William O'Hara v. NIKA Technologies, Inc.

878 F.3d 470
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedDecember 22, 2017
Docket16-1805
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 878 F.3d 470 (William O'Hara v. NIKA Technologies, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
William O'Hara v. NIKA Technologies, Inc., 878 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2017).

Opinion

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Traxler and Judge King joined.

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

William C. O’Hara sued his employer, NIKA Technologies, Inc., under the so-called “whistleblower-protection provisions” of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the “ARRA”), Pub. L. No. 111-5,123 Stat. 297-99 (2009), claiming that NIKA fired him for disclosing another company’s alleged fraud on the government. The district court entered summary judgment for NIKA on the first claim because it determined that § 3730(h) only protects disclosures targeting the whistle-blower’s employer. The court also granted NIKA summary judgment on the ARRA claim, finding that O’Hara did not genuinely dispute that NIKA would have fired him absent the disclosures. Although we hold that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to the § 3730(h) claim, we affirm its grant of summary judgment because O’Hara’s disclosures are not protected under the correct legal standard either. We affirm the district court’s disposition of the ARRA claim on the grounds provided below.

I.

On February 19, 2007, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), an agency in the U.S. Department of Commerce, awarded NIKA a contract to provide design and cost-estimating services on a project to build several new facilities at the National Center for Neutron Research (the “Project”). NIST hired another company, Northern Taiga Ventures, Inc. (“NTVI”), to perform the Project’s construction work.

On March 5, 2007, NIKA hired O’Hara as a senior cost estimator on the Project. The parties’ employment agreement stated that O’Hara would perform “work as may be requested from time to time by NIKA” and that NIKA would assign O’Hara to different projects through “WORK AUTHORIZATION forms.” J.A. 186. The only work authorization form in the record shows that NIKA directed O’Hara to prepare cost estimates “as required” for the Project. J.A. 362. Because NIST funded the Project, it compensated NIKA for O’Hara’s services.

At the beginning of the Project, O’Hara’s primary role was to help NIST evaluate “change order proposals.” As a government agency, NIST is entitled to “make changes in the work [that are] within the general scope of [a government] contract, including changes ... [i]n the specifications (including drawings and designs) [and] [i]n the method or manner of performance of work.” 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.243-4(a)(l)-(2). When the government requires a contractor to perform additional work under an existing contract, the contractor may submit a “change order proposal,” requesting that the government increase the contractor’s compensation to reflect the extra work. See id. at § 552.243-71(b). O’Hara helped NIST evaluate these requests by estimating the cost of performing the additional work.

In 2008, O’Hara submitted two reports informing Christopher Conley, a NIST manager supervising the Project, that NTVI had submitted documents to the government that O’Hara believed contained misrepresentations and inaccuracies. O’Hara’s first report to Conley alleged that several of NTVI’s change order proposals misrepresented subcontractor quotes. The second report alleged that NTVI’s construction plans contained “numerous inaccuracies.” J.A. 15. When Conley disregarded these allegations, O’Hara began to forward his reports to the NIST Procurement Office and the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector General (the “OIG”). The OIG investigated O’Hara’s claims, but it declined to charge NTVI with any misconduct.

In April 2009, NIST issued a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) to which NTVI responded. RFPs “are used in negotiated acquisitions to communicate [g]overnment requirements to prospective contractors and to solicit [their] proposals.” 48 C.F.R. § 15.203(a). In this instance, NIST issued an RFP soliciting bids for the construction of a concrete slab to protect a system of pipelines located under one of the cooling towers at the National Center for Neutron Research. NTVI responded to the RFP by submitting a bid. Because NTVI had an existing contract with NIST, however, its bid was submitted as a change order proposal. That is, NTVI’s bid was a request that the government increase its compensation under the existing contract to reflect the additional work of installing a protective slab over the pipelines.

In May 2009, O’Hara reported to Conley that NTVI’s change order proposal for the protective slab was fraudulent because the slab was unnecessary. According to O’Hara, the pipelines did not need protection because NTVI’s contract required the pipelines to be replaced later in the Project. Conley disagreed. He explained to O’Hara that the protective slab was necessary because NIST would have to use the old pipelines to operate the National Neutron Research Center if the Project fell behind schedule and installation of the replacement pipelines was delayed.

On October 15, 2009, NIST revised the Project’s schedule. The revised schedule required NIKA, as the design contractor, to complete two sets of new designs. The schedule required NIKA to submit the designs at 35%, 50%, 95% and 100% completion. NIST would review each submission to ensure that the designs were progressing on time and according to contract specifications.

The schedule also required NIKA to submit cost estimates for each set of designs. NIST requested that the cost estimates be submitted at 35%, 50%, 95% and 100% completion as well. Each estimate was due one week after NIKA submitted the corresponding design. For example, the 35%-completed designs were due on November 3, 2009, so the 35%-completed cost estimates were due on November 10, 2009.

NIKA placed O’Hara in charge of the cost estimates for both sets of designs, but O’Hara soon fell behind schedule. He submitted the 35%-completed cost estimates on December 11, 2009, one month after the deadline. The estimates included several comments alleging that the conditions at the National Neutron Research Center did not match the site conditions described in NIKA’s contract.

In a December 15, 2009 email, NIST informed NIKA that O’Hara’s delay was unacceptable. NIST also complained that the estimates were not correctly formatted, did not explain many of the assumptions underlying O’Hara’s calculations and included superfluous information. Regarding its last grievance, NIST explained that a cost estimate was not the proper channel to raise concerns about purported inaccu: racies in the contract specifications.

O’Hara responded to the December 15, 2009 email without consulting NIKA’s management. His response, which was misleadingly captioned “NIKA Response,” claimed that the 35%-completed estimates were “delivered within a reasonable amount of time,” and that O’Hara was “compelled by professional ethics to report [inaccuracies in the designs].” J.A. 213-14. Peter Ludgate, NIKA’s Vice President, reprimanded O’Hara for purporting to speak for NIKA without permission.

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878 F.3d 470, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-ohara-v-nika-technologies-inc-ca4-2017.