Wilkins v. Yavapai, County of

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided May 12, 2021·No. 3:20-cv-08298·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO SC 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Cody James Wilkins, No. CV 20-08298-PCT-JAT (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Yavapai County, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Cody James Wilkins, who is confined in the Yavapai County Detention 16 Center, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an 17 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 4). The Court granted the Application 18 and dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend (Doc. 6). Plaintiff has filed a First 19 Amended Complaint (Doc. 8). The Court will dismiss the First Amended Complaint with 20 leave to amend. 21 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 23 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 25 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 26 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 27 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 28 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 1 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 2 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 3 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 4 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 5 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 6 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 7 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 8 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 9 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 10 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 11 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 12 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 13 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 14 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 15 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 16 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 17 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 18 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 19 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 20 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 21 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 22 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 23 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but 24 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave 25 to amend. 26 II. First Amended Complaint 27 In his one-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims for threat to 28 safety, retaliation, and violation of his religious exercise rights. Plaintiff sues Yavapai 1 County Sheriff’s Office (YCSO) Sergeants Byers and Sampson and Detention Officers 2 Lamb and Edmondson. Plaintiff seeks compensatory relief. 3 Plaintiff alleges that in October 2019, he was housed in O-Dorm and asked to be 4 moved due a conflict with another detainee, whom he does not identify. Plaintiff was 5 moved to N-Dorm. Plaintiff again asked to be moved and he was placed in Administrative 6 Segregation (“Ad-Seg”). According to Plaintiff, he was placed in Ad-Seg because 7 detention staff said his behavior was unmanageable, but he sought to be moved for his 8 safety. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of being housed in a unit with violent offenders— 9 Plaintiff does not indicate whether he refers to Ad-Seg, O-Dorm, or N-Dorm—his safety 10 was endangered. He also appears to allege that even when he asked to be moved every 11 other week, he was “shot down” and forced to stay in “units” despite not having done 12 anything wrong. Plaintiff alleges that, as an un-convicted detainee, he was being punished 13 by being placed in Ad-Seg. He alleges that “all the officers involved in housing [him] in 14 unit 5” violated his constitutional rights. As his injury, Plaintiff alleges lack of exposure 15 to sunlight, being afforded only eight hours a month for mental health, and dungeon 16 syndrome from lack of light, causing mental anguish. 17 III. Failure to State a Claim 18 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 19 (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and 20 (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 21 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 22 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury 23 as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link 24 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371- 25 72, 377 (1976). 26 To state a claim against a defendant, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply 27 conclusions [to] show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his 28 civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). For an individual 1 to be liable in his or her official capacity, a plaintiff must allege injuries resulting from a 2 policy, practice, or custom of the agency over which that individual has final policy-making 3 authority. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). In 4 addition, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so a defendant’s position 5 as the supervisor of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, 6 absent more, does not make him liable. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 7 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor in his personal 8 capacity “is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor 9 participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 10 prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Further, under Ninth Circuit law, a defendant 11 can be liable for failure to act. Id. 12 A. Defendants 13 Plaintiff names four YCSO officers as Defendants, but Plaintiff fails to allege any 14 facts against any of them.

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