William Lloyd Hill v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction

Eighth Circuit

William Lloyd Hill v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction

894 F.2d 1009, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 1172, 1990 WL 6384

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 31, 1990

Docket88-2237

StatusPublished

Cited by61 cases

This text of 894 F.2d 1009 (William Lloyd Hill v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

William Lloyd Hill v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, 894 F.2d 1009, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 1172, 1990 WL 6384 (8th Cir. 1990).

Pincite

Opinions

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

William Lloyd Hill, a state prisoner serving a 35-year sentence, brings this petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [1010]*1010The District Court¹ granted relief, ordering that Hill be released unless the State affords him a trial. A panel of this Court affirmed, and we then granted the State's petition for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en bane, thus vacating the panel opinion.

We now affirm, adopting the reasoning contained in the panel decision. Hill v. Lockhart, 877 F.2d 698 (1989). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in hearing Hill's second habeas petition, because there had been no final determination on the merits of Hill's first petition. And the erroneous parole-eligibility advice given to Mr. Hill was ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), rendering Hill's plea invalid and entitling him to a trial.

We are careful to note that not every instance of a lawyer's failure to inform a client accurately of parole eligibility will reach the level of a constitutional violation. As detailed in the panel opinion, in this case there is a reasonable probability that the result of the plea process would have been different but for the erroneous information:

Not only had Hill explicitly asked his counsel about the parole system in Arkansas, Tr. 23, but he had made clear that the timing of eligibility was the dis-positive issue for him in accepting or rejecting a plea bargain. He told his attorney that he considered it no bargain to forego a trial unless his eligibility would be sooner than seven years, which he understood to be the time he could serve with commutation of a life sentence. Tr. 24-26. The Plea Statement bears the signature of Hill's counsel, immediately below the words: "His plea of guilty is consistent with the facts he has related to me and with my own investigation of the case." J.A. 57. Given the attorney's knowledge of his client's particular concern, a failure to check the applicable law was especially incompatible with the objective standard of reasonable representation in Strickland.

877 F.2d at 703.

In some situations incorrect advice ~about parole will be merely a collateral matter, not significant enough to justify habeas relief. A lawyer's incorrect guess as to the actual time of parole, for example, would probably fall into that category. But here the misadvice was of a solid nature, directly affecting Hill's decision to plead guilty. Hill's lawyer had died by the time of the evidentiary hearing in the District Court, thus making it easier for someone to fabricate what the lawyer said, but the District Court believed Hill, and we cannot say that this determination of credibility was clearly erroneous. For a situation with some similarity, cf. Blair v. McCarthy, 881 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.1989) (defendant not told of mandatory parole term to follow sentence of probation; defendant would have pleaded not guilty had he been told; guilty plea set aside on habeas).

We sustain the result reached by the panel, and the judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

William Lloyd Hill, a state prisoner serving a 35-year sentence, brings this petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [1010]*1010The District Court¹ granted relief, ordering that Hill be released unless the State affords him a trial. A panel of this Court affirmed, and we then granted the State's petition for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en bane, thus vacating the panel opinion.

We now affirm, adopting the reasoning contained in the panel decision. Hill v. Lockhart, 877 F.2d 698 (1989). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in hearing Hill's second habeas petition, because there had been no final determination on the merits of Hill's first petition. And the erroneous parole-eligibility advice given to Mr. Hill was ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), rendering Hill's plea invalid and entitling him to a trial.

We are careful to note that not every instance of a lawyer's failure to inform a client accurately of parole eligibility will reach the level of a constitutional violation. As detailed in the panel opinion, in this case there is a reasonable probability that the result of the plea process would have been different but for the erroneous information:

Not only had Hill explicitly asked his counsel about the parole system in Arkansas, Tr. 23, but he had made clear that the timing of eligibility was the dis-positive issue for him in accepting or rejecting a plea bargain. He told his attorney that he considered it no bargain to forego a trial unless his eligibility would be sooner than seven years, which he understood to be the time he could serve with commutation of a life sentence. Tr. 24-26. The Plea Statement bears the signature of Hill's counsel, immediately below the words: "His plea of guilty is consistent with the facts he has related to me and with my own investigation of the case." J.A. 57. Given the attorney's knowledge of his client's particular concern, a failure to check the applicable law was especially incompatible with the objective standard of reasonable representation in Strickland.

877 F.2d at 703.

In some situations incorrect advice ~about parole will be merely a collateral matter, not significant enough to justify habeas relief. A lawyer's incorrect guess as to the actual time of parole, for example, would probably fall into that category. But here the misadvice was of a solid nature, directly affecting Hill's decision to plead guilty. Hill's lawyer had died by the time of the evidentiary hearing in the District Court, thus making it easier for someone to fabricate what the lawyer said, but the District Court believed Hill, and we cannot say that this determination of credibility was clearly erroneous. For a situation with some similarity, cf. Blair v. McCarthy, 881 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.1989) (defendant not told of mandatory parole term to follow sentence of probation; defendant would have pleaded not guilty had he been told; guilty plea set aside on habeas).

We sustain the result reached by the panel, and the judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

894 F.2d 1009, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 1172, 1990 WL 6384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-lloyd-hill-v-al-lockhart-director-arkansas-department-of-ca8-1990.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack