William Coston v. State of Arkansas

2025 Ark. 143

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: October 2, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. 143 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-24-424

Opinion Delivered: October 2, 2025

WILLIAM COSTON APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 26CR-22-744]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE RALPH OHM, JUDGE APPELLEE

AFFIRMED.

KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice

On March 13, 2024, a Garland County Circuit Court jury convicted appellant,

William Coston, of ten counts of rape, one count of introduction of a controlled substance

into the body of another person, and one count of sexually grooming a child. Coston was

sentenced to eleven terms of life imprisonment, a term of six years’ imprisonment, and

received a $10,000 fine. All sentences were ordered to run consecutively. On appeal, Coston

argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the State to amend the criminal

information to add charges prior to trial. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Because Coston does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, only a brief

recitation of the facts is necessary. This appeal stems from the years-long sexual abuse

suffered by Minor Victim (“MV”) at the hands of Coston, beginning when MV was four years old. Coston’s jury trial was held March 11–13, 2024. The record before us establishes

the following facts.

On November 4, 2022, Coston was charged with three counts of rape. On January

9, 2023, the State amended the information to include one count of first-degree endangering

the welfare of a minor in addition to the three counts of rape. On February 29, 2024, the

information was amended a second time to remove the charge for endangering the welfare

of a minor and to include a total of ten counts of rape, one count of introduction of a

controlled substance into the body of another person, and one count of sexually grooming

a child.1

On March 6, 2024, the circuit court held a pretrial hearing during which the second

amended information filed on February 29 was discussed. Coston objected to the

amendment, arguing that the State’s decision to add seven rape charges to the original three

charges was arbitrary. Specifically, he questioned the State’s basis for adding “seven more as

opposed to four more, five more, fifteen more, thirty more, [or] a hundred more [rape]

charges[.]” The State responded that it decided to charge Coston with the additional counts

of rape because it believed it could prove that Coston was guilty of each count based on the

evidence that had long been in discovery. The State contended that it had a right to amend

the charges up to and until it rested its case and that the second amended information was

not an unfair surprise to Coston, nor did it prejudice him. Coston admitted that the evidence

“ha[d] been in the discovery since day one[,]” but took issue with the State’s decision to file

1 On March 6, 2024, the State filed a final amended information, which changed the date range for the grooming charge to conform to the applicable statute of limitations. That amendment is not at issue on appeal.

2 the initial three charges based on its review of the same file two years prior. When asked

whether he could cite to legal authority to support his argument that the State could not

file an amended information a week before trial, Coston responded: “[w]hat the prohibition

would be, is that if it was some type of surprise to the defense, okay. And then, the -- the

remedy would not be striking the amendment, the remedy under that would be a

continuance motion.” (Emphasis added.) The circuit court ultimately overruled Coston’s

objection to the second amended information, and although Coston never moved to strike

the amendment or for a continuance, the court denied such relief. The circuit court noted

that the State was entitled to amend the information up to the point where the case was

submitted to the jury.

At trial, the State introduced evidence that Coston confessed to law enforcement––

as well as to his brother, a close friend, and a local pastor––that he had sexually abused MV.

Coston also admitted to law enforcement that he had previously given marijuana and

methamphetamine to MV as a precursor to the sexual abuse. MV testified that on numerous

occasions over the course of several years, when she was between the ages of four and nine,

Coston penetrated her vaginally and orally with his penis and digitally penetrated her vagina.

MV also recounted instances during which Coston had shown her pornographic photos and

videos, as well as times that he had given her drugs, both before and during the sexual abuse.

At the close of the State’s case, Coston moved for a directed verdict. In support of

his motion, Coston renewed his argument concerning the alleged arbitrariness of the State’s

decision to charge Coston with ten counts of rape as opposed to the three counts in the

original information. Coston argued that it was almost impossible for him to move for a

3 directed verdict on any specific rape charge because each of the charges described the same

behavior and used the same language for the same date range. Coston ultimately stated that

he was either moving for a directed verdict as to nine of the rape counts for insufficient

proof of penetration, or four of the rape counts, claiming that he had admitted to only six

of them. In response, the State described ten separate instances from MV’s testimony that it

alleged constituted rape. The circuit court denied Coston’s motion for directed verdict and

similarly denied his renewed motion at the close of all the evidence.

On March 13, 2024, Coston was convicted and sentenced as described above. This

timely appeal followed.

II. Point on Appeal

For his sole point on appeal, Coston contends that the circuit court abused its

discretion by allowing the State to amend the criminal information to add charges prior to

trial. Coston specifically takes issue with the State’s second amended information that was

filed on February 29, 2024, six business days—or eleven total days—before his trial began.

We have explained that “[t]he State is entitled to amend an information at any time

prior to the case being submitted to the jury as long as the amendment does not change the

nature or the degree of the offense charged or create unfair surprise.” Green v. State, 2012

Ark. 19, at 3–4, 386 S.W.3d 413, 415 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-407(b) (Repl. 2005)).

Further, “[e]ven where there is a change in the nature or degree of the offense, this court

will analyze whether there was adequate notice and whether the defendant was prejudiced.”

Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 166, at 6–7, 460 S.W.3d 781, 788.

4 With these standards in mind, we turn to Coston’s argument on appeal. Coston likens

his case to Harmon v. State, 277 Ark. 265, 641 S.W.2d 21 (1982), and Martinez v. State, 2014

Ark. App. 182, 432 S.W.3d 689, arguing that we should reach a similar result here. Coston

argues that the second amended information impermissibly changed the nature and degree

of the offenses charged in the prior information and that he did not receive proper notice

of the new charges therein. Specifically, Coston contends that the charges of introduction

of a controlled substance into the body of another person and sexually grooming a child

constituted an unfair surprise because these charges did not share elements with the rape

charges and there had been no prior charges for either offense. Additionally, Coston

contends that the seven additional rape charges included in the second amended information

were an unfair surprise because his case had been open for over a year and the probable-

cause affidavit alleged only three counts of rape.2 The State responds that the instant case is

distinguishable from both Martinez and Harmon, as Coston had adequate notice of the

charges in the second amended information. The State asserts that this case is comparable to

Morehead v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 624, 704 S.W.3d 322, because it amended the information

prior to trial––not to remedy a deficiency in proof––but because it had evidence to prove

each alleged count. The State contends that Coston could not have been surprised by the

2 Coston also argues that the additional rape charges created confusion because the ten verdict forms associated with each rape charge were identical, making it nearly impossible for the jury to assess whether the State offered proof of ten distinct instances of rape. However, Coston does not cite any legal authority in support of his position. We have repeatedly held that we will not consider an argument when the appellant presents no citation to authority or convincing argument in its support, and it is not apparent without further research that the argument is well taken. E.g., Williams v. State, 2024 Ark. 12, at 12, 682 S.W.3d 313, 321.

5 amendments because, as Coston conceded at trial, the basis for the charges had been in

discovery since day one. The State argues that Coston was not prejudiced by the second

amended information because he did not claim that he was unfairly surprised by the charges

below and did not move for a continuance.

As an initial matter, although Coston makes the argument before this court that the

addition of the charges of introduction of a controlled substance into the body of another

person and sexually grooming a child constituted an unfair surprise, a review of the record

demonstrates that he did not raise these arguments below. Rather, Coston’s objections to

the second amended information were limited to his concerns about the arbitrariness of the

number of rape charges included in the information. We have long held that arguments not

raised at trial will not be addressed for the first time on appeal. Sylvester v. State, 2016 Ark.

136, at 5, 489 S.W.3d 146, 149. Likewise, parties cannot change the grounds for an

objection on appeal but are bound by the scope and nature of their objections as presented

at trial. Id. Thus, our discussion will be limited to Coston’s arguments concerning the seven

additional rape charges in the second amended information.

In Harmon, supra, we reversed and remanded for a new trial because the circuit court

erroneously permitted the State to amend the criminal information at too late a juncture.

277 Ark. at 266–67, 641 S.W.2d at 22. Specifically, Harmon had been charged with capital-

felony murder committed in the course of a kidnapping, but on the first day of trial after

the jury had already been sworn, the State was permitted to amend the information to add

robbery as an alternative underlying felony to support the capital-felony-murder charge. Id.

We explained that “[t]he nature of the charge was unquestionably changed by adding the

6 offense of robbery. That amendment was not permissible in the absence of any notice to

Harmon that he was to be required to defend an essentially different charge of capital

murder.” Id. at 270, 641 S.W.2d at 24. In Martinez, supra, our court of appeals reversed and

dismissed Martinez’s second-degree sexual-assault conviction because the circuit court

erroneously allowed the State to amend the criminal information after the State rested its

case. 2014 Ark. App. 182, at 1, 432 S.W.3d at 690. At the close of the State’s case, Martinez

moved to dismiss the rape charge, arguing that the State had failed to introduce evidence of

penetration as is necessary to sustain a rape charge. Id. at 3, 432 S.W.3d at 691. Over

Martinez’s objection, the State then successfully moved to amend the information to add a

second-degree sexual-assault charge in order to conform to the evidence presented at trial.

Id. The court of appeals ruled that the amended information impermissibly changed the

nature of the offense charged because the crimes had different elements, and the “appellant

essentially had to defend a different charge.” Id. at 9, 432 S.W.3d at 694. The court of

appeals held that Martinez was unfairly surprised by the amendment because penetration

was an essential element of the rape charge, and therefore, Martinez had come to trial

prepared to defend against that element. Id. at 8, 432 S.W.3d at 694. In reversing his

conviction, the court of appeals noted that Martinez did not learn of the State’s intent to

amend the information until after the State had presented its case and the jury had already

heard testimony from the State’s witnesses––without objection from Martinez––concerning

acts that did not go to the elements of Martinez’s rape charge. Id.

We are not persuaded by Coston’s reliance on Harmon and Martinez. First, unlike in

Harmon and Martinez, Coston was not forced to defend against a different charge. Here,

7 Coston was originally charged with three counts of rape. The second amended information

added seven counts of rape, totaling ten counts. Therefore, the second amended information

did not change the nature or degree of the offense charged since it merely added counts of

the same offense. Further, Coston was not subjected to the same lack of notice as in Harmon

and Martinez. As opposed to the State’s amended information being sought on the morning

of trial after the jury was sworn as in Harmon, or at the close of the State’s case after the

presentation of its evidence as in Martinez, Coston learned of the additional charges in the

second amended information eleven days prior to trial.

Indeed, the present case bears more of a resemblance to Morehead, supra. In Morehead,

our court of appeals affirmed Morehead’s convictions for rape and second-degree sexual

assault. 2024 Ark. App. 624, at 1, 704 S.W.3d at 323. Morehead was initially charged with

two counts of rape, but two business days before trial, the circuit court allowed the State to

amend the information to add two counts of second-degree sexual assault. Id. at 2, 704

S.W.3d at 323. The court of appeals noted that, as in Martinez, supra, the State’s amended

information changed the nature of the charged offense due to the essential element of

penetration. Id. However, the court of appeals explained that unlike Martinez, Morehead

was not unfairly surprised because “the State did not amend in an effort to remedy any

deficiency in the proof. Instead, the State amended prior to trial because it had the evidence

to prove all the counts alleged. The rapes and the sexual assaults arose from a common set

of facts, and both were discussed in the probable-cause affidavit.” Id. at 5, 704 S.W.3d at

325. Likewise, the court of appeals held that Morehead was not prejudiced by the amended

8 information because he did move for a continuance, nor did he claim that he did not have

adequate time to prepare for trial due to the amendment. Id. at 5, 704 S.W.3d at 325.

Here, as discussed above, the second amended information did not change the nature

or degree of the offenses charged. Rather, the amendment added counts of the same

offense—rape. As in Morehead, the State amended the information before trial began.

Specifically, the State filed the second amended information six business days, or eleven total

days, prior to trial. Additionally, as in Morehead, the State filed its amendment ahead of trial

to conform to the evidence that it planned to introduce as opposed to filing the amendment

in order to conform to the testimony that had already been adduced at trial that supported

a lesser charge. Further, Coston did not allege below that the additional rape charges in the

second amended information were an unfair surprise; rather, his argument focused on the

arbitrariness of the number of rape counts. In fact, Coston conceded below that the

additional charges stemmed from evidence that had been in the record since day one.

Therefore, we are satisfied that Coston was given adequate notice of the additional rape

charges. Finally, like Morehead, Coston was not prejudiced by the amendment. Coston

neither moved for a continuance—either after the second amended information was filed

on February 29, 2024, or at the March 6, 2024 pretrial hearing—nor claimed that he was

unable to prepare for trial as a result of the additional charges set forth in the amendment.

We have held that we will not presume prejudice when an appellant fails to move for a

continuance or claim surprise after he is put on notice that the State plans to amend an

information. See, e.g., Holloway v. State, 312 Ark. 306, 313, 849 S.W.2d 473, 477 (1993);

Hoover v. State, 353 Ark. 424, 430, 108 S.W.3d 618, 621 (2003).

9 Accordingly, given our review of the record and our discussion above, we affirm the

circuit court’s ruling allowing the State to amend the criminal information.

III. Rule 4-3(a) Review

Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a), the record has been reviewed for

all objections, motions, and requests that were decided adversely to Coston, and no

prejudicial error was found.

Mylissia M. Blankenship, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Dalton Cook, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.