William Davis v. Clark Ducart

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 5, 2019
Docket16-56662
StatusUnpublished

This text of William Davis v. Clark Ducart (William Davis v. Clark Ducart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
William Davis v. Clark Ducart, (9th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 5 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM JOVIAN DAVIS, No. 16-56662

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-08179-GW-LAL

v.

CLARK E. DUCART, Warden, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 3, 2019**

Before: WALLACE, FARRIS, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner William Jovian Davis appeals from the district

court’s judgment denying his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo the district court’s denial

of Davis’s petition, see Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 2011), and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). we affirm.

Davis contends that the sentencing enhancement imposed under Cal. Penal

Code § 186.22(b)(1) was not supported by sufficient evidence. On this record, the

California Court of Appeal’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to

support all elements of the gang enhancement was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Johnson v.

Montgomery, 899 F.3d 1052, 1056-60 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Coleman v.

Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) (“We have made clear that

Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are

subject to two layers of judicial deference.”).

We construe Davis’s additional argument concerning the denial of an

evidentiary hearing as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability. So

construed, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R. 22-1(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195

F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.

2 16-56662

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Emery v. Clark
643 F.3d 1210 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Todd Hiivala v. Tana Wood
195 F.3d 1098 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
Coleman v. Johnson
132 S. Ct. 2060 (Supreme Court, 2012)
Ronneld Johnson v. W. Montgomery
899 F.3d 1052 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
William Davis v. Clark Ducart, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-davis-v-clark-ducart-ca9-2019.