Wilke v. Von Blanckensee

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: November 23, 2022
• Docket: 4:20-cv-00282
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Edwin Wilke, No. CV-20-00282-TUC-CKJ (BGM)

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Barbara Von Blanckensee, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 The Petitioner filed a habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his 16 confinement in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) at USP Tucson, without benefit of a 17 hearing related to this placement, and asks for early release to a half-way-house under the 18 First Step Act, the Cares Act, and Second Chance Act. (Doc. 1.) This Court has jurisdiction 19 over habeas petitions filed by persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws 20 or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Habeas corpus is the appropriate 21 remedy for a prisoner “challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, 22 and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a 23 speedier release from that imprisonment.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 24 Petitioner admits he failed to administratively exhaust his habeas claims because his 25 counselor refused to advance one administrative claim, and he was threatened as to other 26 claims. “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 27 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 28 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Castro–Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 1 (9th Cir.2001), abrogated on other grounds, Fernandez–Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 2 (2006)). Motions for compassionate release, such as those brought under the First Step Act 3 and Cares Act, seeking early release, require exhaustion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) 4 (requiring request for compassionate release to warden of defendant’s facility and 5 exhaustion of all administrative appeals if denied or lapse of 30 days from receipt of request 6 and no response by the warden). Exhaustion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is mandatory and 7 jurisdictional. Shaw v. Bank of America Corp., 946 F.3d 533, 541 (9th Cir. 2019); see also 8 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (referencing the Prison Litigation Reform 9 Act of 1995 requirement for prisoners to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are 10 available” before suing over prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. 1983, explaining the court 11 will not read futility or other exceptions into such statutory exhaustion requirements). 12 On January 13, 2021, the Government filed a Response to the merits of the 13 Petitioner’s claims and noted a scheduled release date in August of 2021. The Court has 14 confirmed that the Petitioner was released on August 13, 2021. Petitioner did not file a 15 Reply to the Government’s Response, including its arguments that his claims are subject 16 to dismissal for failure to exhaust and mootness.1 17 In all likelihood Petitioner’s claims fail because he failed to exhaust his 18 administrative remedies and on the merits. See (Response (Doc. 14) at 11-25.) The Court, 19 however, dismisses the Petition because it is moot. 20 A case becomes moot when issues presented are no longer live controversies or if 21 parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 22 481 (1984). Mootness is a doctrine of standing and occurs if the case or controversy 23 requirement of Article III, § 2, of the Constitution is not met, and mootness may occur at 24 any stage of a federal judicial proceeding. Standing requires a personal interest exist at the 25 commencement of litigation and throughout the entirety of the action, Spencer v. Kemna, 26 1 Petitioner has not filed a change of address, which is his responsibility pursuant to Rule 27 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, service of this Order is being made to the last known address, which is the prison from which he has now been released. 28 See Order (Doc. 5) at 2 (providing warning that Petitioner must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d)). 1 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); the parties must have a personal stake in the outcome of a lawsuit at 2 all stages of the proceeding, United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001). 3 “This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be 4 threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a 5 favorable decision.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. If a case becomes moot, the case or controversy 6 requirement of Article III requires this Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 7 Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983); NAACP, Western Region v. 8 City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1352 (9th Cir.1984). 9 Petitioner has been released. His placement in SHU at USP Tucson, with or without 10 a hearing, is moot. Simply put, he is no longer subject to the challenged prior detention in 11 the SHU. There is no possibility of future placements in SHU. This challenge no longer 12 involves a live case and controversy. Likewise, there is no relief, including compassionate 13 relief, for the Court to fashion related to early release to a half-way house or otherwise. 14 When a petitioner does not challenge the validity of his conviction, but instead seeks 15 an earlier release date, the petition becomes moot when petitioner is released from 16 custody. Fendler v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 846 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir.1988) (finding 17 that release of petitioner on parole mooted his petition seeking earlier release date on the 18 grounds contending that Parole Commission had improperly delayed 19 his release date); Brady v. United States Parole Comm., 600 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir.1979) 20 (same); Picron–Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 775–76 (9th Cir.1991) (finding petition 21 seeking release from confinement by I.N.S. mooted by petitioner's release from custody), 22 see also Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8-14 (1, 7 (1998) (petitioner no longer in custody and did not 23 challenge validity of his conviction, but only the propriety of revocation of his parole, he 24 could not rely on any presumption of collateral consequences due to conviction to 25 demonstrate consequences to satisfy case-or-controversy requirement). These cases guide 26 the Court. Here, the Petition did not challenge the validity of his conviction, but rather 27 sought an earlier release date. The Petition became moot on August 13, 2021, when 28 1 || Petitioner was released. The case and controversy requirement of Article III requires this 2 || Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED that the reference to Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald is || withdrawn. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment, 9|| accordingly, and close this case. 10 Dated this 22nd day of November, 2022. 11 I Ce LE Aaegamses 13 Honorable Cin . J6fgenson United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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