Cite as 2026 Ark. 97 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-25-768
Opinion Delivered: May 7, 2026 OWEN WATSON APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 18CR-22-338] V. HONORABLE RANDY PHILHOURS, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice
Owen Watson began raping Minor Victim when she was just ten years old, and four
months after she turned fourteen, MV gave birth to Watson’s biological daughter. A jury
convicted Watson of child rape, and the circuit court sentenced him to life in prison. He
appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing evidentiary issues, judicial bias, and other
supposed errors. We reject Watson’s claims and affirm both his conviction and his sentence.
Factual and Procedural Background
When MV was ten years old, Watson, her mother’s boyfriend, moved into their
home. Watson then began raping MV. The abuse continued for years until MV became
pregnant—at age thirteen—and her family contacted police. Following an investigation,
the State charged Watson with rape.
Watson’s trial was short. MV testified that Watson had begun raping her when she
was just ten years old, and she described how she had learned she was pregnant. A police
officer, Chelsey Stafford, testified about the investigation and, particularly relevant here, how she had collected and stored DNA samples from Watson. A forensic DNA technician,
Christopher Glaze, testified that DNA testing confirmed that Watson is the biological father
of MV’s child. And Watson did not contest paternity; his counsel repeatedly acknowledged
that Watson is the biological father of MV’s child.
The jury convicted Watson of rape, and the circuit court sentenced him to life in
prison. Watson appeals.
Discussion
Watson raises five claims on appeal. Broadly speaking, he claims that the circuit
court improperly: (1) heard hearsay testimony; (2) admitted DNA evidence without
sufficient foundation; (3) denied his motion for a mistrial on the basis of a prospective juror’s
statement that she had worked with defense counsel at the public defender’s office; (4)
denied his recusal motion; and (5) concluded that he was a habitual offender. None of those
claims have any merit, and we affirm Watson’s conviction and sentence.
1. Start with the hearsay claim. Watson argues that the circuit court erred when it
permitted Officer Stafford to testify that MV had told her that “Watson had been raping her
since she was ten years old.” Watson objected and argued that statement was inadmissible
hearsay. The circuit court overruled the objection, explaining the statement was not being
used to prove rape but to explain how Officer Stafford got involved with the case and how
she conducted her investigation. That was not error. On the contrary, consistent with the
circuit court’s conclusion here, we have previously held that “testimony introduced to
explain an officer’s actions in pursing and apprehending a suspect is not hearsay.” Dixon v.
State, 2011 Ark. 450, at 14–15, 385 S.W.3d 164, 174. So we reject Watson’s argument.
2 2. Second is Watson’s argument that the circuit court erroneously admitted DNA
evidence. Watson claims that DNA evidence should never have been admitted because
“[t]here was no proof as to the chain of custody of the DNA exhibits whatsoever.” But
that is not the case. Officer Stafford testified about collecting DNA samples from Watson
and MV’s child, sealing those samples in manilla envelopes labeled with the case number,
and delivering them to a secure evidence locker. Officer Stafford also testified that an
evidence clerk transported those samples to the state crime laboratory for testing. And
Glaze, the forensic DNA technician at the state crime laboratory, testified that he did not
believe anyone had tampered with the envelopes used to collect the DNA samples.
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 901(a) says that “evidence is admissible so long as there
is evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.” Faulkner v. State, 2026 Ark. 60, at 8, 728 S.W.3d 352, 357 (quoting Ark. R. Evid.
901(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That rule does not require the State to
“eliminate every possibility of tampering” or to “‘account[] for . . . every person who could
have conceivably’” touched a piece of evidence. Lee v. State, 326 Ark. 229, 236, 931
S.W.2d 433, 437–38 (1996) (quoting Phills v. State, 301 Ark. 265, 783 S.W.2d 348 (1990)).
It need only “establish[] within a reasonable probability that the evidence ha[s] not been
tampered with.” Guydon v. State, 344 Ark. 251, 255, 39 S.W.3d 767, 770 (2001). The
testimony above—explaining how the evidence was collected, secured, and moved—was
more than sufficient to meet that standard.
3. Next is Watson’s claim that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for
a mistrial after a prospective juror stated she knew Watson’s attorney from her employment
3 at the public defender’s office years earlier. Watson claims that statement revealed he was
indigent and prejudiced his defense. To obtain a mistrial, Watson had to demonstrate that
the prospective juror’s statement was “so prejudicial that justice could not be served by a
continuation of the trial.” Hill v. State, 255 Ark. 720, 722, 502 S.W.2d 649, 650 (1973).
Incontrovertibly, a mistrial is such “an extreme and drastic remedy,” Franklin v. State, 2024
Ark. 9, at 4, 682 S.W.3d 1, 4, and only “appropriate when there is a high degree of
necessity,” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010) (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497, 506 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Watson does not make that showing, preferring to simply speculate that mere
knowledge that a prospective juror had once worked alongside defense counsel in the public
defender’s office would lead jurors to conclude that Watson was indigent and use that
knowledge against Watson. But naked conjecture is not prejudice, and we have previously
rejected substantially similar claims. See Vaughn v. State, 289 Ark. 31, 709 S.W. 73 (1986)
(rejecting as speculative, a defendant’s claim that he was so prejudiced by the circuit court’s
reference to his attorney as a public defender); Landreth v. State, 331 Ark. 12, 22–23, 960
S.W.2d 434, 439 (1998) (“Any prejudice caused by reference to the defense counsel as
‘public defenders’ is speculative at best.”). We likewise do so here.
4. Then there is Watson’s recusal motion. Watson argues that the circuit court
abused its discretion when it denied his recusal motion after making an off-hand comment
before trial expressing skepticism about Watson’s claim that while the DNA proved he is
the father of MV’s child, he did not rape MV. The rules of judicial conduct require
disqualification “in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
4 questioned.” Ark. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A). That is a high standard, and Watson’s
allegation falls short here. Impartiality does not require gullibility; nor does it bar judges
from forming opinions and expressing skepticism. See In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650,
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Cite as 2026 Ark. 97 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-25-768
Opinion Delivered: May 7, 2026 OWEN WATSON APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 18CR-22-338] V. HONORABLE RANDY PHILHOURS, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice
Owen Watson began raping Minor Victim when she was just ten years old, and four
months after she turned fourteen, MV gave birth to Watson’s biological daughter. A jury
convicted Watson of child rape, and the circuit court sentenced him to life in prison. He
appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing evidentiary issues, judicial bias, and other
supposed errors. We reject Watson’s claims and affirm both his conviction and his sentence.
Factual and Procedural Background
When MV was ten years old, Watson, her mother’s boyfriend, moved into their
home. Watson then began raping MV. The abuse continued for years until MV became
pregnant—at age thirteen—and her family contacted police. Following an investigation,
the State charged Watson with rape.
Watson’s trial was short. MV testified that Watson had begun raping her when she
was just ten years old, and she described how she had learned she was pregnant. A police
officer, Chelsey Stafford, testified about the investigation and, particularly relevant here, how she had collected and stored DNA samples from Watson. A forensic DNA technician,
Christopher Glaze, testified that DNA testing confirmed that Watson is the biological father
of MV’s child. And Watson did not contest paternity; his counsel repeatedly acknowledged
that Watson is the biological father of MV’s child.
The jury convicted Watson of rape, and the circuit court sentenced him to life in
prison. Watson appeals.
Discussion
Watson raises five claims on appeal. Broadly speaking, he claims that the circuit
court improperly: (1) heard hearsay testimony; (2) admitted DNA evidence without
sufficient foundation; (3) denied his motion for a mistrial on the basis of a prospective juror’s
statement that she had worked with defense counsel at the public defender’s office; (4)
denied his recusal motion; and (5) concluded that he was a habitual offender. None of those
claims have any merit, and we affirm Watson’s conviction and sentence.
1. Start with the hearsay claim. Watson argues that the circuit court erred when it
permitted Officer Stafford to testify that MV had told her that “Watson had been raping her
since she was ten years old.” Watson objected and argued that statement was inadmissible
hearsay. The circuit court overruled the objection, explaining the statement was not being
used to prove rape but to explain how Officer Stafford got involved with the case and how
she conducted her investigation. That was not error. On the contrary, consistent with the
circuit court’s conclusion here, we have previously held that “testimony introduced to
explain an officer’s actions in pursing and apprehending a suspect is not hearsay.” Dixon v.
State, 2011 Ark. 450, at 14–15, 385 S.W.3d 164, 174. So we reject Watson’s argument.
2 2. Second is Watson’s argument that the circuit court erroneously admitted DNA
evidence. Watson claims that DNA evidence should never have been admitted because
“[t]here was no proof as to the chain of custody of the DNA exhibits whatsoever.” But
that is not the case. Officer Stafford testified about collecting DNA samples from Watson
and MV’s child, sealing those samples in manilla envelopes labeled with the case number,
and delivering them to a secure evidence locker. Officer Stafford also testified that an
evidence clerk transported those samples to the state crime laboratory for testing. And
Glaze, the forensic DNA technician at the state crime laboratory, testified that he did not
believe anyone had tampered with the envelopes used to collect the DNA samples.
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 901(a) says that “evidence is admissible so long as there
is evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.” Faulkner v. State, 2026 Ark. 60, at 8, 728 S.W.3d 352, 357 (quoting Ark. R. Evid.
901(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That rule does not require the State to
“eliminate every possibility of tampering” or to “‘account[] for . . . every person who could
have conceivably’” touched a piece of evidence. Lee v. State, 326 Ark. 229, 236, 931
S.W.2d 433, 437–38 (1996) (quoting Phills v. State, 301 Ark. 265, 783 S.W.2d 348 (1990)).
It need only “establish[] within a reasonable probability that the evidence ha[s] not been
tampered with.” Guydon v. State, 344 Ark. 251, 255, 39 S.W.3d 767, 770 (2001). The
testimony above—explaining how the evidence was collected, secured, and moved—was
more than sufficient to meet that standard.
3. Next is Watson’s claim that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for
a mistrial after a prospective juror stated she knew Watson’s attorney from her employment
3 at the public defender’s office years earlier. Watson claims that statement revealed he was
indigent and prejudiced his defense. To obtain a mistrial, Watson had to demonstrate that
the prospective juror’s statement was “so prejudicial that justice could not be served by a
continuation of the trial.” Hill v. State, 255 Ark. 720, 722, 502 S.W.2d 649, 650 (1973).
Incontrovertibly, a mistrial is such “an extreme and drastic remedy,” Franklin v. State, 2024
Ark. 9, at 4, 682 S.W.3d 1, 4, and only “appropriate when there is a high degree of
necessity,” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010) (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497, 506 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Watson does not make that showing, preferring to simply speculate that mere
knowledge that a prospective juror had once worked alongside defense counsel in the public
defender’s office would lead jurors to conclude that Watson was indigent and use that
knowledge against Watson. But naked conjecture is not prejudice, and we have previously
rejected substantially similar claims. See Vaughn v. State, 289 Ark. 31, 709 S.W. 73 (1986)
(rejecting as speculative, a defendant’s claim that he was so prejudiced by the circuit court’s
reference to his attorney as a public defender); Landreth v. State, 331 Ark. 12, 22–23, 960
S.W.2d 434, 439 (1998) (“Any prejudice caused by reference to the defense counsel as
‘public defenders’ is speculative at best.”). We likewise do so here.
4. Then there is Watson’s recusal motion. Watson argues that the circuit court
abused its discretion when it denied his recusal motion after making an off-hand comment
before trial expressing skepticism about Watson’s claim that while the DNA proved he is
the father of MV’s child, he did not rape MV. The rules of judicial conduct require
disqualification “in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
4 questioned.” Ark. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A). That is a high standard, and Watson’s
allegation falls short here. Impartiality does not require gullibility; nor does it bar judges
from forming opinions and expressing skepticism. See In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650,
654 (2d Cir. 1943) (“Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-
like innocence. If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house
dramas called trials, he could never render decisions.”); see also Bentonville Sch. Dist. v. Sitton,
2022 Ark. 1, at 4 (“A mere allegation that a judge’s conduct has the appearance of
impropriety falls short of the disqualifying standard that a judge’s impartiality be reasonably
questioned.”). Watson’s claim to the contrary falls flat.
5. Last, we consider Watson’s claim that the State failed to prove he was a habitual
offender. The circuit court sentenced Watson as a habitual offender under Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-4-501(d) (Repl. 2024) after the State proved Watson had been convicted of two prior
violent felonies. The State proved one of Watson’s prior convictions with a document titled
“Order and Conditions of Probation.” Watson argues that order was insufficient to prove
the prior conviction, claiming that a document that merely shows he was placed on
probation was not sufficient.1 But the order does not simply show he was placed on
probation. It shows Watson pled guilty, that the circuit court found him guilty, and that
he was placed on probation. That is sufficient to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that
1 Watson also argues that order did not reflect that he was represented by counsel and thus could not be used to demonstrate a prior conviction. Because he did not make that argument below, the State did not have an opportunity to respond to it with additional evidence, so we decline to reach the unpreserved issue.
5 the defendant was [previously] convicted or found guilty.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-504(a)
(Repl. 2025).
6. That leaves just one loose end. The State asks us to remand to correct a scrivener’s
error because the circuit court did not check the habitual-offender box on its sentencing
order. We decline to remand this matter, “needless[ly] wasting . . . resources.” Smith v.
State, 2022 Ark. 95, at 22 (Womack, J., concurring). Instead, as the error is purely clerical,
we exercise our power to “correct the sentence in lieu of remanding” and, as we have in
other cases, affirm the sentence as modified. Walden v. State, 2014 Ark. 193, at 11, 433
S.W.3d 864, 871.
Affirmed as modified.
BAKER, C.J., and HUDSON, J., concur.
KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice, concurring. While I agree with the majority’s
decision to affirm Watson’s rape conviction, I write separately because, based on this court’s
longstanding precedent, Watson’s hearsay argument is not preserved for our review. Thus,
I would decline to reach the merits of it.
On appeal, Watson challenges Officer Chelsey Stafford’s testimony that, during the
investigation, MV told Stafford that “Watson had been raping her since she was ten years
old.” At trial, Watson simply objected “to hearsay[.]” The circuit court overruled Watson’s
general hearsay objection, and the direct examination of Stafford continued. After Stafford’s
testimony had concluded and outside the presence of the jury, the circuit court expressed
concern about its earlier ruling regarding the admissibility of Stafford’s testimony recounting
what MV said to her in the course of the investigation, because “we didn’t establish any
6 groundwork for an excited utterance or anything like that.” The court went on to explain
that the testimony was admissible to “show why the investigator went on and did what she
did the rest of that evening.” No further objections were made.
Now on appeal, Watson argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing
Stafford to repeat at trial a prior consistent statement made by MV that improperly bolstered
MV’s testimony. He specifically contends that the prior consistent statement was
inadmissible because MV’s alleged motive to fabricate the rape allegations preexisted the
statement she made to Stafford, and her motive was as great when the statement was made
as it was when the testimony was given. Watson did not make these arguments at trial. In
criminal cases, issues must be presented to the circuit court in order to preserve them for
appeal. Wilder v. State, 2023 Ark. 137, at 5, 675 S.W.3d 424, 428. We have long held that
arguments not raised at trial will not be addressed for the first time on appeal. Coston v. State,
2025 Ark. 143, at 6, 720 S.W.3d 241, 244. Likewise, parties cannot change the grounds for
an objection on appeal but are bound by the scope and nature of their objections as presented
at trial. Id. Therefore, I would decline to address the merits of Watson’s prior-consistent-
statement arguments because they were not presented to the circuit court as a basis for his
general hearsay objection.
Accordingly, I must concur.
HUDSON, J., joins.
Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.