IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
HANA YOHANNES, No. 82988-2-I
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WILLIAM PEARSON,
Appellant.
BOWMAN, J. — William Pearson appeals from a domestic violence
protection order (DVPO) protecting his former girlfriend, Hana Yohannes, and a
related order to surrender weapons. Substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s determinations that Pearson committed domestic violence and
represented a credible threat to Yohannes’ physical safety, and Pearson fails to
show the trial court abused its discretion in entering either the DVPO or the
weapons surrender order. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 14, 2021, Yohannes petitioned for a DVPO protecting her from
Pearson, her former boyfriend. In her sworn declarations below, Yohannes
attested that Pearson began physically abusing her in December 2020, had
“gotten worse over time,” and would “punch, hit, or restrain” her if she “[went]
against any of his wishes.” She said that in January 2021, she told Pearson she
was “breaking up with him” after an incident during which Pearson screamed at
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 82988-2-I/2
her and threw a sheet at her head out of anger. But they still shared the
residence. So, “[g]iven that it was [her] bed in the master bedroom and
[Pearson’s bed] in the office/guest bedroom, [she] asked that [Pearson] sleep in
his own bed while [they] figure[d] this out.”
Yohannes said that on April 15, 2021, she threatened to tell Pearson’s
family and friends that they had broken up. According to Yohannes, Pearson
argued with her, called her demeaning names, yelled at her, and “hit” her.
Yohannes “feared for her safety” and began recording the incident on her cell
phone. She provided a hyperlink to a YouTube website purportedly containing a
video of Pearson “calling [her] names and punching [her].”
Yohannes attested that on May 30, 2021, Pearson slapped her after
finding out she had kissed someone. “[A]s punishment,” Pearson “began
sleeping in [Yohannes’] bedroom each night, despite [her] asking him to sleep in
his own.” Each night for the next two weeks, Pearson “refused to leave and [she]
had to either uncomfortably share [her] bed with him, sleep on his bed in the
other room, or sleep on the couch.” She said that if she slept in her bed,
Pearson engaged in “unwanted touching,” and if she asked him to stop, he would
respond, “ ‘[W]ell, deal with it.’ ” If she asked him to leave the bedroom, “he
would scream in [her] face, hit [her], and one night he began to suffocate [her].”
She was “only able to get him to stop punching . . . and suffocating [her] by
keeping 911 dialed on [her] phone and telling him [she] would press ‘call.’ ”
Yohannes attested that on the night of June 13, 2021, she locked her
bedroom door “to protect [her]self from [Pearson],” and when he realized she
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locked the door, he “began to violently shake [the] door and yell at [Yohannes] to
let him in.” According to Yohannes, Pearson “said things such as ‘it’s my fucking
room, you dumb bitch,’ “ and “ ‘should I go get the drill.’ ” After Yohannes
pleaded with him to stop, Pearson said, “ ‘[O]r what’ ” and, “ ‘[Y]ou’re gonna do
what you’re gonna do, and I’m gonna do what I’m gonna do and we’ll just see
what happens, huh.’ ” Yohannes said that she “was terrified about what would
happen” if Pearson entered the room and that she was able to contact two of her
friends, who came to the upstairs apartment and escorted her out. Yohannes
included a hyperlink to YouTube purportedly containing a video of Pearson
“violently attempting to enter [her] bedroom and threatening [her] with a drill.”
Pearson filed a declaration in opposition to Yohannes’ petition and denied
the allegations of abuse. He attested that while the couple had “normal, non-
physical disputes in December of 2020,” there was no domestic violence.
Pearson said that in January 2021, the parties discussed breaking up but
remained in a “roommate with benefits type situation.”
As for the May 30, 2021 incident, Pearson attested that he and Yohannes
were lying in bed and began to get intimate when Yohannes disclosed that “she
made out with someone else.” He said that his first reaction was to raise his
voice and express displeasure, but he denied slapping Yohannes.
Pearson attested that after the May 30 incident, “things got murky.” Both
he and Yohannes wanted the master bedroom, and “[t]he only thing that
escalated in the days leading up to the [June 14] petition were [Yohannes’]
efforts to kick [Pearson] out of [the] shared bedroom.” In response to Yohannes’
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allegations that he would hit her when she asked him to leave the bedroom,
Pearson claimed he was trying to sleep in the master bedroom when Yohannes
“started to play loud music on her phone.” Pearson “believe[d] [Yohannes] was
purposefully trying to force [him] to leave the bedroom by making it impossible for
[him] to sleep.” According to Pearson, when Yohannes “saw that her loud music
would not get [him] to leave the bedroom,” she told him that if he did not leave,
she would call the police and have him arrested for domestic violence. Pearson
denied punching or hitting Yohannes, claiming that he had “done nothing but lay
there.”
As to the June 13, 2021 incident, Pearson claimed that “[w]hat really
happened” was that Yohannes “locked herself in our shared bedroom.” Pearson
attested that “around midnight, [he] tried to enter the bedroom so that [he] could
go to sleep.” Finding the door locked, Pearson “became upset” and “started to
shake the doorknob.” According to Pearson, he “yelled through the door that it
was [his] room and that [Yohannes] ha[d] no right to lock [him] out of it.” He then
“vigorously shook the doorknob, but seeing it was pointless, . . . decided to just
stay near the door in case [Yohannes] changed her mind.” Pearson attested that
“[a]t one point, [he] remarked that the only way [he] would be able to get into the
bedroom would be if [he] drilled the lock,” and that around 12:30 a.m., he gave
up and slept in another room. According to Pearson, “[a]t no point did [he] say or
do anything that could be interpreted as a threat to [Yohannes] or her safety,”
and he “only wanted to go in our bedroom and sleep.”
4 No. 82988-2-I/5
Yohannes’ petition came before the trial court for a hearing in July 2021.
Both parties gave sworn testimony. Yohannes, who appeared pro se, began by
testifying that everything in her declarations remained true and correct. She then
gave a prepared statement. In her statement, Yohannes testified that on June
13, 2021, the night she alleged Pearson was violently shaking the bedroom door
after Yohannes had locked it, the “threats that [Pearson] made through the door
and the shouting was terrifying.” She said that “there was no doubt, in [her]
mind, [Pearson] would be violent . . . if he made it into the bedroom,” and that
she “went on to the roof through [her] window but there was no way off.”
Following Yohannes’ statement, Pearson testified about his version of the
events. Pearson’s attorney asked, “I believe . . . [Yohannes] has submitted a
video purportedly from April 15th of 2021.” At that point, the trial court
interjected, stating, “I wanted to just point out that I haven’t viewed any
video. . . . I haven’t received or reviewed any video or audio recordings from
either party.” Pearson’s attorney then said, “All right. I’ll move on from that.” On
rebuttal, Yohannes sought to admit the two videos allegedly depicting Pearson’s
abuse, but the trial court declined to do so because Yohannes had not offered
them in a form that the court could accept as evidence.
Yohannes also testified that she had a website for her business that
Pearson “insisted that he pay for so he would have ownership and be able to
make edits to the website on [Yohannes’] behalf.” But after she served Pearson
with the DVPO petition, Yohannes noticed that he had changed some pages on
the website and “all of the text had gone white such that it couldn’t be seen on
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the white background.” Yohannes testified that she asked through Pearson’s
attorney that Pearson make some changes to the website, and while he made
some, he did not make all the changes. Yohannes then testified that she made a
second request and did not hear back. So she requested that Pearson “hand
over exclusive editing access to that website.”
At the close of the hearing, the trial court found that “[b]ased on all of the
evidence,” Yohannes “has proven it is more likely than not that [Pearson] . . . has
committed domestic violence.” The court found Yohannes’ testimony “to be
credible,” that “there has been a history of physical assault,” and “that
[Yohannes] feared imminent harm, which is also a basis . . . for the court to grant
the protection order.” The court further found that Pearson “represents a credible
threat to the physical safety of [Yohannes].”
The court granted Yohannes’ petition and entered a one-year DVPO
directing, among other things, that Yohannes “shall have exclusive use and
access to the website created for [her] business.” The court also entered a
weapons surrender order directing Pearson to immediately surrender all firearms,
other dangerous weapons, and concealed pistol licenses.
Pearson appeals.
ANALYSIS
Pearson raises several challenges to the DVPO and related weapons
surrender order. None warrant reversal.
6 No. 82988-2-I/7
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a DVPO for abuse of
discretion. In re Parentage of T.W.J., 193 Wn. App. 1, 6, 367 P.3d 607 (2016).
A trial court abuses its discretion by exercising it on untenable grounds or for
untenable reasons or if its decision is manifestly unreasonable. Id. Where, as
here, the trial court has weighed the evidence, our role is simply to determine
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and
whether those findings support the conclusions of law. In re Marriage of Greene,
97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999). Substantial evidence is a quantum
of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational and fair-minded person that a
premise is true. Nguyen v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn. App. 155, 163, 317 P.3d 518
(2014).
Domestic Violence
Pearson first contends that we must reverse because the trial court erred
in determining that he committed domestic violence. We disagree.
Chapter 26.50 RCW1 authorizes the trial court to enter a DVPO based on
a determination that domestic violence occurred. See RCW 26.50.030 (DVPO
exists for protection “in cases of domestic violence”). “Domestic violence”
includes “[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault” between parties who are living
1 The legislature repealed chapter 26.50 RCW effective July 1, 2022 as part of legislation that reorganized various civil protection order statutes into a new chapter. See LAWS OF 2021, ch. 215, §§ 170(94)-(126), 1; see also chapter 7.105 RCW. Because that legislation was not yet in effect at the time of the proceedings below, we refer herein to the relevant, but since repealed, 2021 statutes as if still in effect.
7 No. 82988-2-I/8
together and have or have had a dating relationship. RCW 26.50.010(3)(a),
(7)(d).
Here, as reflected in its oral ruling, the trial court determined that Pearson
had committed domestic violence based on both a finding of assault and a
finding that Pearson inflicted a fear of imminent physical harm. Substantial
evidence supports these findings. Yohannes testified under oath that Pearson
slapped her on May 30, 2021, and that one night in June when she asked him to
leave the bedroom, he struck her and began suffocating her. And she described
Pearson screaming at her and hitting her if she told him to stop touching her
when they shared the bed. Yohannes also testified that Pearson began
physically abusing her in December 2020, including hitting and restraining her,
and in January 2021, he screamed at her and threw a sheet at her head.
Yohannes’ testimony, which the trial court expressly found credible, supports the
trial court’s finding that Pearson assaulted Yohannes. Cf. State v. Tyler, 138 Wn.
App. 120, 130, 155 P.3d 1002 (2007) (assault includes “an intentional touching or
striking of another person that is harmful or offensive, regardless of whether it
results in physical injury”).
Yohannes also testified that on June 13, 2021, after she had locked
herself in the bedroom, Pearson violently shook the door and threatened to get a
drill. She said that she had seen Pearson use a drill to open a locked door
before, that she had “no doubt” Pearson would be “violent” if he gained entry to
the bedroom, and that she was so “terrified” that she tried to escape through the
window. This testimony, combined with the trial court’s finding that Pearson had
8 No. 82988-2-I/9
assaulted Yohannes before, supports the trial court’s finding that Pearson
caused Yohannes to fear imminent physical harm.
Pearson disagrees and argues that Yohannes offered no photographic
evidence and never called the police or filed a police report. Pearson denies
slapping Yohannes in May 2021 and disputes Yohannes’ characterization of the
force with which he shook the bedroom door on June 13, 2021, i.e., “vigorously”
and not “violently.” He asserts Yohannes’ claim that she tried to escape through
the window “is likely an embellishment or exaggeration,” and “[i]f it was a fear
of . . . Pearson that drove her to try escaping out the window, then that same fear
would have prevented her from returning inside.” Pearson argues that
Yohannes’ testimony “amounts to nothing more than mere allegations” and is
insufficient to support the trial court’s findings.
But testimony is evidence, and “[t]he trier of facts, where the evidence is
conflicting, may believe entirely the testimony of one party and disbelieve the
testimony of the other party.” Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wn.2d 150, 155, 385 P.2d 727
(1963). Also, in a substantial evidence review, “[w]e will not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court, even if we might have resolved the factual
dispute differently.” Nguyen, 179 Wn. App. at 163. Pearson essentially asks this
court to set aside the trial court’s determination that Yohannes’ testimony was
credible and reweigh the evidence in a manner more favorable to him. This we
will not do. See Thompson v. Hanson, 142 Wn. App. 53, 60, 174 P.3d 120
(2007) (“An appellate court defers to the trier of fact for purposes of resolving
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conflicting testimony and evaluating the persuasiveness of the evidence and
credibility of the witnesses.”), aff’d, 168 Wn.2d 738, 239 P.3d 537 (2009).
Pearson also contends that any harm Yohannes feared during the June
13, 2021 incident could not have been “imminent” because it was conditioned on
him entering the bedroom, yet Yohannes had locked the door. He asserts that
“shaking of the bedroom doorknob (or door) while the door is locked is not
enough to give rise to a fear of imminent harm,” and that he could not get into the
bedroom until after Yohannes left. But a reasonable inference from Yohannes’
testimony that Pearson was violently shaking the door is that he was attempting
to open it. Cf. State v. Living Essentials, LLC, 8 Wn. App. 2d 1, 14, 436 P.3d 857
(2019) (substantial evidence standard requires the court to view the evidence
and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party who
prevailed below). And as discussed, Yohannes also testified that Pearson
threatened to get a drill, which Yohannes had seen Pearson use on another
occasion to open a locked door.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that Yohannes feared
imminent physical harm. In any case, the trial court also found that Pearson had
assaulted Yohannes, a finding which alone supported entry of the DVPO, even
without considering the additional finding that Pearson inflicted a fear of imminent
physical harm. See RCW 26.50.010(3)(a) (domestic violence includes assault
“or” infliction of fear of imminent physical harm).
Next, Pearson contends that the videos Yohannes tried to admit
contradicted her testimony. But because the court did not admit the videos, the
10 No. 82988-2-I/11
record does not support Pearson’s contention. To this end, Pearson also
contends that because the trial court did not consider the videos, “the trial court
should not have considered . . . Yohannes’ testimony regarding the contents of
said videos,” including testimony about an incident that occurred on April 15,
2021. But Pearson points to nothing in the record to show the trial court relied on
any testimony from Yohannes as to the contents of the excluded videos. And as
much as Pearson is arguing that exclusion of the videos foreclosed Yohannes’
testimony about her personal recollection of the events depicted, Pearson is
incorrect.
Finally, Pearson contends:
If the trial court . . . consider[ed] statements that . . . Yohannes alleges . . . Pearson made on the night of June 13[, 2021], then it was a violation of . . . Pearson’s due process rights for the trial court to interrupt and shut down . . . Pearson’s testimony regarding that night and the associated recording.
The record does not support Pearson’s assertion that the trial court
prevented him from testifying about the events of June 13, 2021. After the court
informed Pearson’s counsel that it had reviewed no video, Pearson’s counsel
said he would “move on from that” and “[g]iven that, . . . I have no other
questions for . . . Pearson.” Counsel then asked Pearson, “[I]s there anything I
missed that you wish to testify to, based upon what you’ve heard today.”
Pearson began saying something about a “YouTube link for the recording from
June 13th.” It was then Pearson’s counsel, not the trial court, who interjected to
say, “[T]hat’s not in evidence so you don’t have to worry about that.” Pearson
responded, “All right, then, . . . I do not believe there is anything else.”
11 No. 82988-2-I/12
Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court deprived Pearson of an
opportunity to testify about the events of June 13, 2021, so his due process claim
fails. Cf. Tellevik v. Real Prop. Known as 31641 W. Rutherford St. Located in the
City of Carnation, Wash., 125 Wn.2d 364, 370-71, 884 P.2d 1319 (1984) (“[D]ue
process generally affords an individual notice and an opportunity to be heard
when the government deprives the individual of a life, liberty, or property
interest.”).
Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings and
because its findings support the determination that Pearson committed domestic
violence, the trial court did not err by entering the DVPO.
Credible Threat
Pearson argues that the trial court erred in finding that he presents a
credible threat to Yohannes and ordering him to surrender weapons.2 Again, we
disagree.
A trial court must enter an order to surrender weapons in connection with
a DVPO if it finds that the respondent “represents a credible threat to the physical
safety” of the individual protected by the DVPO. RCW 9.41.800(2)(c)(i).
Here, the trial court expressly found that Pearson “represents a credible
threat to the physical safety of [Yohannes].” While Pearson asserts that the court
2 Pearson asserts that the trial court’s credible threat determination was a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. He is incorrect. See RCW 9.41.800(2)(c)(i) (characterizing credible threat determination as a “finding”); see also Goodeill v. Madison Real Est., 191 Wn. App. 88, 99, 362 P.3d 302 (2015) (“ ‘If a determination concerns whether the evidence showed that something occurred or existed, it is properly labeled a finding of fact.’ ”) (quoting Moulden & Sons, Inc. v. Osaka Landscaping & Nursery, Inc., 21 Wn. App. 194, 197 n.5, 584 P.2d 968 (1978)).
12 No. 82988-2-I/13
needed to specify the “particular set of words and/or actions” that constituted a
credible threat, he cites no authority to support such an assertion. See RAP
10.3(a)(6). And substantial evidence supports the trial court’s credible threat
finding. As discussed, Yohannes testified about multiple instances of assault by
Pearson. Yohannes also testified that in the days leading up to her petitioning for
a DVPO, Pearson insisted on sleeping in Yohannes’ bed despite her asking him
to sleep in his own, that Pearson would scream at and hit Yohannes if she asked
him to leave, and that once, Pearson began to suffocate Yohannes, stopping
only when she threatened to call 911.
Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s credible threat
finding, and because RCW 9.41.800(2)(c)(i) obligates the trial court to enter the
weapons surrender order once it made this finding, it did not err by doing so.
Website
As a final matter, Pearson contends that the trial court erred by ordering
that Yohannes have exclusive use of and access to the website for her business.
Pearson asserts that although a trial court entering a DVPO may provide for the
possession and use of essential personal effects, i.e., “those items necessary for
a person’s immediate health, welfare, and livelihood,”3 essential personal effects
do not include “intangible personal property.” But Pearson cites no authority to
support this conclusory assertion, so we reject it. See RAP 10.3(a)(6).
In any case, a trial court entering a DVPO is authorized to “[o]rder other
relief as it deems necessary for the protection of the petitioner.” RCW
3 RCW 26.50.010(5).
13 No. 82988-2-I/14
26.50.060(1)(f). Yohannes testified that after she served her DVPO petition on
Pearson, she noticed changes to the website for her business, and that the
changes to the website were “severely impacting [her] business.” It is undisputed
that Pearson had the ability to make—and undo—these changes. Yet when
Yohannes asked Pearson to undo the changes to the website, he did not do so,
despite Yohannes’ multiple requests through Pearson’s counsel. Under these
circumstances, Pearson fails to persuade us that the trial court had no tenable
basis for ordering that Yohannes have exclusive use of and access to the
website.
Pearson also argues that the trial court’s order with regard to the website
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private property for private use in
violation of the takings clause under article I, section 16 of the Washington
Constitution. That clause provides, “Private property shall not be taken for
private use, except for private ways of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or
ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary
purposes.” CONST. art. I, § 16. But the two cases Pearson relies on,
Manufactured Housing Communities and Chong Yim, do not involve a court
order related to the use or possession of property to protect a domestic violence
victim. See Mfd. Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wn.2d 347, 351, 13 P.3d
183 (2000)4 (challenge to legislation giving qualified tenants a right of first refusal
to purchase a mobile home park), abrogated by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle,
194 Wn.2d 651, 655, 451 P.3d 675 (2019) (challenge to legislation requiring
4 Plurality opinion.
14 No. 82988-2-I/15
landlords to screen applications in chronological order and offer tenancy to first
qualified applicant).
Pearson cites no case in which a court applies the takings clause to the
circumstances here. To the contrary, our Supreme Court has observed that a
court’s equity power “transcends the mechanical application of property rules,”
including the takings clause. Proctor v. Huntington, 169 Wn.2d 491, 499-01, 238
P.3d 1117 (2010); see also Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wn.2d 143, 151-52, 449 P.2d
800 (1968) (article I, section 16 does not divest the court of equitable powers or
bar passage of title under equitable doctrines); cf. Smith v. Smith, 1 Wn. App. 2d
122, 132, 404 P.3d 101 (2017) (DVPO proceedings are equitable in nature).
Pearson does not persuade us that the takings clause applies here.
We affirm the DVPO and order to surrender weapons.
WE CONCUR: