FOURTH DIVISION RICKMAN, C. J., DILLARD, P. J., and PIPKIN, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 28, 2023
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A23A0333. RIDLEY v. THE STATE.
RICKMAN, Chief Judge.
In this interlocutory appeal, William Ridley challenges the trial court’s order
granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude any evidence related to criminal
charges lodged against the lead investigator in the case. Ridley contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding any reference to the investigator’s arrest, the
charges asserted against him, and the subsequent termination of his employment. For
the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case to the
trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In October 2017, the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office investigated reports that
Ridley had engaged in acts that would constitute aggravated child molestation and
child molestation with two victims. Steve Sorrells, a detective in the Crimes Against Children Unit of the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office, was the lead investigator.
Sorrells interviewed the victims and their parents, attended the victims’ forensic
interviews, obtained a recorded statement from Ridley, applied for and obtained an
arrest warrant for Ridley and search warrants for evidence in the case, and testified
before the grand jury, which returned indictments against Ridley in October 2018.1
In November 2019, Sorrells was arrested on two charges of child molestation
and possibly other offenses. He was subsequently terminated from the Sheriff’s
Office. The record does not include many details about the case against Sorrells,
revealing only that, according to the Paulding County District Attorney’s Office, the
events took place while Sorrells was employed by the Sheriff’s Office, the Georgia
Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation, the Paulding County District
Attorney’s office is not handling the case, and no deal has been reached for his
cooperation as a witness in Ridley’s case. In September 2022, after Ridley’s appeal
was docketed in this Court, Sorrells was indicted by a Paulding County grand jury.
In anticipation of Sorrells’ testimony in this case, the State filed a motion in
limine to prohibit Ridley from mentioning the child molestation charges against
1 Although Ridley was indicted separately for each victim, the indictments were combined for trial.
2 Sorrells, his arrest, or his subsequent termination from the Sheriff’s Office. In its
motion, the State argued that such evidence would be inadmissible under OCGA §
24-6-608 (specific instances of bad conduct may not be proved by extrinsic evidence,
but may be inquired into on cross-examination if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness), OCGA § 24-4-402 (irrelevant evidence is not admissible), and
OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”).
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine.2 In its
order, the trial court initially recognized that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him
and stated that although the potential bias of a witness is always relevant, trial judges
retain the right to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. The trial court then
concluded that the evidence at issue was inadmissible character evidence precluded
by Rule 608. In addition, the trial court concluded that the evidence was more
prejudicial than probative and therefore properly excluded under Rule 403. After
2 We note that the trial court’s order was drafted by the State.
3 obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the trial court, Ridley filed an
application for interlocutory appeal in this Court, which we granted. This appeal
followed.
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine for abuse of discretion.
Hutzel v. State, 359 Ga. App. 493, 498 (4) (859 SE2d 495) (2021). “A party’s motion
in limine to exclude evidence as inadmissible should be granted only if there is no
circumstance under which the evidence is likely to be admissible at trial.
Accordingly, the grant of a motion in limine excluding evidence is a judicial power
which must be exercised with great care.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at
499 (4).
Ridley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding any
reference to Sorrells’ arrest, the charges asserted against him, and the subsequent
termination of his employment. He argues that the trial court abridged his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him and that the risk of unfair
prejudice to the State from admitting evidence of Sorrells’ pending charges does not
substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.3
3 Ridley does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence would not be admissible under Rule 608.
4 “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees to the defendant the right to inquire about a witness’s
pending criminal charges in an effort to show that the witness has possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives that may influence his testimony.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Carston v. State, 310 Ga. 797, 800 (2) (854 SE2d 684) (2021);
accord Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 402-403 (3) (480 SE2d 1) (1996).4 Whether
the witness is testifying pursuant to a deal with the State is not crucial to the right to
conduct such cross-examination. Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (290 SE2d 911)
(1982); accord Byrd v. State, 262 Ga. 426, 427 (2) (420 SE2d 748) (1992); see also
Cheley v. State, 299 Ga. 88, 94 (4) (786 SE2d 642) (2016) (Where a prosecution
witness is facing charges but has not entered a deal with the State, “the defendant has
broad scope in exposing the potential for bias in the witness’s testimony[.]”) (citation
and punctuation omitted).
What counts is whether the witness may be shading his testimony in an effort to please the prosecution. A desire to cooperate may be formed
4 “Bias is a term used in the ‘common law of evidence’ to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest.” United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 52 (105 SCt 465, 83 LE2d 450) (1984).
5 beneath the conscious level, in a manner not apparent even to the witness, but such a subtle desire to assist the state nevertheless may cloud perception.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hines, 249 Ga. at 260 (2). In addition, a
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FOURTH DIVISION RICKMAN, C. J., DILLARD, P. J., and PIPKIN, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 28, 2023
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A23A0333. RIDLEY v. THE STATE.
RICKMAN, Chief Judge.
In this interlocutory appeal, William Ridley challenges the trial court’s order
granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude any evidence related to criminal
charges lodged against the lead investigator in the case. Ridley contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding any reference to the investigator’s arrest, the
charges asserted against him, and the subsequent termination of his employment. For
the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case to the
trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In October 2017, the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office investigated reports that
Ridley had engaged in acts that would constitute aggravated child molestation and
child molestation with two victims. Steve Sorrells, a detective in the Crimes Against Children Unit of the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office, was the lead investigator.
Sorrells interviewed the victims and their parents, attended the victims’ forensic
interviews, obtained a recorded statement from Ridley, applied for and obtained an
arrest warrant for Ridley and search warrants for evidence in the case, and testified
before the grand jury, which returned indictments against Ridley in October 2018.1
In November 2019, Sorrells was arrested on two charges of child molestation
and possibly other offenses. He was subsequently terminated from the Sheriff’s
Office. The record does not include many details about the case against Sorrells,
revealing only that, according to the Paulding County District Attorney’s Office, the
events took place while Sorrells was employed by the Sheriff’s Office, the Georgia
Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation, the Paulding County District
Attorney’s office is not handling the case, and no deal has been reached for his
cooperation as a witness in Ridley’s case. In September 2022, after Ridley’s appeal
was docketed in this Court, Sorrells was indicted by a Paulding County grand jury.
In anticipation of Sorrells’ testimony in this case, the State filed a motion in
limine to prohibit Ridley from mentioning the child molestation charges against
1 Although Ridley was indicted separately for each victim, the indictments were combined for trial.
2 Sorrells, his arrest, or his subsequent termination from the Sheriff’s Office. In its
motion, the State argued that such evidence would be inadmissible under OCGA §
24-6-608 (specific instances of bad conduct may not be proved by extrinsic evidence,
but may be inquired into on cross-examination if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness), OCGA § 24-4-402 (irrelevant evidence is not admissible), and
OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”).
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine.2 In its
order, the trial court initially recognized that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him
and stated that although the potential bias of a witness is always relevant, trial judges
retain the right to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. The trial court then
concluded that the evidence at issue was inadmissible character evidence precluded
by Rule 608. In addition, the trial court concluded that the evidence was more
prejudicial than probative and therefore properly excluded under Rule 403. After
2 We note that the trial court’s order was drafted by the State.
3 obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the trial court, Ridley filed an
application for interlocutory appeal in this Court, which we granted. This appeal
followed.
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine for abuse of discretion.
Hutzel v. State, 359 Ga. App. 493, 498 (4) (859 SE2d 495) (2021). “A party’s motion
in limine to exclude evidence as inadmissible should be granted only if there is no
circumstance under which the evidence is likely to be admissible at trial.
Accordingly, the grant of a motion in limine excluding evidence is a judicial power
which must be exercised with great care.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at
499 (4).
Ridley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding any
reference to Sorrells’ arrest, the charges asserted against him, and the subsequent
termination of his employment. He argues that the trial court abridged his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him and that the risk of unfair
prejudice to the State from admitting evidence of Sorrells’ pending charges does not
substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.3
3 Ridley does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence would not be admissible under Rule 608.
4 “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees to the defendant the right to inquire about a witness’s
pending criminal charges in an effort to show that the witness has possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives that may influence his testimony.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Carston v. State, 310 Ga. 797, 800 (2) (854 SE2d 684) (2021);
accord Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 402-403 (3) (480 SE2d 1) (1996).4 Whether
the witness is testifying pursuant to a deal with the State is not crucial to the right to
conduct such cross-examination. Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (290 SE2d 911)
(1982); accord Byrd v. State, 262 Ga. 426, 427 (2) (420 SE2d 748) (1992); see also
Cheley v. State, 299 Ga. 88, 94 (4) (786 SE2d 642) (2016) (Where a prosecution
witness is facing charges but has not entered a deal with the State, “the defendant has
broad scope in exposing the potential for bias in the witness’s testimony[.]”) (citation
and punctuation omitted).
What counts is whether the witness may be shading his testimony in an effort to please the prosecution. A desire to cooperate may be formed
4 “Bias is a term used in the ‘common law of evidence’ to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest.” United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 52 (105 SCt 465, 83 LE2d 450) (1984).
5 beneath the conscious level, in a manner not apparent even to the witness, but such a subtle desire to assist the state nevertheless may cloud perception.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hines, 249 Ga. at 260 (2). In addition, a
defendant’s Confrontation Clause right to inquire about a witness’s pending criminal
charges is not automatically negated by the fact that the pending charges are being
prosecuted by a different district attorney’s office in the state. See Hines, 249 Ga. at
258, 260 (2) (upholding defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine a key
state’s witness concerning pending criminal charges against the witness where the
witness was being held in jail in an adjoining county because of his arrest on charges
in that county).
The Confrontation Clause does not, however, prohibit the imposition of any
limits on cross-examination into potential bias.5 Trial judges
5 For example, in Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 581 (3) (581 SE2d 23) (2003), the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized that the right of cross-examination integral to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does not mandate “unlimited questioning by the defense,” and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed defense counsel to question a prosecution witness about her pending charges but ruled that counsel could not ask the witness about the specific nature of the charges pending against her.
6 retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 639 (1) (571
SE2d 752) (2002). These limitations are consistent with Georgia’s Rule 403, which
permits trial judges to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury.6
“The major function of Rule 403 is to exclude matter of scant or cumulative
probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.”
6 Although the applicability of Rule 403 is not directly challenged here, we note that in Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U. S. 319 (126 SCt 1727, 164 LEd2d 503) (2006), the United State Supreme Court recognized the connection between these limitations on cross-examination and Federal Rule 403 and explained that although the Constitution “prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at 326-327 (II). In addition, the Supreme Court of Georgia, relying on the Holmes decision, found no constitutional impediment to applying Rule 403 to evidence of prior false allegations by a complaining witness in a sexual offense prosecution in State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 125-126 (3) (829 SE2d 367) (2019).
7 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 103 (4) (786 SE2d
648) (2016). Thus, the trial court’s discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 “is
an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 70 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016).
Here, the trial court found only that evidence of Sorrells’ pending charges was
more prejudicial than probative and never analyzed whether such prejudice
substantially outweighed any probative value. Accordingly, the trial court erred when
it performed its Rule 403 analysis. See State v. Jackson, 351 Ga. App. 675, 677 (832
SE2d 654) (2019) (abuse of discretion standard does not permit application of wrong
legal standard). We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for the
trial court to reconsider the motion in limine under the correct legal standard. See
State v. Harris, ___ Ga. ___ (3) (Case No. S23A0090, decided May 16, 2023); State
v. Anderson, 365 Ga. App. 75, 80 (877 SE2d 639) (2022); Jackson, 351 Ga. App. at
677.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Dillard, P. J., and
Pipkin, J., concur.