William Ray Grimes v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 13, 2026
• Docket: 25A-CR-01687
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Tavitas

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED William Ray Grimes, Apr 13 2026, 8:53 am

Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

v.

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

April 13, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1687 Appeal from the Sullivan Superior Court The Honorable Hugh R. Hunt, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 77D01-2404-MR-200

Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Weissmann concurs. Judge Foley dissents with separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 1 of 15 Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Case Summary [1] Following a jury trial, William Grimes was convicted of felony murder and

conspiracy to commit burglary resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class A

felony. Grimes appeals and argues that his convictions for both felony murder

and conspiracy to commit burglary resulting in serious bodily injury: (1) violate

the multiple convictions statute; and (2) constitute substantive double jeopardy.

We conclude that Grimes’ convictions for both conspiracy to commit burglary

resulting in serious bodily injury and felony murder based on the same burglary

constitute substantive double jeopardy. Accordingly, although we affirm

Grimes’ conviction for felony murder, we reverse his conviction for conspiracy

to commit burglary resulting in serious bodily injury and remand with

instructions that the trial court vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence

entered on that count.

Issue [2] Grimes presents two issues, one of which we find dispositive and restate as

whether Grimes’ convictions for felony murder and conspiracy to commit

burglary resulting in serious bodily injury constitute substantive double

jeopardy.

Facts [3] The victim in this case, Lowell Badger, was an elderly farmer—Badger was

eighty-five years old at the time of his death—who lived alone after his wife Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 2 of 15 passed away in 2008. In early December 2012, Badger planned to visit his

daughter in Bluffton on December 7 and 8. Before he left, Badger ran into

Grimes at a local store. Grimes and his brother, Artie, had worked for Badger

in the past. Badger and Grimes had a friendly conversation, and Badger told

Grimes about his plans to visit his daughter. Badger’s plans, however, changed.

His friend’s mother died, and the funeral was scheduled for December 8.

Accordingly, Badger decided to stay home and attend the funeral and was

home on the night of December 7.

[4] On the night of December 7, Grimes, his brother Artie, and their friend Richard

Taft were hanging out together and using methamphetamine. The three men

rode around in a truck trying to poach deer using a spotlight; Grimes had a

handgun and a rifle with him. At some point, Grimes told the others he knew

where they could get some “pills and money.” Tr. Vol. VII p. 82. The men

then drove to Badger’s home and entered via an unlocked door in the garage.

Grimes took the handgun with him into the house.

[5] Once inside Badger’s home, Taft attempted to disconnect the television, while

Grimes went to another part of the home. Badger, who was home at the time,

went to investigate and confronted Grimes. Grimes struck Badger and knocked

him down. Badger recognized Artie by name. Badger pleaded on his knees,

“please don’t hurt me. Take whatever you want. I won’t tell nobody.” Id. at

90. Unmoved, Grimes said, “f**k that. He’s seen us. He knows who -- who

we are.” Id. Grimes then shot Badger in the head and chest, killing him. Taft

ran away and hid in a nearby fence line, but Grimes and Artie took Badger’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 3 of 15 television, wallet, and safe and fled the scene. Badger’s family later discovered

his body.

[6] Badger’s murder went unsolved for several years. But during this time, Grimes

told several friends and family members about his involvement in the crimes

and stated that he did not know Badger would be home. Eventually, Taft came

forward with information regarding Badger’s murder while he was incarcerated

on other, unrelated charges.

[7] On April 26, 2024, Grimes was indicted on charges of felony murder; burglary,

a Class A felony; and conspiracy to commit burglary, a Class A felony. The

State also filed a notice of intent to seek a sentencing enhancement based on the

use of a handgun. An eight-day jury trial commenced on May 12, 2025, at the

conclusion of which the jury found Grimes guilty as charged. At sentencing,

the trial court vacated the conviction for burglary on double jeopardy grounds

and entered judgments of conviction on the felony murder and conspiracy

verdicts. The trial court sentenced Grimes to sixty-five years on the felony

murder conviction, which it enhanced by an additional five years for the use of

a handgun, and to a consecutive term of fifty years on the conspiracy

conviction. Grimes now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [8] Grimes claims that his convictions for both conspiracy to commit burglary

resulting in serious bodily injury and felony murder based on the same burglary

constitute substantive double jeopardy under Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 4 of 15 (Ind. 2020). In Wadle, our Supreme Court set forth a three-step test to

determine whether two or more convictions constitute substantive double

jeopardy. Under this test, we first determine whether the provisions clearly

permit “multiple punishment, whether expressly or by unmistakable

implication[.]” Id. at 253. Unless the provisions so permit, we proceed to the

second step, which asks whether the offenses are included, “either inherently or

as charged[.]” Id. If the offenses are not included, there is no double jeopardy

violation. But if the offenses are included, we proceed to the third and final

step, in which we “examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in

the charging instrument and as adduced at trial.” Id. If the facts demonstrate

that the defendant’s actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place,

singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single

transaction,” we will find that the defendant’s convictions constitute double

jeopardy. Id.

Step 1

[9] Under the first step of the Wadle test, we ask whether “the language of either

statute clearly permits multiple punishment, whether expressly or by

unmistakable implication.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 253. Grimes argues that

nothing in either the felony murder statute or the conspiracy and burglary

statutes expressly permits multiple punishments. The State argues that the

unmistakable implication of the conspiracy statute is that it clearly permits

multiple punishments.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 5 of 15 [10] In support of its argument, the State relies on Garth v. State, 182 N.E.3d 905

(Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. In that case, we held that the defendant’s

convictions for murder and conspiracy to commit murder did not constitute

double jeopardy. Our holding was based on the multiple convictions statute,

which prohibits convictions for both a conspiracy and an attempt with respect

to the same underlying crime, and for both a crime and an attempt to commit

the same crime. See Ind. Code § 35-41-5-3. The multiple convictions statute,

however, says nothing about convictions for both a completed crime and a

conspiracy to commit the same crime. Garth, 182 N.E.3d at 920.

[11] Accordingly, in Garth, we noted that “[i]f the legislature wanted to prohibit

convictions for both a crime and a conspiracy to commit that same crime, it

surely would have included such language in” the multiple convictions statute.

182 N.E.3d at 920. We, therefore, concluded that “the murder and conspiracy

statutes allow for multiple punishments,” and that the defendant’s convictions

for both murder and conspiracy to commit murder were not double jeopardy.

Id. at 920; see also Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)

(holding that defendant’s convictions for murder and conspiracy to commit

murder were not double jeopardy under the first step of the Wadle test).

[12] We find Garth and Littlefield to be readily distinguishable. Grimes was not

convicted of both the underlying crime and conspiracy to commit the

underlying crime, as were the defendants in Garth and Littlefield. Instead, he

was convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary and felony murder, an entirely

different crime. Although conspiracy is a distinct crime, this does not mean

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 6 of 15 that the statutes expressly permit multiple punishments. To the contrary, we

held in Hendricks v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1123, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), that the

statutes defining felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery did not

clearly permit multiple punishments, even though the felony murder was based

on the robbery. 1 The same is true here. We, therefore, proceed to the second

step of the Wadle analysis.

Step 2

[13] “Under Wadle step two, we determine whether the two offenses for which the

defendant was convicted constitute ‘included’ offenses.” Boner v. State, 243

N.E.3d 354, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248).

Included offenses come in two varieties: (1) “inherently” included offenses; and

(2) offenses that are included “as charged” or “factually included.” Id. (citing

A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1067 (Ind. 2024)).

[14] As explained in Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248, an offense is inherently included if it

meets the definition of an included offense under Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-

2-168. This statute provides that an “[i]ncluded offense” means an offense that:

1 The State criticizes Hendricks by claiming that, there, we considered only the express language of the statutes and failed to analyze whether the conspiracy statute permits multiple punishments by unmistakable implication. We disagree. When explaining the first step of the Wadle test in Hendricks, we explicitly stated that statutes may permit multiple punishment either expressly “or by unmistakable implication.” Hendricks, 162 N.E.3d at 1138 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 253). We then looked at the text of the statutes and concluded that they did not clearly permit multiple punishment. Id. The clear implication of this is that the statutes did not permit multiple punishment either expressly or by unmistakable implication.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 7 of 15 (1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168.

[15] In contrast to inherently included offenses, “[o]ffenses are included as charged

when ‘the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime

charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.’”

Boner, 243 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067). In A.W., our

Supreme Court clarified Wadle’s “perhaps misunderstood directions, while

adding a modification at Step 2.” Specifically, A.W. held that:

[W]here ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another, courts must construe those ambiguities in the defendant’s favor, and thus find a presumptive double jeopardy violation at Step 2. In this event, the State can later rebut this presumption at Step 3.

229 N.E.3d at 1069.

[16] Here, the charging instrument was ambiguous as to whether the conspiracy-to-

commit-burglary charge was factually included in the felony murder charge.

The felony murder charge alleged that Grimes “did knowingly or intentionally

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 8 of 15 commit or attempt to commit burglary: to wit: did break and enter the dwelling

of [Badger], with the intent to commit a felony in it, and in doing so, [Grimes]

or another person did kill [Badger].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 22. The

conspiracy-to-commit-burglary charge alleged that Grimes “did knowingly or

intentionally agree with another person to commit the crime of Burglary of a

dwelling,” that Grimes “and/or one or more conspirators performed an overt

act in furtherance of the agreement, to wit: by travelling to [Badger]’s dwelling,

securing the exterior door, and/or disposing of stolen property, and the

commission of the burglary resulted in serious bodily injury to [Badger].” Id. at

27.

[17] Although the charging instrument included some factual allegations, we can

still conceive of facts under which the means used to commit the felony murder

charge did not include all the elements of the conspiracy-to-commit-burglary

charge. We must construe any ambiguity against the State and presume a

double jeopardy violation at Step 2, which the State can rebut at Step 3. See

A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069.

Step 3

[18] “Under Wadle step three, we examine the facts underlying the offenses, ‘as

presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial.’” Boner, 243

N.E.3d at 367 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). “‘Based on this

information, a court must ask whether the defendant’s actions were so

compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of

action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 9 of 15 249). “If the defendant’s acts constitute a single transaction, the multiple

convictions constitute double jeopardy.” Id.

[19] Here, Grimes conceived of the plan to burglarize Badger’s home, informed his

co-conspirators, drove to Badger’s home, and entered the home, where Grimes

was confronted by Badger, who was unexpectedly home at the time. Grimes

then shot and killed Badger. All of this occurred within the span of one night

and was part of a continuous course of conduct. Grimes’ actions were

compressed in terms of time, place, and continuity of action.

[20] The State claims that Grimes’ actions did not share a singleness of purpose

because Grimes and his co-conspirators only agreed to burglarize the home, not

kill Badger. We disagree. First, when considering whether the defendant’s

actions constituted a single transaction, we consider all of the factors—time,

place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action—together, not in

isolation. Moreover, felony murder never requires that the killing be done with

purpose, i.e., knowingly or intentionally; instead, the felony murder statute

requires only the killing of another human being while committing (or

attempting to commit) one of the listed felonies. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1(2). The

fact that the killing need not be intentional does not mean that the conspiracy

and felony murder did not share a singleness of purpose. The singleness of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 10 of 15 purpose was the burglary, and Badger was shot and killed during the

commission of this burglary. 2

[21] We conclude that Grimes’ actions were so compressed in terms of time, place,

singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single

transaction. His convictions for both conspiracy to commit burglary resulting

in serious bodily injury and felony murder based on the same burglary,

therefore, constitute double jeopardy. 3 See Hendricks, 162 N.E.3d at 1140

(holding that actions on which defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to

commit robbery and felony murder were based constituted a single transaction).

Accordingly, we reverse Grimes’ conviction for the lesser offense of conspiracy

to commit burglary and remand with instructions that the trial court vacate the

judgment of conviction and sentence entered on that count. See Wadle, 151

N.E.3d at 255-56 (ordering vacatur of the lesser offense as remedy for double

jeopardy violation).

2 The State cites Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2002), and Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434 (Ind. 1999), in support of its argument that conspiracy and felony murder do not constitute double jeopardy. Spivey was decided under the previously-used Richardson double jeopardy analysis, and is no longer controlling. See Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 235 (expressly overruling the Richardson tests in resolving claims of substantive double jeopardy). Willey was a case involving the federal double jeopardy clause, and has no bearing on our Wadle analysis. 3 Grimes also claims that his convictions for conspiracy to commit burglary and felony murder violate the multiple convictions statute, Indiana Code Section 35-41-5-3. This statute provides that a defendant cannot be convicted of “both a conspiracy and an attempt with respect to the same underlying crime” or of “both a crime and an attempt to commit the same crime.” Id. Because we reverse Grimes’ conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary on double jeopardy grounds, we need not address his argument under the multiple convictions statute.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 11 of 15 Conclusion [22] Grimes’ convictions for both conspiracy to commit burglary resulting in serious

bodily injury and felony murder based on the same burglary constitute

substantive double jeopardy. Accordingly, we affirm Grimes’ conviction for

felony murder but reverse his conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary

resulting in serious bodily injury and remand with instructions that the trial

court vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence entered thereon.

[23] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Weissmann, J., concurs. Foley, J., dissents with separate opinion.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Christopher Taylor-Price Taylor-Price Law, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 12 of 15 Foley, Judge, dissenting.

[24] I respectfully dissent.

[25] While I agree with the majority as to Step 1 of the Wadle analysis, I part ways as

to Step 2. First, I would conclude that the two offenses are not inherently

included offenses under Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-168, as conspiracy to

commit burglary is not established by proof of same material elements as felony

murder, does not consist of an attempt to commit felony murder, and is not a

lesser included offense of felony murder.

[26] Next, we must consider whether the offenses are included, as charged. Based

on the language used in the charging instrument, I do not believe that an

ambiguity exists regarding whether the offense of conspiracy to commit

burglary was factually included in the offense of felony murder. Here, the

charging instrument provided as to felony murder:

that on or about the 8th day of December, 2012, at and within the County of Sullivan and in the State of Indiana, [Grimes] did knowingly or intentionally commit or attempt to commit burglary: to wit: did break and enter the dwelling of [Badger], with the intent to commit a felony in it, and in doing so, [Grimes] or another person did kill Lowell . . . .

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 22. As to the offense of conspiracy to commit

burglary, the charging information provided:

that on or about the 8th day of December, 2012, at and within the County of Sullivan and in the State of Indiana, [Grimes] did

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 13 of 15 knowingly or intentionally agree with another person to commit the crime of Burglary of a dwelling, and [Grimes] and/or one or more conspirators performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement, to wit: by travelling to [Badger’s] dwelling, securing the exterior door, and/or disposing of stolen property, and the commission of the Burglary resulted in bodily injury to [Badger] . ..

Id. at 27.

[27] The conspiracy to commit burglary count disclosed the means alleged to

commit the “act[s] in furtherance” of the conspiracy, which were specifically

identified by the State as “travelling to [Badger’s] dwelling, securing the exterior

door, and/or disposing of stolen property.” Id. In contrast, in the felony

murder count, the State alleged the means by which Grimes committed

burglary was by breaking and entering Badger’s dwelling with the intent to

commit a felony therein. The majority concludes that there is an ambiguity in

the charges about whether one offense is factually included in the other, and

therefore under A.W., we presume a double jeopardy violation and proceed to

Step 3.

[28] I find no such ambiguity. The two charges explicitly included distinct factual

allegations that dispelled any ambiguity in the means alleged. The felony

murder alleged a breaking and entering occurred. However, in the conspiracy

to commit burglary charge, the State disclosed the operative facts it alleged

supported the conspiracy, specifically alleging that Grimes committed the acts

of “travelling to [Badger’s] dwelling, securing the exterior door, and/or

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 14 of 15 disposing of stolen property,” which constitute acts in furtherance of the

conspiracy. Id. Those operative facts fail to support any material element of

the felony murder count, such that same facts are not being used to prove both

offenses. Here, no asymmetrical benefit is conferred to the State because the

State specifically alleged the operative facts relied upon for the conspiracy to

commit burglary count, and those facts fail to support any material element of

the felony murder count.

[29] Because I find no ambiguity in the charging instrument, I conclude that the

offenses are not factually included offenses. Under Wadle, our analysis ends

then at Step 2, and I would find no double jeopardy violation. Wadle, 151

N.E.3d at 248.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1687 | April 13, 2026 Page 15 of 15