William L. Richards, Jr. And Frances M. Richards v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Sixth Circuit

William L. Richards, Jr. And Frances M. Richards v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

382 F.2d 538, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5467, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5307

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

DecidedAugust 17, 1967

Docket17244

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 382 F.2d 538 (William L. Richards, Jr. And Frances M. Richards v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

William L. Richards, Jr. And Frances M. Richards v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 382 F.2d 538, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5467, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5307 (6th Cir. 1967).

Pincite

Opinion

ORDER.

The facts of this case were stipulated to the Tax Court, from which this appeal was perfected, and are not in issue. They establish that in petitioner-appellant’s * Federal income tax return for 1962 he claimed a deduction for the entire amount of payments made during the taxable year on account of a mortgage executed by him and his former wife. They then owned the subject property jointly, but under the terms of a separation agreement entered into in 1958, when they were divorced, appellant conveyed his one-half interest in the property to their four children.

The respondent-appellee disallowed one-half of the amount of the mortgage payments claimed by appellant as an alimony deduction and the Tax Court confirmed that determination. 26 U.S.C. § 215(a) permits as a deduction in the return of a taxpayer paying alimony amounts includable “in the gross income of his [former] wife,” and therefore the dispositive issue in this case is whether the one-half of the mortgage payments disallowed by appellee constituted taxable income to appellant’s former wife.

As above indicated, there is no issue concerning the deductibility of one-half of the mortgage payments; that one-half increased the value of the former wife’s equity in the property and constituted income to her. Conversely, the remaining one-half increased only the value of the equity of the four children, and not only did not in any way increase the value of the former wife’s holdings but also did not constitute taxable income to her. The disallowance by the appellee and the conclusion of the Tax Court properly reflect the applicable law. See Kiesling v. United States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1965); Seligmann v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 207 F.2d 489 *540 (7th Cir. 1953); Neely B. Taylor, Jr., 45 T.C. 120; and James Parks Bradley, 30 T.C. 701.

Affirmed.

*

Petitioners-appellants filed a joint return for the year in question, a remarriage having occurred. Since, however, we are here concerned only with the deduction claimed by the husband the term “appellant” will be hereinafter used.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ORDER.

The facts of this case were stipulated to the Tax Court, from which this appeal was perfected, and are not in issue. They establish that in petitioner-appellant’s * Federal income tax return for 1962 he claimed a deduction for the entire amount of payments made during the taxable year on account of a mortgage executed by him and his former wife. They then owned the subject property jointly, but under the terms of a separation agreement entered into in 1958, when they were divorced, appellant conveyed his one-half interest in the property to their four children.

The respondent-appellee disallowed one-half of the amount of the mortgage payments claimed by appellant as an alimony deduction and the Tax Court confirmed that determination. 26 U.S.C. § 215(a) permits as a deduction in the return of a taxpayer paying alimony amounts includable “in the gross income of his [former] wife,” and therefore the dispositive issue in this case is whether the one-half of the mortgage payments disallowed by appellee constituted taxable income to appellant’s former wife.

As above indicated, there is no issue concerning the deductibility of one-half of the mortgage payments; that one-half increased the value of the former wife’s equity in the property and constituted income to her. Conversely, the remaining one-half increased only the value of the equity of the four children, and not only did not in any way increase the value of the former wife’s holdings but also did not constitute taxable income to her. The disallowance by the appellee and the conclusion of the Tax Court properly reflect the applicable law. See Kiesling v. United States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1965); Seligmann v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 207 F.2d 489 *540 (7th Cir. 1953); Neely B. Taylor, Jr., 45 T.C. 120; and James Parks Bradley, 30 T.C. 701.

Affirmed.

*

Petitioners-appellants filed a joint return for the year in question, a remarriage having occurred. Since, however, we are here concerned only with the deduction claimed by the husband the term “appellant” will be hereinafter used.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

382 F.2d 538, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5467, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-l-richards-jr-and-frances-m-richards-v-commissioner-of-ca6-1967.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack