William H. Whitehead v. BBVA Compass Bank

979 F.3d 1327
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedNovember 6, 2020
Docket19-11821
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 979 F.3d 1327 (William H. Whitehead v. BBVA Compass Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
William H. Whitehead v. BBVA Compass Bank, 979 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 19-11821 Date Filed: 11/06/2020 Page: 1 of 10

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________

No. 19-11821 ________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-01130-AKK

WILLIAM H. WHITEHEAD as power of attorney for Lewis E. Whitehead, Jr. pursuant to a power of attorney signed by Lewis E. Whitehead, Jr.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BBVA COMPASS BANK, JAMES C. PUCKETT,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________

(November 6, 2020) USCA11 Case: 19-11821 Date Filed: 11/06/2020 Page: 2 of 10

Before NEWSOM and BRANCH, Circuit Judges, and RAY,* District Judge.

RAY, District Judge:

We consider in this appeal whether the District Court correctly granted

summary judgment against the Appellant (who was an investor) on his various

claims that the Appellees (a bank officer and the bank with whom he was

employed) wrongfully failed to inform the Appellant of the risks involved in

making a certain investment. When this investment sold for a loss, this lawsuit

ensued. Because we find that the alleged wrongful conduct of the Appellees did

not cause the economic loss for which the Appellant sues, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.

I.

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56. “Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment … against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party

* Honorable William M. Ray II, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.

2 USCA11 Case: 19-11821 Date Filed: 11/06/2020 Page: 3 of 10

bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to “go

beyond the pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at

324 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material

fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

On motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the evidence and

all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Any factual disputes will be resolved in the non-

moving party’s favor when sufficient competent evidence supports the non-moving

party’s version of the disputed facts. See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275,

1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (a court is not required to resolve disputes in the non-

moving party’s favor when that party’s version of events is supported by

insufficient evidence). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual

allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v.

England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain

Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, “[a] mere

‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice;

3 USCA11 Case: 19-11821 Date Filed: 11/06/2020 Page: 4 of 10

there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that

party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson,

477 U.S. at 252).

II.

The pertinent facts in this case are as follows. Lewis E. Whitehead, Jr.,

acting through his son William H. Whitehead (collectively, “Whitehead”), opened

an account with BBVA Compass Bank (Compass Bank) to consolidate his

financial accounts. His contact at Compass Bank was with James C. Puckett

(“Puckett”), who was a senior officer of the bank. In electing to move his father’s

money to Compass Bank, William Whitehead placed great confidence in Puckett

and allegedly vested Puckett with responsibility and control over his father’s

funds. 1

At the same time, the record demonstrates that Whitehead agreed to disperse

some of his funds to another investment company. Puckett introduced Whitehead

to Wesley McGugin, who was an investment officer at BBVA Compass

Investment Solutions (“BCIS”), which was a related company to Compass Bank.

Thereafter, Whitehead opened a brokerage account at BCIS using funds from the

Compass Bank account. Whitehead executed documents authorizing BCIS and

1 Of course, despite his engagement of Puckett and Compass Bank, William Whitehead maintained ultimate control and responsibility for his father’s funds. 4 USCA11 Case: 19-11821 Date Filed: 11/06/2020 Page: 5 of 10

McGugin to act as his “registered representative” for the purchase of brokered

certificates of deposit which were not affiliated with or the obligation of Compass

Bank. This lawsuit focuses on a certificate of deposit issued by the Bank of the

West (the “West CD”), which McGugin and BCIS acquired for the Whitehead

portfolio. After holding the West CD for approximately 19 months, BCIS and

McGugin surrendered the West CD for a $38,000 loss. Whitehead seeks to recover

this $38,000 loss as part of his damages in this action.2

Interestingly, Whitehead has sued neither BCIS nor McGugin, even though

it is undisputed that McGugin directed the surrender of the West CD in his

capacity as Whitehead’s investment representative at BCIS. Rather, Puckett and

Compass Bank are the objects of Whitehead’s displeasure. Arguing that Puckett

(and only Puckett) was responsible for the investment of Whitehead’s funds and

that Puckett did not inform him of the potential penalty if the West CD was sold

prior to maturity (which was the source of the $38,000 loss), Whitehead contends

that Puckett and Compass Bank are liable for damages for securities fraud pursuant

to Security Exchange Commission Rule 10(b)(5) and §10b of the Security

Exchange Act of 1934, as well as for state common law claims of negligence,

breach of fiduciary duty, suppression, and fraud.

2 The total amount of compensatory damages sought ($100,000) also includes brokerage fees.

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979 F.3d 1327, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-h-whitehead-v-bbva-compass-bank-ca11-2020.