UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK WILLIAM BURCH, Plaintiff, 25-CV-4587 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL CHASE BANK, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. By order dated June 4, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with 30 days’ leave to replead. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits-to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff William S. Burch, who resides in Brooklyn, filed this complaint against a
Manhattan branch of Chase Bank because he believes that the bank is “claiming his funding.” (ECF 1 at 6.) Plaintiff’s handwriting is very difficult to read, but the following are the facts the Court could discern from the complaint.1 On an unspecified date, Plaintiff “requested money” for his rent and birthday, but a Jane Doe teller “placed” a “first overdraft on [Plaintiff’s] account by saying she misunderstood the transaction.” (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, he only uses money orders, and collects his “pay from Chase,” and that “over the years,” there have been
1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. “many transactions” that “occurred without [him] knowing.” (Id. at 5-6.) He further claims that he has overcome 30 years of homelessness, police harassment, and false arrest, and did not receive financial assistance from his family or friends. (Id. at 5-6.) DISCUSSION A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth
generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, a federal district court has jurisdiction only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.”) Federal Question Jurisdiction To support federal question jurisdiction, a type of subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Mere invocation of federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff does not invoke the Court’s
federal question jurisdiction, and the facts he alleges do not suggest that he can state claims giving rise to any federal claims. The Court therefore finds that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction of this matter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK WILLIAM BURCH, Plaintiff, 25-CV-4587 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL CHASE BANK, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. By order dated June 4, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with 30 days’ leave to replead. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits-to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff William S. Burch, who resides in Brooklyn, filed this complaint against a
Manhattan branch of Chase Bank because he believes that the bank is “claiming his funding.” (ECF 1 at 6.) Plaintiff’s handwriting is very difficult to read, but the following are the facts the Court could discern from the complaint.1 On an unspecified date, Plaintiff “requested money” for his rent and birthday, but a Jane Doe teller “placed” a “first overdraft on [Plaintiff’s] account by saying she misunderstood the transaction.” (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, he only uses money orders, and collects his “pay from Chase,” and that “over the years,” there have been
1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. “many transactions” that “occurred without [him] knowing.” (Id. at 5-6.) He further claims that he has overcome 30 years of homelessness, police harassment, and false arrest, and did not receive financial assistance from his family or friends. (Id. at 5-6.) DISCUSSION A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth
generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, a federal district court has jurisdiction only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.”) Federal Question Jurisdiction To support federal question jurisdiction, a type of subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Mere invocation of federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff does not invoke the Court’s
federal question jurisdiction, and the facts he alleges do not suggest that he can state claims giving rise to any federal claims. The Court therefore finds that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction of this matter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction To establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (“A case falls within the federal district court’s ‘original’ diversity ‘jurisdiction’ only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.”). “An individual’s citizenship, within the meaning of the diversity statute, is determined by his domicile.” Johnson v. Smithsonian, 4 Fed. App’x 69, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Palazzo v. Corio, 232 F.3d 88, 42 (2d
Cir. 2000)). Domicile is “the place where a person has his true fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Linardos v. Fortuna,157 F.3d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1998). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts generally “recognize[ ] a rebuttable presumption that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of the actual amount in controversy.” Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty. Servs., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999). Where a complaint does not contain facts suggesting that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, however, the Court is not required to presume that the bare allegations in the complaint are a good faith representation of the actual amount in controversy. See Weir v. Cenlar FSB, No. 16-CV-8650 (CS), 2018 WL 3443173, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 17,
2018) (reasoning that “the jurisdictional amount, like any other factual allegation, ought not to receive the presumption of truth unless it is supported by facts rendering it plausible”) (citing Wood v. Maguire Auto. LLC, No. 09-CV-0640, 2011 WL 4478485, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011), aff’d, 508 F. App’x 65 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)). The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint do not meet his burden of showing that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of this matter, although the citizenship of the parties may be diverse. Plaintiff resides in Brooklyn, New York, and he sues Chase Bank at its New York address; although Plaintiff has not pleaded facts about Defendant Chase Bank’s citizenship, it appears to be a citizen of Ohio for diversity purposes. See Gutierrez v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 09-CV-2257 (LAK), 2009 WL 1059636, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2009) (recognizing that JP
Morgan Chase Bank is a citizen of Ohio for diversity purposes); see also Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006) holding that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a national bank resides only in the state designated in its articles of association (and not in each state in which it has branch offices)). Even if the Court assumes that the parties are diverse, the Plaintiff does not specify an amount of money in damages. It is, therefore, not clear that his claim meets the amount in controversy. Insofar as Plaintiff asserts claims under state law under the court’s diversity jurisdiction, the Court dismisses this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has
cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). In an abundance of caution, and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants him 30 days’ leave to replead any claims under state law in an amended complaint in which he alleges facts showing that the court has diversity jurisdiction of such claims.2 If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), with 30 days’ leave to replead.
2 Plaintiff does not indicate what his state-law claims are against Defendant. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff must comply with Rule 8 by providing a short and plain statement showing that he is entitled to relief. Additionally, Plaintiff must write the amended complaint as neatly as possible so that the Court will be able to read it. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered. SO ORDERED. Dated: February 24, 2026 New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge