NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2019 IL App (3d) 180310-U
Order filed October 22, 2019 _____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
KEITH L. WILLIAMS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 9th Judicial Circuit, ) Knox County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. 3-18-0310 ) Circuit No. 18-MR-70 ) v. ) The Honorable ) Scott Shipplett, ) Judge, presiding. ) DEBBIE KNAUER, ) ) Defendant-Appellee. ) _____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Wright concurred in the judgment. Justice O'Brien dissented. _____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: In an appeal in a mandamus action, the appellate court found that the trial court properly sua sponte dismissed the plaintiff’s mandamus complaint because the complaint failed to state a cause for action for mandamus relief. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. ¶2 Plaintiff, Keith L. Williams, an inmate in the Department of Corrections (DOC), filed a
petition for writ of mandamus (complaint) in the trial court seeking to compel defendant, Debbie
Knauer, a member of the DOC Administrative Review Board (Board), to review the merits of
defendant’s grievance appeal. 1 The trial court sua sponte denied Williams’s complaint for
mandamus relief. Williams appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. FACTS
¶4 Williams was an inmate in the Department of Corrections at the Hill Correctional Center
(HCC). In October 2017, Williams was allegedly involved in an incident at the HCC with
Correctional Officer McCune. As a result of that incident, Williams received certain disciplinary
sanctions. In November 2017, Williams filed a grievance, contesting McCune’s version of
events and the disciplinary sanctions Williams received. Upon review, the grievance officer at
HCC denied Williams’s grievance. On January 29, 2018, the Chief Administrative Officer of
HCC filed a written concurrence as to the denial. On February 22, 2018, Williams
acknowledged receipt of the denial and also of his appeal rights. The appeal rights notice that
Williams was given indicated that an appeal to the Board had to be “submitted” within 30 days
after the Chief Administrative Officer’s decision on the grievance. On that same date, February
22, 2018, Williams signed a payment authorization for postage, presumably to mail his appeal to
the Board. The payment authorization was approved by the Chief Administrative Officer of
HCC on February 26, 2018.
1 It would appear that the petition in this case is more properly referred to as a complaint for mandamus relief. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1501 (West 2016) (abolishing writs); 735 ILCS 5/14-102 (West 2016) (referring to the filing of a complaint for mandamus); Turner-El v. West, 349 Ill. App. 3d 475, 477 (2004); People ex rel. Braver v. Washington, 311 Ill. App. 3d 179, 181 n.1 (1999). 2 ¶5 On March 29, 2018, the Board received Williams’s grievance appeal. At that point, it
had been more than 30 days since the HCC Chief Administrative Officer had ruled upon
Williams’s grievance. The grievance appeal was initially reviewed by defendant Knauer, a
member of the Board. Because the appeal was untimely when it was received by the Board,
Knauer declined to take any further action on the grievance appeal and did not review the merits.
Williams was later notified of the Board’s decision.
¶6 In May 2018, Williams filed the instant pro se mandamus complaint in the trial court
seeking to have the trial court order Knauer to review the merits of his grievance appeal.
Williams also filed in the trial court a written proof of service for his mandamus complaint (not
for the underlying grievance appeal). The proof of service stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
“PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 7, 2018, I placed the attached or
enclosed documents in the institutional mail at Hill C.C. properly addressed to the
parties listed above [the specific mailing addresses were listed above] for mailing
through the United States [P]ostal [S]ervice at Hill C.C. [the post office box
address for Hill Correctional Center was listed][.]”
As supporting exhibits, Williams attached to the mandamus complaint copies of the postage
payment authorization, the applicable regulation, the Board’s response to his grievance, the HCC
grievance officer’s report with the concurring decision of the HCC Chief Administrative Officer,
the written grievance that Williams had filed, the HCC disciplinary report, and the final summary
report of the DOC adjustment committee.
¶7 There is no indication in the record that a summons was issued to, or served upon,
Knauer in the trial court relating to the filing of the mandamus complaint or that Knauer filed an
answer or any type of response to the mandamus complaint. A few days after the mandamus
3 complaint was filed, the trial court sua sponte denied the complaint without prejudice. In its
decision, the trial court indicated essentially that the mandamus complaint failed to state that
Knauer had a nondiscretionary duty to review the merits of a late-filed grievance appeal. The
trial court gave Williams 30 days to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiency.
Williams did not file an amended complaint and, instead, filed the instant appeal.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing his
complaint for mandamus relief. 2 Williams acknowledges that a trial court may sua sponte
dismiss a mandamus complaint when the complaint is frivolous or patently without merit or fails
to state a cause of action for mandamus relief (see, e.g., Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834,
842 (2002); Owens v. Snyder, 349 Ill. App. 3d 35, 45 (2004)) but asserts that such a rule does not
apply here because his complaint was not frivolous, had merit, and was sufficient to state a cause
of action for mandamus relief. In support of that assertion, Williams contends that had the trial
court reviewed the complaint and the attached exhibits, rather than sua sponte dismissing the
complaint, the trial court would have realized that Williams’s underlying grievance appeal was
timely filed pursuant to the mailbox rule and that the Board was obligated to consider the merits
of the grievance appeal. For all of the reasons stated, Williams asks that we reverse the trial
court’s judgment and that we remand this case for further proceedings.
¶ 10 Knauer was not served in the trial court and does not appear in this appeal. However,
because the record before us is simple and the claimed error is such that this court can easily
decide it without the aid of an appellee's brief, we will decide this case on the merits. See First
2 Williams treats the trial court’s sua sponte denial of the mandamus complaint as a sua sponte dismissal. We agree that the denial in this case was akin to a dismissal and will refer to it as such throughout the remainder of this order. 4 Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (indicating,
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2019 IL App (3d) 180310-U
Order filed October 22, 2019 _____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
KEITH L. WILLIAMS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 9th Judicial Circuit, ) Knox County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. 3-18-0310 ) Circuit No. 18-MR-70 ) v. ) The Honorable ) Scott Shipplett, ) Judge, presiding. ) DEBBIE KNAUER, ) ) Defendant-Appellee. ) _____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Wright concurred in the judgment. Justice O'Brien dissented. _____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: In an appeal in a mandamus action, the appellate court found that the trial court properly sua sponte dismissed the plaintiff’s mandamus complaint because the complaint failed to state a cause for action for mandamus relief. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. ¶2 Plaintiff, Keith L. Williams, an inmate in the Department of Corrections (DOC), filed a
petition for writ of mandamus (complaint) in the trial court seeking to compel defendant, Debbie
Knauer, a member of the DOC Administrative Review Board (Board), to review the merits of
defendant’s grievance appeal. 1 The trial court sua sponte denied Williams’s complaint for
mandamus relief. Williams appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. FACTS
¶4 Williams was an inmate in the Department of Corrections at the Hill Correctional Center
(HCC). In October 2017, Williams was allegedly involved in an incident at the HCC with
Correctional Officer McCune. As a result of that incident, Williams received certain disciplinary
sanctions. In November 2017, Williams filed a grievance, contesting McCune’s version of
events and the disciplinary sanctions Williams received. Upon review, the grievance officer at
HCC denied Williams’s grievance. On January 29, 2018, the Chief Administrative Officer of
HCC filed a written concurrence as to the denial. On February 22, 2018, Williams
acknowledged receipt of the denial and also of his appeal rights. The appeal rights notice that
Williams was given indicated that an appeal to the Board had to be “submitted” within 30 days
after the Chief Administrative Officer’s decision on the grievance. On that same date, February
22, 2018, Williams signed a payment authorization for postage, presumably to mail his appeal to
the Board. The payment authorization was approved by the Chief Administrative Officer of
HCC on February 26, 2018.
1 It would appear that the petition in this case is more properly referred to as a complaint for mandamus relief. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1501 (West 2016) (abolishing writs); 735 ILCS 5/14-102 (West 2016) (referring to the filing of a complaint for mandamus); Turner-El v. West, 349 Ill. App. 3d 475, 477 (2004); People ex rel. Braver v. Washington, 311 Ill. App. 3d 179, 181 n.1 (1999). 2 ¶5 On March 29, 2018, the Board received Williams’s grievance appeal. At that point, it
had been more than 30 days since the HCC Chief Administrative Officer had ruled upon
Williams’s grievance. The grievance appeal was initially reviewed by defendant Knauer, a
member of the Board. Because the appeal was untimely when it was received by the Board,
Knauer declined to take any further action on the grievance appeal and did not review the merits.
Williams was later notified of the Board’s decision.
¶6 In May 2018, Williams filed the instant pro se mandamus complaint in the trial court
seeking to have the trial court order Knauer to review the merits of his grievance appeal.
Williams also filed in the trial court a written proof of service for his mandamus complaint (not
for the underlying grievance appeal). The proof of service stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
“PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 7, 2018, I placed the attached or
enclosed documents in the institutional mail at Hill C.C. properly addressed to the
parties listed above [the specific mailing addresses were listed above] for mailing
through the United States [P]ostal [S]ervice at Hill C.C. [the post office box
address for Hill Correctional Center was listed][.]”
As supporting exhibits, Williams attached to the mandamus complaint copies of the postage
payment authorization, the applicable regulation, the Board’s response to his grievance, the HCC
grievance officer’s report with the concurring decision of the HCC Chief Administrative Officer,
the written grievance that Williams had filed, the HCC disciplinary report, and the final summary
report of the DOC adjustment committee.
¶7 There is no indication in the record that a summons was issued to, or served upon,
Knauer in the trial court relating to the filing of the mandamus complaint or that Knauer filed an
answer or any type of response to the mandamus complaint. A few days after the mandamus
3 complaint was filed, the trial court sua sponte denied the complaint without prejudice. In its
decision, the trial court indicated essentially that the mandamus complaint failed to state that
Knauer had a nondiscretionary duty to review the merits of a late-filed grievance appeal. The
trial court gave Williams 30 days to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiency.
Williams did not file an amended complaint and, instead, filed the instant appeal.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing his
complaint for mandamus relief. 2 Williams acknowledges that a trial court may sua sponte
dismiss a mandamus complaint when the complaint is frivolous or patently without merit or fails
to state a cause of action for mandamus relief (see, e.g., Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834,
842 (2002); Owens v. Snyder, 349 Ill. App. 3d 35, 45 (2004)) but asserts that such a rule does not
apply here because his complaint was not frivolous, had merit, and was sufficient to state a cause
of action for mandamus relief. In support of that assertion, Williams contends that had the trial
court reviewed the complaint and the attached exhibits, rather than sua sponte dismissing the
complaint, the trial court would have realized that Williams’s underlying grievance appeal was
timely filed pursuant to the mailbox rule and that the Board was obligated to consider the merits
of the grievance appeal. For all of the reasons stated, Williams asks that we reverse the trial
court’s judgment and that we remand this case for further proceedings.
¶ 10 Knauer was not served in the trial court and does not appear in this appeal. However,
because the record before us is simple and the claimed error is such that this court can easily
decide it without the aid of an appellee's brief, we will decide this case on the merits. See First
2 Williams treats the trial court’s sua sponte denial of the mandamus complaint as a sua sponte dismissal. We agree that the denial in this case was akin to a dismissal and will refer to it as such throughout the remainder of this order. 4 Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (indicating,
among other things, that if the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the reviewing
court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee's brief, the reviewing court should
decide the merits of the appeal).
¶ 11 In this particular case, we are faced with the question of whether the trial court complied
with the statutory mandamus procedure when it summarily dismissed Williams’s complaint for
mandamus relief. Such a determination is a question of law that is subject to de novo review on
appeal. See Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998); People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d
175, 176 (2003) (stating that whether the trial court complied with the applicable statutory
procedure is a question of law that the appellate court reviews de novo), aff'd on other grounds,
216 Ill. 2d 45, 47 (2005); People v. Spivey, 377 Ill. App. 3d 146, 148 (2007) (same).
¶ 12 Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy that is used to compel a public officer or
body to perform a nondiscretionary (mandatory) official duty. McFatridge v. Madigan, 2013 IL
113676, ¶ 17. In order to obtain mandamus relief, the plaintiff must establish the following three
elements: (1) that the plaintiff has a clear right to the relief requested; (2) that the public officer
has a clear duty to act; and (3) that the public officer has clear authority to comply with an order
granting mandamus relief. Id. As the elements indicate, mandamus may not be used to compel a
public officer to perform an act that involves the exercise of the public officer’s discretion. See
id. Despite the extraordinary nature of mandamus relief, mandamus proceedings are governed
by the same pleading rules that apply to other actions. See Noyola v. Board of Education of the
City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133 (1997).
¶ 13 The instant case involved the filing of a grievance appeal with the Board by a DOC
inmate. Section 504.850(a) of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code. 504.850(a)
5 (2017)) requires that such an appeal must be “received” by the Board within 30 days after the
date of the Chief Administrative Officer’s decision on the grievance. It is undisputed in this case
that Williams’s grievance appeal was not “received” by the Board within the 30-day deadline.
Williams asserts, however, that his grievance appeal was timely filed with the Board pursuant to
the mailbox rule.
¶ 14 The mailbox rule provides that pleadings are considered timely filed on the date they are
placed in the prison mail system by an incarcerated inmate. People v. Liner, 2015 IL App (3d)
140167, ¶ 13. For a pro se inmate to rely on the date of mailing as the filing date, however, the
inmate must provide proof of mailing by filing a proof of service that complies with the
requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12 (eff. Jul. 1, 2017). Id. Subsection (b)(6) of Rule
12 specifically addresses the service of pro se documents by a correctional facility inmate and
requires that the inmate file a certification as provided for in section 1-109 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2016)) of the person who deposited the document in
the institutional mail, stating the time and place of deposit and the complete address to which the
document was to be delivered. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. Jul. 1, 2017); Walker v. Monreal,
2017 IL App (3d) 150055, ¶ 17.
¶ 15 In the present case, even if we assume for argument’s sake that the mailbox rule could
possibly apply in the context of the underlying matter (the filing of an administrative appeal
where the applicable regulation specifically required that the appeal be “received” within a 30
day-time period), we would still have to conclude that it could not be applied here because
Williams failed to present appropriate proof of mailing as necessary for the mailbox rule to
apply. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. Jul. 1, 2017); 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2016); Liner, 2015
IL App (3d) 140167, ¶ 13; Walker, 2017 IL App (3d) 150055, ¶ 17. Although Williams alleged
6 in his mandamus complaint that he had placed his grievance appeal in the institutional mail
system prior to the expiration of the 30-day period, he did not attach a section 1-109 certification
for the grievance appeal as a supporting exhibit. Nor did he attach to the mandamus complaint a
postmark for the grievance appeal as a possible alternative means of establishing the date of
mailing. See Walker, 2017 IL App (3d) 150055, ¶ 21 (recognizing that a postmark was sufficient
to establish the date of mailing for the purpose of the mailbox rule in the context of a notice of
appeal filed in the trial court by a correctional inmate). Without the benefit of the mailbox rule,
the mandamus complaint and the supporting exhibits that Williams filed in the trial court in this
case established only that Williams had filed a late grievance appeal with the Board. As the trial
court correctly pointed out, however, the Board had no duty to review the merits of Williams’s
untimely grievance appeal and could not be compelled to do so through a mandamus procedure.
See 20 Ill. Adm. Code. 504.850(a) (2017); McFatridge, 2013 IL 113676, ¶ 17. Thus, Williams
did not establish a cause of action for mandamus relief, and his mandamus complaint was
properly dismissed by the trial court sua sponte. See Mason, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 842; Owens, 349
Ill. App. 3d at 45. In reaching that conclusion, we note that the trial court gave Williams 30 days
to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiency, but Williams either failed or chose not to
do so. Williams obviously knew how to prepare a proper proof service, since he filed one in the
trial court for his mandamus complaint.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County.
¶ 18 Affirmed.
¶ 19 JUSTICE O’BRIEN, dissenting:
7 ¶ 20 I dissent from the majority because I feel the documentation provided by Williams
satisfies the mailbox rule as set out in Walker, 2017 IL App (3d) 150055, ¶¶ 17-21. The
attachments to Williams’s petition indicate that Williams received the grievance officer’s report
(signed by the Chief Administrative Officer on January 29, 2018) on February 22, 2018. On that
same date, Williams signed and dated the “Offender’s Appeal To The Director.” Williams also
authorized payment for postage on February 22, 2018, and the correctional institution
acknowledges that the postage was paid on February 26, 2018. Once Williams handed the items
to a correctional institution official for mailing, all aspects regarding timeliness are out of his
control. Here, Williams demonstrated that his items were delivered to the facility along with the
payment for proper postage well in advance of the 30-day deadline for appealing the
administrative decision. For that reason, I would find that Williams has made a sufficient
showing that the appeal was timely filed and would reverse the decision of the trial court and
remand the matter for further proceedings.