Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of Jun 16 2014, 9:13 am establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CARA SCHAEFER WIENEKE GREGORY F. ZOELLER Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana Plainfield, Indiana RICHARD C. WEBSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
WILLIAM R. GRIFFIN, II, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 84A01-1401-CR-17 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable David R. Bolk, Judge Cause No. 84D03-1201-FC-292
June 16, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge William R. Griffin, II, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation and
reinstating his previously-suspended sentence of six years. Griffin raises one issue which
we revise and restate as whether the court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve
the entirety of his previously suspended sentence. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts most favorable to the revocation follow. On March 8, 2012, Griffin
pled guilty to escape as a class C felony, and the court sentenced him pursuant to a plea
agreement to eight years, with two years executed to be served as a direct commitment to
the Home Detention Program under the supervision of Vigo County Community
Corrections, and six years suspended to formal probation. In October 2012, Griffin
admitted to violating the terms of his direct commitment and, consistent with the parties’
proposed agreement, the court ordered Griffin to serve the balance of his two-year
executed sentence at the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) and that he then
report for probation as previously ordered. On February 4, 2013, Griffin signed a copy of
the rules and conditions of formal probation in which he agreed, in part, to not violate any
laws, to not possess or use any controlled substance except as prescribed by a licensed
medical practitioner, and to attend two Alcoholics Anonymous and/or Narcotics
Anonymous meetings per week.
On October 3, 2013, the Vigo County Adult Probation Department filed a Notice
of Probation Violation alleging that Griffin violated the conditions of his probation by
failing to report as ordered, missing an appointment in August 2013, and by failing to
notify the Probation Department of a change of address. On October 10, 2013, the court
2 entered an order that Griffin report immediately to his probation officer, report weekly
thereafter, and comply with all terms and conditions of his probation.
On November 21, 2013, the State filed a petition to revoke probation alleging that,
“[s]ince October 10, 2013, [Griffin] has violated the conditions of his probation in that he
has submitted to numerous drug screens, all of which have tested positive for the
presence of THC, and over the course of time the levels of THC in the samples submitted
have increased from the previous test on several occasions, indicating use of marijuana
between several of the tests.” Appellant’s Appendix at 34. On December 12, 2013, the
court held a hearing on the State’s petition at which Griffin admitted that he had violated
the terms and conditions of his probation as alleged in the November 21, 2013 petition.
He presented evidence that he had been evaluated and accepted into Club Soda’s Sober
Living Program contingent upon bed space availability and the successful completion of
the Jail Linkage Program. Griffin admitted that his criminal history included theft
convictions in 2004, 2005, and 2006, a domestic battery conviction in 2005, and
convictions for receiving stolen property and domestic battery in 2009. He testified that
he had a long-term substance abuse problem involving marijuana, and that he never
sought treatment for his problem. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court revoked
Griffin’s probation and ordered that he serve his previously suspended sentence of six
years at the DOC. The court recommended that Griffin receive substance abuse
treatment and counseling during his period of incarceration.
DISCUSSION
3 The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Griffin to
serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence of six years at the DOC. Griffin
concedes that he violated the conditions of his placement on probation but contends that,
because the trial court had alternatives in place other than a lengthy prison sentence, the
court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve his entire sentence in prison. He
argues that he acknowledged he had a serious addiction for which he needs help and that
he had arranged to receive treatment that would permit him to avoid returning to prison.
The State maintains that the court exercised proper discretion in sentencing Griffin
and notes that this was his second probation violation in the case, and that he had a
marijuana abuse problem for which he had never before sought treatment. The State also
contends that “[t]he trial court could reasonably determine that, given [Griffin’s] criminal
history, the length of his substance abuse problem, and prior probation violation in this
case, [Griffin] would be unsuccessful in the treatment program that he was proposing,
and that [Griffin] would be better served in a structured environment and a more
disciplined treatment program . . . .” Appellee’s Brief at 6.
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) sets forth the court’s sentencing options upon a finding
of a probation violation and provides:
If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:
(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary 4 period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
The Indiana Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s sentencing decisions for
probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. Prewitt v.
State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The Court explained that “[o]nce a trial court has
exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have
considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed” and that “[i]f this discretion were not
afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges
might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. An abuse of
discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances. Id. As long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a
probation revocation hearing, “the trial court may order execution of a suspended
sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Goonen v.
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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of Jun 16 2014, 9:13 am establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CARA SCHAEFER WIENEKE GREGORY F. ZOELLER Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana Plainfield, Indiana RICHARD C. WEBSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
WILLIAM R. GRIFFIN, II, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 84A01-1401-CR-17 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable David R. Bolk, Judge Cause No. 84D03-1201-FC-292
June 16, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge William R. Griffin, II, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation and
reinstating his previously-suspended sentence of six years. Griffin raises one issue which
we revise and restate as whether the court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve
the entirety of his previously suspended sentence. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts most favorable to the revocation follow. On March 8, 2012, Griffin
pled guilty to escape as a class C felony, and the court sentenced him pursuant to a plea
agreement to eight years, with two years executed to be served as a direct commitment to
the Home Detention Program under the supervision of Vigo County Community
Corrections, and six years suspended to formal probation. In October 2012, Griffin
admitted to violating the terms of his direct commitment and, consistent with the parties’
proposed agreement, the court ordered Griffin to serve the balance of his two-year
executed sentence at the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) and that he then
report for probation as previously ordered. On February 4, 2013, Griffin signed a copy of
the rules and conditions of formal probation in which he agreed, in part, to not violate any
laws, to not possess or use any controlled substance except as prescribed by a licensed
medical practitioner, and to attend two Alcoholics Anonymous and/or Narcotics
Anonymous meetings per week.
On October 3, 2013, the Vigo County Adult Probation Department filed a Notice
of Probation Violation alleging that Griffin violated the conditions of his probation by
failing to report as ordered, missing an appointment in August 2013, and by failing to
notify the Probation Department of a change of address. On October 10, 2013, the court
2 entered an order that Griffin report immediately to his probation officer, report weekly
thereafter, and comply with all terms and conditions of his probation.
On November 21, 2013, the State filed a petition to revoke probation alleging that,
“[s]ince October 10, 2013, [Griffin] has violated the conditions of his probation in that he
has submitted to numerous drug screens, all of which have tested positive for the
presence of THC, and over the course of time the levels of THC in the samples submitted
have increased from the previous test on several occasions, indicating use of marijuana
between several of the tests.” Appellant’s Appendix at 34. On December 12, 2013, the
court held a hearing on the State’s petition at which Griffin admitted that he had violated
the terms and conditions of his probation as alleged in the November 21, 2013 petition.
He presented evidence that he had been evaluated and accepted into Club Soda’s Sober
Living Program contingent upon bed space availability and the successful completion of
the Jail Linkage Program. Griffin admitted that his criminal history included theft
convictions in 2004, 2005, and 2006, a domestic battery conviction in 2005, and
convictions for receiving stolen property and domestic battery in 2009. He testified that
he had a long-term substance abuse problem involving marijuana, and that he never
sought treatment for his problem. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court revoked
Griffin’s probation and ordered that he serve his previously suspended sentence of six
years at the DOC. The court recommended that Griffin receive substance abuse
treatment and counseling during his period of incarceration.
DISCUSSION
3 The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Griffin to
serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence of six years at the DOC. Griffin
concedes that he violated the conditions of his placement on probation but contends that,
because the trial court had alternatives in place other than a lengthy prison sentence, the
court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve his entire sentence in prison. He
argues that he acknowledged he had a serious addiction for which he needs help and that
he had arranged to receive treatment that would permit him to avoid returning to prison.
The State maintains that the court exercised proper discretion in sentencing Griffin
and notes that this was his second probation violation in the case, and that he had a
marijuana abuse problem for which he had never before sought treatment. The State also
contends that “[t]he trial court could reasonably determine that, given [Griffin’s] criminal
history, the length of his substance abuse problem, and prior probation violation in this
case, [Griffin] would be unsuccessful in the treatment program that he was proposing,
and that [Griffin] would be better served in a structured environment and a more
disciplined treatment program . . . .” Appellee’s Brief at 6.
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) sets forth the court’s sentencing options upon a finding
of a probation violation and provides:
If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:
(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary 4 period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
The Indiana Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s sentencing decisions for
probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. Prewitt v.
State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The Court explained that “[o]nce a trial court has
exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have
considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed” and that “[i]f this discretion were not
afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges
might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. An abuse of
discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances. Id. As long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a
probation revocation hearing, “the trial court may order execution of a suspended
sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Goonen v.
State, 705 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
The record reveals that Griffin admitted at the revocation hearing that he had
violated the terms of his probation, that his drug screens showed he had tested positive
for THC or marijuana, and that he knew that the positive test was a probation violation.
We observe that, although Griffin testified that he had “people that are gonna help [him]
for the first time in [his] life” and presented evidence that he was accepted into Club
Soda’s Sober Living Program, Transcript at 11, evidence before the court also showed
that, in October 2012, the court had revoked his direct commitment to the Home
5 Detention Program through Vigo County Community Corrections. At that time the court
ordered him to serve the balance of his executed sentence at the DOC. In October 2013,
the Probation Department alleged that he missed an appointment and failed to notify it of
an address change and the court ordered that Griffin report immediately to probation and
comply with all of the terms of his probation. At the hearing, the following exchange
occurred:
Court: You were – this, this charge is for escaping from the Work Release facility, while you were there, I believe on a pre-trial placement on another matter. You absconded, and instead of going to the [DOC] then, you were given a home detention sentence. You couldn’t complete it because you were using marijuana.
Griffin: No, I, it – my fees.
Court: And you went, you were, you flunked for marijuana as well. So, you went to the [DOC] for that. You get placed on probation, you stopped showing up for probation, you move, don’t let your probation officer know, I issue a warrant, you get picked up on that warrant, I released you from jail to go back and to cooperate with your probation officer, and what do you do, you flunk every drug screen, for marijuana. I, I don’t know what else there is to do. We’ve tried, the Court has tried work release, home detention, probation, and you’ve not done anything over the last – since March when you pled out on this. You haven’t done anything. And understand now is the time to ask (sic.), you know, now’s not the time to say you want help, or that, that the system, the criminal justice system should afford you help. You’ve gotta want to do it yourself, you need to do it when you’re on the outside, not when you’re on the inside. I mean I, I really see very little option that the Court has, other than to order the balance of your six (6) year sentence to be executed. . . . I’m going to give you credit for the time that you’ve served, both when you were first arrested on this and then since you’ve been arrested this most recent time, and good time credit as well.
Id. at 20-22. 6 Probation is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty, not a right to which a
defendant is entitled. Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012). Ind. Code §
35-38-2-3(h) provides in part that if the court finds that a person has violated a condition
of probation, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was
suspended at the time of initial sentencing. The court noted Griffin’s unsuccessful
commitment to home detention and his behavior while placed on probation in the past.
Further, Griffin did not establish that he was unable to obtain any necessary treatment for
substance abuse while on probation. In addition, the court recommended that Griffin
receive treatment while incarcerated at the DOC.
Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that
the court abused its discretion in ordering Griffin to serve his previously suspended
sentence at the DOC. See Milliner v. State, 890 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reinstating the probationer’s
entire previously suspended sentence), trans. denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order that Griffin serve his
previously-suspended sentence at the DOC.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.