiff's argument on its merits, we need not address defendant's argument that plaintiff's post- verdict motion should have been dismissed because it was untimely filed.
10 A-3910-15T1