WILLIAM LIGHTLE v. WILLIAM BURTON JONES

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: March 12, 2025
• Docket: A24A1203
• Status: Published

Opinion

SECOND DIVISION MARKLE, J., LAND and DAVIS, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 12, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A24A1203. LIGHTLE et al. v. JONES.

DAVIS, Judge.

William Lightle, Phyliss Lightle, Richard Rose, and Henry Kahn (collectively

“petitioners”) appeal from the trial court’s order denying their application for leave

to file an information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto against William Burton

Jones, the lieutenant governor of Georgia. On appeal, the petitioners contend that the

trial court (1) failed to apply the proper procedural rules for quo warranto actions; (2)

exceeded its authority by ruling on the merits of their petition without first granting

their application; (3) erroneously applied precedent from this Court; and (4) wrongly

concluded that their claims under the United States Constitution were not cognizable under Georgia law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s order

denying the petitioners’ application.

The record shows that the petitioners are citizens, taxpayers, and registered

voters in Georgia, and Jones currently serves as the lieutenant governor of Georgia.

In December 2023, the petitioners filed an “application for leave of court to file an

information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto” against Jones in Butts County

Superior Court. The petitioners asserted that Jones was disqualified from serving as

lieutenant governor under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution1 because of certain documents he executed in connection with the

2020 presidential election while serving as a state senator.2 According to the

petitioners, Jones sought to overturn the election results by “falsely and fraudulently

creating and executing false writings which were submitted to authorities in the

United States Congress [who were] responsible for counting the electoral votes from

the [s]tate of Georgia.” The trial court issued a rule nisi and set the matter for a

1 Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment is commonly referred to as the “Insurrection Clause.” 2 The petitioners attached the petition and supporting documents to their application. 2 hearing. Jones filed a demurrer to the application, or alternatively, a motion to dismiss,

arguing that quo warranto was not a proper remedy for alleged misconduct that

occurred while he was a Georgia state senator and that the petitioners failed to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the application.

Specifically, although the trial court found that Jones executed certain documents in

December 2020 while he served as a state senator, the court determined that, in

accordance with this Court’s prior decision in Edwards v. Smith, 369 Ga. App. 128

(892 SE2d 566) (2023), quo warranto was not a proper remedy for alleged misconduct

that was committed while in office. Therefore, the court concluded that the

petitioners were not entitled to any relief based on the facts asserted in the application

and that they could not introduce any evidence within the framework of their

application to warrant relief. This appeal followed.

1. First, in two claims of error, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred by

ruling on the merits of their petition without first granting their application for leave

to file their petition, and as a result, they were deprived of the opportunity to present

evidence to support the petition. We conclude that these claims are without merit.

3 The petitioners allege that Jones is disqualified from holding public office under

Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

which states in part, that “[n]o person shall . . . hold any office, civil or military, . . .

under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, . . . as a member of any State

legislature . . . to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in

insurrection or rebellion against the same[.] . . .” Under this Constitutional provision,

among the powers retained by the states “is the power . . . to order the processes of

its own governance. In particular, the States enjoy sovereign power to prescribe the

qualifications of their own officers and the manner of their election.” (Citations and

punctuation omitted.) Trump v. Anderson, 601 U. S. 100, 110 (II) (B) (144 SCt 662, 218

LE2d 1) (2024). Therefore, the United States Supreme Court has been clear that

states may disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office under Section

Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Fourteenth Amendment gives

states the right to disqualify state officers “in accordance with state statutes.” (Emphasis

supplied.) Id at 110-111 (II) (B). Here, the petitioners assert that a quo warranto

proceeding under OCGA § 9-6-60 is the proper vehicle by which to assert their claim

that Jones is disqualified from holding public office.

4 In Georgia, “[t]he writ of quo warranto may issue to inquire into the right of

any person to any public office the duties of which he is in fact discharging. It may be

granted only after the application by some person either claiming the office or

interested therein.” OCGA § 9-6-60. A petition for a writ of quo warranto can be

brought by a citizen and taxpayer, and it is an “extraordinary remedy which exists

solely by virtue of statute.” (Citation omitted.) Richardson v. Phillips, 285 Ga. 385 (677

SE2d 117) (2009). The Supreme Court of Georgia has stated that the “approved”

procedure in seeking a writ of quo warranto is simply for a party to seek and obtain

leave of court before the petition can be filed. Jones v. Boone, 297 Ga. 437, 439 (1) (774

SE2d 668) (2015); see also Walker v. Hamilton, 209 Ga. 735, 738 (76 SE2d 12) (1953)

(“We therefore hold that in all cases of applications to file an information in the nature

of a quo warranto the judge to whom it is presented is authorized to issue a rule to

show cause why it should not be granted, and upon a return of the rule to hear and

consider evidence relevant to the matter involved.”).

We turn first to the petitioners’ procedural arguments. In light of the

aforementioned principles, we reject the petitioners’ claims that the trial court did not

follow the proper procedures in denying their application. Consistent with the

5 procedures established by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Jones and Walker, the trial

court issued a rule nisi after the petitioners filed their application, and the court held

a hearing and considered matters relevant to the application. Contrary to the

petitioners’ claims, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court held

a hearing on the merits of their petition, or ruled on the merits of the petition. As the

petitioners ultimately acknowledge, at the hearing, the trial court emphasized that its

only task at that point in the proceedings was to decide whether to grant the

application. Moreover, in denying the application, the trial court did not address the

merits of their claim that Jones did, in fact, wrongfully execute certain documents in

connection with the 2020 presidential election. Instead, the trial court merely

correctly concluded, for the reasons set forth infra, that a writ of quo warranto was not

the proper vehicle to assert their claim.

Furthermore, we know of no authority, and the petitioners do not cite to any

authority, requiring the trial court to grant an application for a writ of quo warranto

upon the showing of any particular factors, or restricting what a trial court may

consider in ruling on an application. Thus, although the petitioners contend that the

trial court erred by denying their application because they established that they are

6 citizens and voters, Jones is a public official, and the trial court “implicitly” found

that Jones was properly served, the trial court was not required to grant their

application based on these facts. See, e.g., Walker, supra, 209 Ga. at 738 (affirming the

denial of an application for writ of quo warranto where the party failed to show error

in the trial court’s ruling). Consequently, the petitioners’ claim that the trial court

failed to follow the proper procedures in ruling on their petition necessarily fails.

2. Second, in two other claims, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred

by relying on our prior decision in Edwards to deny their application and by concluding

that quo warranto was not the proper vehicle to assert their claim. We conclude that

the trial court did not err by relying on Edwards in denying the petitioners’ application

and that quo warranto was not the proper vehicle to assert their claim against Jones.

In Edwards, the petitioner sought a writ of quo warranto against the District

Attorney for Dougherty County, alleging that he “was discharging duties that his

office was ineligible to perform.” Edwards, supra, 369 Ga. App. at 128-129. In

reversing the trial court’s order granting the petition, we reasoned that a “quo

warranto proceeding is about the right of the official to hold his or her public office[,]”

but “quo warranto is not a proper remedy for misconduct while in office.” (Emphasis

7 omitted.) Id. at 129-130 (2). We then examined the nature of the petitioner’s

allegations and we noted that she sought to challenge “whether an action [the district

attorney] took while in office was permitted under the Georgia Constitution.” Id. at

130 (2). Therefore, we concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to a writ of quo

warranto because the underlying allegations in the petition did not implicate the

district attorney’s qualifications or his right to hold the position. Id.

Here, the petitioners alleged that Jones was disqualified from serving as

lieutenant governor under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution because of certain documents he executed in connection with the

2020 presidential election while serving as a state senator. Specifically, the petitioners

alleged that Jones, in an effort to overturn the election results, “falsely and

fraudulently creat[ed] and execut[ed] false writings which were submitted to

authorities in the United States Congress [who were] responsible for counting the

electoral votes from the [s]tate of Georgia.” Although the petitioners frame their

claim as though they are challenging Jones’ qualifications to hold public office, it is

apparent that the underlying allegation in their application is that Jones acted

improperly while serving as a state senator and wrongfully executed certain

8 documents in connection with the 2020 presidential election. Hence, like Edwards, the

petitioners’ claim does not challenge Jones’ actual right to hold public office (i.e.,

because he did not meet the residency requirement or because his election was held

contrary to Georgia law), but they instead allege that Jones committed misconduct

while in office by wrongfully executing certain documents which warrants his removal.

Even assuming the allegations to be true, such a claim of misconduct in office is not

redressable under Georgia’s quo warranto statute. See Richardson, supra, 285 Ga. at

386 (stating that a writ of quo warranto was not the appropriate remedy where the

petitioner claimed that the county commissioner committed misconduct that

warranted his removal from office under OCGA § 36-1-14 (b)); Turner v. Wilburn, 206

Ga. 149, 152 (b) (56 SE2d 285) (1949) (stating in a quo warranto action that “[w]here

one holds a public office, a forfeiture of such office does not follow by reason of doing

some particular act forbidden by statute, but must result because of some positive rule

of law which declares that the doing of such act shall result in forfeiture.”);

McDonough v. Bacon, 143 Ga. 283 (84 SE 588) (1915) (“[T]he remedy by quo

warranto, or information in the nature thereof, is employed only to test the actual right

to an office or franchise, [and] it follows that it can afford no relief for official

9 misconduct, and cannot be used to test the legality of the official action of public or

corporate officers.”) (citation omitted). Compare Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501-

502 (2) (480 SE2d 10) (1997) (dismissal of quo warranto petition was improper where

the petitioner sought to challenge a judge’s qualifications to hold office on the basis

that the judge did not satisfy the residency requirements).

Moreover, although the petitioners filed a supplemental brief citing two

decisions in support of their claim that a quo warranto proceeding is the proper

vehicle to assert their claim, none of those decisions provide a basis for us to reverse

the trial court’s order.

The petitioners first cite to Trump and argue that the trial court erred by failing

to exercise its authority and address their claim regarding Section Three of the

Fourteenth Amendment. But this argument is unavailing and it ignores a key portion

of the Trump decision. As stated above in Division 1, in Trump, the United States

Supreme Court acknowledged that state legislatures retain their independent ability

to determine the eligibility criteria for state-level offices and can still choose to

disqualify individuals for violations of Section Three, even absent federal legislation

to that effect. However, the Trump decision also makes clear that the Fourteenth

10 Amendment has no self-executing power absent a legislative enforcement mechanism

for state officeholders.3 Indeed, the Court made it clear that although “[s]tates may

disqualify persons holding or attempting to hold state office[,]” this authority is to be

exercised “in accordance with state statues.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 110-111 (II)

(B). There is no language in the Trump decision to suggest that a state’s exercise of its

authority under this Constitutional provision can be utilized outside of a state statute

authorizing such action, and as stated above, Georgia law is clear that a quo warranto

proceeding seeking to disqualify a state officeholder from public office based on

allegations of misconduct is not the proper vehicle for such action.

Finally, the petitioners cite a case involving a New Mexico quo warranto

proceeding which sought the disqualification of a county commissioner from office

under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment based on his participation in the

events that took place at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. White v. Griffin, No. D-

101-CV-2022-00473, 2022 N.M. Dist. LEXIS 1, slip op. at *6-7 (1st Dist. N.M., June

3 The same principle is true for federal officeholders. The Trump Court acknowledged that the U.S. Constitution enables Congress to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and clarified that the Fourteenth Amendment has no self-executing power absent a legislative enforcement mechanism. Trump, supra, 601 U. S. at 110-113 (II) (B). 11 28, 2022), cert. denied, Griffin v. New Mexico, ___ U. S. ___ (144 SCt 1056, 218

LE2d 240) (2024). But in relying on White, the petitioners misconstrue the significant

differences between the New Mexico quo warranto statute and Georgia’s quo

warranto statute. In granting quo warranto relief and disqualifying the county

commissioner from public office under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment,

Id. at * 44-45 (II) (11) - (12), the court noted that under New Mexico’s quo warranto

statute, a quo warranto action is proper against “any public officer, civil or military,

who shall have done or suffered an act which, by the provisions of law, shall work a

forfeiture of his office.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at *41 (I) (A) (1); see NMSA 1978 §

44-3-4 (B). The court further noted that New Mexico’s quo warranto statute

“authorizes courts to make a judicial finding that an official has engaged in conduct

resulting in their forfeiture of office due to constitutional disqualification.” (Emphasis

supplied.) White, supra, slip op. at *42-43 (I) (A) (6). Thus, New Mexico’s quo

warranto statute clearly permits quo warranto actions to disqualify a public official

from holding office based on a judicial finding that the official engaged in misconduct

that would require the official’s removal from office. Unlike New Mexico’s quo

warranto statute, there is no language in Georgia’s quo warranto statute that

12 authorizes a quo warranto action based on misconduct committed by a public officer,

see OCGA § 9-6-60, and the courts of this state have consistently interpreted our quo

warranto statute to deny petitions for a writ of quo warranto based on misconduct. See

McDonough, supra, 143 Ga. at 283; Edwards, supra, 369 Ga. App. at 129-130 (2).

Consequently, in light of this key distinction between Georgia’s quo warranto statute

and New Mexico’s quo warranto statute, the New Mexico court’s decision in White

does not provide any support for the petitioners’ quo warranto application in this

matter, and for the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial court did not err

in its determination that a quo warranto proceeding was not a proper vehicle for the

petitioners to assert their claim.

We emphasize that our decision does not reach the merits, or lack thereof, of

the petitioners’ claim. Our holding only addresses whether a quo warranto action is

the proper vehicle to seek the disqualification of state officeholders based on

allegations of misconduct. It is not. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm

the trial court’s order denying the petitioners’ application for leave to file a petition

for a writ of quo warranto.

Judgment affirmed. Markle and Land, JJ., concur.