William Ray v. Peabody Institute of the Johns Hopkins University Conservatory of Music

11 F.3d 31, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31205, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,726, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 497, 1993 WL 492921
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedDecember 1, 1993
Docket93-1361
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 11 F.3d 31 (William Ray v. Peabody Institute of the Johns Hopkins University Conservatory of Music) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
William Ray v. Peabody Institute of the Johns Hopkins University Conservatory of Music, 11 F.3d 31, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31205, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,726, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 497, 1993 WL 492921 (4th Cir. 1993).

Opinion

OPINION

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:

William Ray appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment to the Peabody Institute of the Johns Hopkins University on his claims that several personnel actions taken against him by Peabody violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

William Ray, a sixty-seven year old black man, has been a voice instructor since 1982 at the Peabody Conservatory, a music college affiliated with the Johns Hopkins University. Ray was hired as a “performance” or “studio” faculty member in Peabody’s voice department to train students to be professional performers.

In an effort to attract students to the conservatory, Peabody assigns matriculating students to the studio of their first or second choice, provided that studio is not full and the faculty member is willing to instruct them. The students generally remain in the studio to which they are initially assigned throughout their study at the Institute. Students who do not register a preference for a particular studio, or whose preferred studios are unavailable, are permitted to choose from among the remaining available faculty studios. J.A. at 109-111.

Since arriving at Peabody, Ray has consistently failed to attract a full class of fourteen students to his studio. Id. at 112. Notwithstanding the facts that prior to and since Ray’s arrival, Peabody’s faculty salaries have been based in part on studio enrollment, id. at 117, and that Ray’s studio was significantly under-enrolled, Peabody paid Ray his full salary during each of his first three years at the conservatory, id. at 115, 118, in addition to the five-thousand dollars annually that he was paid to serve as Peabody’s minority recruiter. Id. at 25,170. In May 1985, however, Dean Eileen Tate Cline, a black woman, informed Ray that his salary would thereafter be adjusted to account for the under-enrollment in his studio (although in fact Ray’s salary for the following year was still not reduced to reflect his sub-par enrollment). Id. at 88-89. After enrolling twelve students in 1985-86, two fewer than the full enrollment of fourteen, Ray’s studio attendance dwindled to ten students in 1986-87, seven in 1987-88, and six in 1988-89. Id. at 112. Based in large part on Ray’s under-subscribed studio, Dean Cline finally recommended that Ray’s contract not be renewed *33 effective July 1, 1989. This recommendation was ultimately rejected after intercession by the University provost, however, and Ray’s contract was renewed for the 1989-90 academic year. Id. at 115-16.

During that year, a specially convened state task force mandated that Peabody control its expenditures. Id. at 118. In response, Peabody adopted new faculty salary guidelines that tied compensation even more directly to an instructor’s studio enrollment. 1 Id. at 119, 134. These guidelines have been uniformly applied to all instructors at Peabody since 1990. As Ray’s studio enrollment between 1990 and 1993 dwindled from seven students to four and then to only one, id. at 112, Peabody applied its new guidelines, with some lenience, 2 to reduce his salary by five percent, then by fifty percent, and finally to convert Ray to a part-time faculty member paid on an hourly basis. Id. at 121. The salaries of twelve other instructors were also reduced under these guidelines.

Ray alleges that his salary adjustments were made on the basis of his race and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The district court held that Ray failed to establish a prima facie ease of discrimination, and granted summary judgment to Peabody. From this judgment, appeal was taken.

II.

Ray advances essentially two theories of discrimination. First, he contends that Peabody’s enrollment-based salary plan is itself discriminatory because it impermissibly allows subjective student preferences to dictate faculty salaries. Second, he argues that, even if Peabody’s enrollment-based compensation plan is not discriminatory in principle, Peabody discriminatorily manipulated its student assignment system to minimize the number of students enrolled in his studio. We reject both claims.

A.

Ray first challenges the legality of Peabody’s compensation scheme itself. He alleges that, because faculty salaries are directly affected by the students’ studio choices, which are often made after actually meeting various instructors, the scheme is “inherently designed to reflect the subjective preferences and prejudices of individual students-” Appellant’s Brief at 36. In effect, he argues that the compensation plan, although facially neutral, disparately affects minorities and the aged.

We find it difficult to imagine a case where a plaintiff could successfully claim that a policy of allowing students to choose their instructors, a neutral educational policy with an established tradition in higher education, and basing salary in part on the resulting enrollment, violates Title VII. Assuming that such would be possible, however, it is clear that Ray has not produced the evidence that would be required to make out this claim. As the district court recognized, Ray produced “no evidence” contradictory to Peabody’s assertions that the 1990 guidelines have been uniformly applied to all faculty members and have resulted in salary reductions for faculty members of diverse races and ages. J.A. at 31-32. Indeed, the record *34 supports no conclusion other than that Peabody’s compensation scheme is a sound educational policy born not of racial design, but of a genuine interest in achieving the highest academic standards possible during a period of financial austerity. Against this record, the mere fact that the plan happened to affect adversely one member of a protected class through its even-handed infusion of healthy competition into the salary calculus simply is not sufficient to permit Ray to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Cf. Gairola v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep’t of General Services, 753 F.2d 1281, 1287 (4th Cir.1985) (Title VII does not “require an employer to adopt a life of economic altruism and thereby immunize protected class members from discharge or demotion despite their poor performance ...”).

B.

Perhaps recognizing as much, Ray alternatively contends that, even if Peabody’s salary plan is not itself illegitimate, the institution still violated Title VII by manipulating its student assignment system so as to minimize Ray’s studio enrollment and thereby reduce his compensation. Ray claims in this regard that Peabody deliberately assigned a disproportionate number of minority students to his studio.

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11 F.3d 31, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31205, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,726, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 497, 1993 WL 492921, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-ray-v-peabody-institute-of-the-johns-hopkins-university-ca4-1993.