WILL TOOMEY, Individually and On Behalf of Others Similarly Situated v. Opt-in Plaintiffs

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided December 17, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-01579·Unknown

Opinion

Esther C. Rodriguez Michael A. Josephson Nevada State Bar No. 006473 Texas State Bar No. 24014780 RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C. Andrew W. Dunlap 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Texas State Bar No. 24078444 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Alyssa White Tel: (702) 320-8400; Fax: (702) 320-8401 Texas State Bar No. 24073014 esther@rodriguezlaw.com JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050 Richard J. (Rex) Burch Houston, Texas 77046 Texas State Bar No. 24001807 Tel: (713) 352-1100; Fax: (713) 352-3300 BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC mjosephson@mybackwages.com 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025 adunlap@mybackwages.com Houston, Texas 77046 awhite@mybackwages.com Tel: (713) 877-8788 rburch@brucknerburch.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Opt-in Plaintiffs UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

WILL TOOMEY, Individually and On Behalf of Case No.: 2:24-cv-01579-MDC Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, AMENDED JOINT STIPULATION REGARDING DISMISSAL vs. COLD BORE TECHNOLOGY CORP., Defendant. Plaintiff Will Toomey, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, and Defendant Cold Bore Technology Corp. (“Cold Bore”), by and through their respective counsels of record, hereby request the Court approve this Amended Joint Stipulation of Dismissal and enter the attached Proposed Order. 1. Toomey filed this lawsuit on August 26, 2024, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (NMMWA). Doc. No. 1. 2. On March 7, 2025, the Court entered an Order conditionally certifying Plaintiff’s FLSA Collective and authorizing notice to be sent to the collective members. Doc. 31. By the end of the opt-in period, 31 Plaintiffs had filed written consents to join this lawsuit and to be represented by Plaintiff’s Counsel. Doc. Nos. 34-43. Thereafter, the Court granted a stay of this matter so the Parties could attend private mediation. Doc. No. 54. 3. Prior to mediation, the Parties informally exchanged documents and information regarding the FLSA collective and the putative class of New Mexico employees. Review of the data revealed that de minimis time was worked in New Mexico and that the number of individuals working in New Mexico could not fulfill Rule 23’s numerosity requirement. 4. The Parties mediated this matter on November 18, 2025. Based on the data provided for Cold Bore’s New Mexico employees, the Parties agreed not to pursue NMMWA class-based claims and focused resolution efforts on the FLSA Collective. 5. Ultimately, the Parties reached a settlement covering Plaintiff Toomey and the 31 Opt- In Plaintiffs who are represented by Plaintiff’s Counsel. 6. As part of the settlement, Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss this lawsuit and proceed privately in arbitration. To that end, the Parties filed a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice on November 25, 2025. Doc. 55. 7. On December 1, 2025, the Court entered an Order instructing the Parties to file an amended stipulation addressing whether prior notice of dismissal should be given to class and collective plaintiffs. Doc. 56.

RULE 41 DISMISSALS ARE EFFECTIVE UPON FILING 8. A notice or stipulation of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) is self-executing and effective when the notice or stipulation is filed with the court. See, e.g., Karlsson v. Ewing, No. CV 14-0420 FMO (EX), 2020 WL 10762224, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2020); Fastlicht v. Rivian, LLC, No. 25-CV-872-RSH-KSC, 2025 WL 1645591, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2025); Moyer v. Tilton, No. CIV S–03–1350 FCD DAD P, 2011 WL 590602, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (“[T]he parties filed a stipulated dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) (A)(ii). All of the parties signed the stipulation, and the dismissal was effective upon filing without a court order.”). 9. Other Circuits agree with this holding. See, e.g., Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff’s filing in the district court of a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) divests the court of its jurisdiction over a case....”); State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Cnty. of Camden, 824 F.3d 399, 406-07 (3d Cir. 2017) ("Every court to have considered the nature of a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) has come to the conclusion that it is immediately self-executing. No separate entry or order is required to effectuate the dismissal."); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[A] voluntary stipulation of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is effective immediately, [and] any action by the district court after the filing of such a stipulation can have no force or effect because the matter has already been dismissed by the parties themselves without any court action.”); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Caselaw concerning stipulated dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1)[(A)](ii) is clear that entry of such a stipulation of dismissal is effective automatically and does not require judicial approval.”); De Leon v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2011) (“A stipulation of dismissal filed under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) or (ii) is self-executing and immediately strips the district court of jurisdiction over the merits.”); Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that a stipulation filed pursuant Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is “self-executing and dismisses the case upon its becoming effective” and that “[d]istrict courts need not and may not take action after the stipulation becomes effective because the stipulation dismisses the case and divests the district court of jurisdiction.”). 10. The Parties believe that their stipulation of dismissal was effective upon filing and divested the Court of jurisdiction. However, the Parties file this Amended Stipulation in response to the Court’s Order regarding notice to the class and collective members. NOTICE PRIOR TO DISMISSAL IS NOT NECESSARY 11. Notice prior to dismissal is not necessary for class or collective plaintiffs. 12. First, notice is not necessary for the New Mexico Class because a class does not exist and no potential class claims for absent New Mexico employees will be released by the settlement. As discussed above, pre-mediation discovery revealed the proposed New Mexico Class did not satisfy numerosity and the Parties agreed to settle FLSA and related NMMWA and other state law claims only for Toomey and the Opt-In Plaintiffs represented by Plaintiff’s Counsel. 13. Plaintiff did not move to certify a New Mexico class and the settlement does not release any class claims under the NMMWA. Thus, no absent class members will be bound by this settlement, and all absent New Mexico employees will retain their claims under the NMMWA should they wish to bring a separate lawsuit. Woodard v. Smith, No. 3:23-CV-1165-AR, 2024 WL 1993484, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 2, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Woodard v. Boeing Emp. Credit Union, No. 3:23-CV-01165-AR, 2024 WL 1999860 (D. Or. May 5, 2024) (“Finally, no class interests are conceded by Woodard's dismissal because no class has been, or is proposed to be, certified in this action. In this context, notice to putative class members of Woodard's voluntary dismissal is unnecessary.”). Thus, notice to class members is not necessary. 14. Further, notice of dismissal is not necessary for the FLSA collective members who opted in to this lawsuit and are

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