William L. Stringer-El v. Crispus C. Nix Paul Hedgepeth John Henry John Emmett James Helling Roger Lawson

945 F.2d 1015, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22129, 1991 WL 183555

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: September 20, 1991
• Docket: 91-1967
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the court on the state’s appeal from the district court’s order granting the prisoner a preliminary injunction and ordering prison officials to release him from punitive segregation. William L. Stringer-El is an Iowa prisoner who was transferred to Kansas under the Interstate Corrections Compact. See Iowa Code § 247.2 (Supp.1991). Although he was serving punitive segregation in Iowa he was released into the general population in Kansas without serving the balance of his disciplinary time. The district court found that Stringer-El was returned to Iowa and placed in punitive segregation, apparently to serve out the balance of his original Iowa segregation. Stringer-El sought an injunction in the district court, claiming that the reinstatement of his punitive segregation violated his due process rights under Hayes v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 281 (8th Cir.1985). The court granted the injunction and ordered Stringer-El released from punitive segregation.

The state argues that Stringer-El did not meet the requirements for an injunction as set out in Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C.L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir.1981). After studying the briefs and record in this case we affirm the order granting the injunction. The elements required for an injunction have been met and further analysis by this court would have no precedential value.¹ See 8th Cir.R. 47B.

The state also contends that the court erred in not considering additional facts brought forward by the state in its motion to reconsider. The state sought to establish in the motion that Stringer-El’s segregation upon return from Kansas was simply a continuation of Kansas disciplinary time and was not reinstatement of previously-imposed Iowa disciplinary time. Although the new facts alleged by the state if accepted as true would require a different analysis, the district court was within its discretion in refusing to consider the late proffer of evidence. See Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 413-14 (8th Cir.) (abuse of discretion standard governs district court’s decision not to accept new facts and argument after judgment), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820, 109 S.Ct. 63,102 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Whitlock v. Midwest Acceptance Corp., 575 F.2d 652, 653 n. 1 (8th Cir.1978) (movant has duty to show that new argument or facts brought forward after judgment could not have been made prior to judgment). We agree that the state’s explanation for not initially informing the court of the true facts is insufficient. No matter how the state perceived Stringer-El’s complaint, it would have been relevant and supportive of the state’s defense to inform the court that Stringer-El was currently serving Kansas segregation time.

The district court’s order is affirmed.

1 . The likelihood that Stringer-EI will succeed on the merits is not changed by our decision in Pletka v. .Nix, 943 F.2d 916 (8th Cir.1991). The Pletka decision simply makes explicit that our decision in Hayes did not contemplate any distinction between punitive and administrative segregation.