Nolan, J.
The plaintiffs, Michael Wild and Rebecca Wild Baxter (Wilds), trustees of Wild Realty Trust, brought two actions against the defendant, Vincent J. Constantini, trustee [664]*664of Herring Creek Farm Trust, to determine their rights in two parcels of registered land in Dukes County. G. L. c. 185, § 114 (1990 ed.). A judge in the Land Court entered judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor and the defendant appeals. We granted the defendant’s application for direct appellate review.
We summarize the pertinent facts as drawn from the judge’s findings. Prior to 1947, the Wilds’ predecessors in title, Ronald and Dorothy Wild, owned contiguous parcels of land. A plan of the subject property is appended to this opinion. The property is bounded to the east by Slough Cove Road, a public way in Edgartown.
On June 20, 1947, Ronald and Dorothy Wild conveyed, by two deeds, title to their land lying between the Wild property (retained lands) and Slough Cove Road to B. Harrison Cohan and Hildegarde N. Cohan. The first deed conveyed registered land (First Herring Creek Farm Parcel), shown as lot B-l on Land Court Plan 13419D and on the appended map. The second deed conveyed unregistered land (Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel), later to become lot 1 on Land Court Plan 34423A, and so labeled on the appended map. “In each deed, Dorothy and Ronald Wild reserved ‘to the grantors a right of way, over the ways as now travelled to their remaining land, to be used in common by the grantors and others now or hereafter entitled thereto.’ ”4
On March 26, 1966, the Cohans filed a petition with the Land Court to register title to the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. In their petition, the Cohans acknowledged that the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel was “[sjubject to rights of way for all purposes, as shown on said plan, said rights of way being more particularly described as follows: Right of way, 15 feet wide, shown on said plan as lying approximately along the Northerly boundaries of the above described premises, and running from Slough Cove Road to the lands of . . . Ronald Wild et ux. . . .” The published notice [665]*665for the proceeding (see G. L. c. 185, § 38 [1990 ed.]) contained the same language.
The subject right of way (the Wild right of way) is shown on the map appended hereto. The Wild right of way is comprised of four segments. Segments 2 and 4 burden the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. Segments 1 and 3 burden the First Herring Creek Farm Parcel.
On or about February 5, 1970, Monte J. Wallace and Neil W. Wallace, trustees of an unnamed trust dated November 4, 1969, acquired title to both Herring Creek Farm Parcels. The Wallaces shortly thereafter conveyed, for nominal consideration, title to the Herring Creek Farm Parcels to themselves as trustees of Jenkins Point Trust (later renamed Herring Creek Farm Trust). Thereafter, the Wallaces became substitute petitioners in the pending registration case concerning the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. The Wal-laces did not attempt to amend that portion of the registration petition which acknowledged the Wild right of way. The Wallaces filed an affidavit of the Cohans which, among other things, acknowledged that the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel “was subject to ‘rights of way attributable to’ . . . the Wild Property.”
The Cohans and Wallaces “did not request, nor did the then owners of the Wild Property consent to, any modification or termination of the Wild Right of Way.” There is evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel registration proceeding was uncontested.
On October 30, 1972, a judge in the Land Court issued a decree of registration concerning the title of the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. The decree contains a metes and bounds description of the parcel and unambiguously provides that the property was subject to ten encumbrances. Inexplicably, the judgment did not contain an express provision describing the right of way appurtenant to the Wild property. The judgment, however, also provides: “The land hereby registered is subject to rights of way appurtenant to adjoining land as set forth in the decree in Registration [666]*666Cases No. 13419 and No. 30925, so far as now in force and applicable.” Segments 2 and 4 of the Wild right of way appear on the decree plan, although they are not so labeled.
In May, 1989, the Wilds sought an order directing the amendment of their land title certificate to reflect that their property has the benefit of an appurtenant right of way across the property owned by Vincent J. Constantini, successor trustee of Herring Creek Farm Trust. The Wilds also sought a correlative order directing the amendment of certificates of title describing the Herring Creek Farm Parcels to reflect that these parcels are encumbered by the Wild right of way.
On March 11, 1992, the Land Court judge granted the Wilds’ motion for summary judgment. The defendant appeals, contesting only that part of the decision that pertains to the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. The judge found that “this matter fits within the logic of Feldman v. Souza, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1142 (1989) and cases cited there. . . . I find that the owners of the Herring Creek Farm Parcels had actual knowledge of the Wild Right of Way.”
The judge continued: “Defendant points to the following from G. L. c. 185, § 114: ‘but this section shall not authorize the court to open the original judgment of registration, . . .’ citing Hill v. Taylor, 319 Mass. 5 (1944) for the same proposition. Feldman was a petition to modify under § 114, as here, but the relief was granted. Admittedly, in Feldman, the Court was dealing with a purchaser of registered land and could therefore point to the first paragraph of G. L. c. 185, § 46 and its reference to purchasers for value and in good, faith. I do not, however, understand the law to be that a different standard applies to a petitioner for registration with knowledge. . . . [G] ranting the relief requested . . . will not constitute an opening of the original judgment, since it already includes reference, if indirect, to the Wild Right of Way. The relief requested is an elaboration only.”
The judge also found that the “[djefendant should not be allowed to seize on ambiguity in his Certificate of Title to destroy theretofore valid and acknowledged rights. [The de[667]*667fendant’s predecessor trustees] knew of the Wild Right of Way and acknowledged it in [their] registration filings. [They] made no move to extinguish it. Defendant is not a bona fide purchaser .... To adopt [defendant's position would be to allow the Wild Right of Way to be extinguished without notice to its holders.”
Generally, “[n]o easement can pass as appurtenant affecting registered land as the servient estate, which is not disclosed on its title. . . .” Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 757 (1945), quoting Dubinsky v. Cama, 261 Mass. 47, 57 (1927). Since our decision in Killam v. March, 316 Mass. 646 (1944), we have recognized an exception: If a “purchaser of registered land has notice of the existence of a way over his estate, that person takes the land subject to such an easement, even if it is not mentioned as an encumbrance in the grantor’s certificate of title.” Feldman v. Souza, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1142, 1143 (1989).
Much like the Killam
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Nolan, J.
The plaintiffs, Michael Wild and Rebecca Wild Baxter (Wilds), trustees of Wild Realty Trust, brought two actions against the defendant, Vincent J. Constantini, trustee [664]*664of Herring Creek Farm Trust, to determine their rights in two parcels of registered land in Dukes County. G. L. c. 185, § 114 (1990 ed.). A judge in the Land Court entered judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor and the defendant appeals. We granted the defendant’s application for direct appellate review.
We summarize the pertinent facts as drawn from the judge’s findings. Prior to 1947, the Wilds’ predecessors in title, Ronald and Dorothy Wild, owned contiguous parcels of land. A plan of the subject property is appended to this opinion. The property is bounded to the east by Slough Cove Road, a public way in Edgartown.
On June 20, 1947, Ronald and Dorothy Wild conveyed, by two deeds, title to their land lying between the Wild property (retained lands) and Slough Cove Road to B. Harrison Cohan and Hildegarde N. Cohan. The first deed conveyed registered land (First Herring Creek Farm Parcel), shown as lot B-l on Land Court Plan 13419D and on the appended map. The second deed conveyed unregistered land (Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel), later to become lot 1 on Land Court Plan 34423A, and so labeled on the appended map. “In each deed, Dorothy and Ronald Wild reserved ‘to the grantors a right of way, over the ways as now travelled to their remaining land, to be used in common by the grantors and others now or hereafter entitled thereto.’ ”4
On March 26, 1966, the Cohans filed a petition with the Land Court to register title to the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. In their petition, the Cohans acknowledged that the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel was “[sjubject to rights of way for all purposes, as shown on said plan, said rights of way being more particularly described as follows: Right of way, 15 feet wide, shown on said plan as lying approximately along the Northerly boundaries of the above described premises, and running from Slough Cove Road to the lands of . . . Ronald Wild et ux. . . .” The published notice [665]*665for the proceeding (see G. L. c. 185, § 38 [1990 ed.]) contained the same language.
The subject right of way (the Wild right of way) is shown on the map appended hereto. The Wild right of way is comprised of four segments. Segments 2 and 4 burden the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. Segments 1 and 3 burden the First Herring Creek Farm Parcel.
On or about February 5, 1970, Monte J. Wallace and Neil W. Wallace, trustees of an unnamed trust dated November 4, 1969, acquired title to both Herring Creek Farm Parcels. The Wallaces shortly thereafter conveyed, for nominal consideration, title to the Herring Creek Farm Parcels to themselves as trustees of Jenkins Point Trust (later renamed Herring Creek Farm Trust). Thereafter, the Wallaces became substitute petitioners in the pending registration case concerning the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. The Wal-laces did not attempt to amend that portion of the registration petition which acknowledged the Wild right of way. The Wallaces filed an affidavit of the Cohans which, among other things, acknowledged that the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel “was subject to ‘rights of way attributable to’ . . . the Wild Property.”
The Cohans and Wallaces “did not request, nor did the then owners of the Wild Property consent to, any modification or termination of the Wild Right of Way.” There is evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel registration proceeding was uncontested.
On October 30, 1972, a judge in the Land Court issued a decree of registration concerning the title of the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. The decree contains a metes and bounds description of the parcel and unambiguously provides that the property was subject to ten encumbrances. Inexplicably, the judgment did not contain an express provision describing the right of way appurtenant to the Wild property. The judgment, however, also provides: “The land hereby registered is subject to rights of way appurtenant to adjoining land as set forth in the decree in Registration [666]*666Cases No. 13419 and No. 30925, so far as now in force and applicable.” Segments 2 and 4 of the Wild right of way appear on the decree plan, although they are not so labeled.
In May, 1989, the Wilds sought an order directing the amendment of their land title certificate to reflect that their property has the benefit of an appurtenant right of way across the property owned by Vincent J. Constantini, successor trustee of Herring Creek Farm Trust. The Wilds also sought a correlative order directing the amendment of certificates of title describing the Herring Creek Farm Parcels to reflect that these parcels are encumbered by the Wild right of way.
On March 11, 1992, the Land Court judge granted the Wilds’ motion for summary judgment. The defendant appeals, contesting only that part of the decision that pertains to the Second Herring Creek Farm Parcel. The judge found that “this matter fits within the logic of Feldman v. Souza, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1142 (1989) and cases cited there. . . . I find that the owners of the Herring Creek Farm Parcels had actual knowledge of the Wild Right of Way.”
The judge continued: “Defendant points to the following from G. L. c. 185, § 114: ‘but this section shall not authorize the court to open the original judgment of registration, . . .’ citing Hill v. Taylor, 319 Mass. 5 (1944) for the same proposition. Feldman was a petition to modify under § 114, as here, but the relief was granted. Admittedly, in Feldman, the Court was dealing with a purchaser of registered land and could therefore point to the first paragraph of G. L. c. 185, § 46 and its reference to purchasers for value and in good, faith. I do not, however, understand the law to be that a different standard applies to a petitioner for registration with knowledge. . . . [G] ranting the relief requested . . . will not constitute an opening of the original judgment, since it already includes reference, if indirect, to the Wild Right of Way. The relief requested is an elaboration only.”
The judge also found that the “[djefendant should not be allowed to seize on ambiguity in his Certificate of Title to destroy theretofore valid and acknowledged rights. [The de[667]*667fendant’s predecessor trustees] knew of the Wild Right of Way and acknowledged it in [their] registration filings. [They] made no move to extinguish it. Defendant is not a bona fide purchaser .... To adopt [defendant's position would be to allow the Wild Right of Way to be extinguished without notice to its holders.”
Generally, “[n]o easement can pass as appurtenant affecting registered land as the servient estate, which is not disclosed on its title. . . .” Goldstein v. Beal, 317 Mass. 750, 757 (1945), quoting Dubinsky v. Cama, 261 Mass. 47, 57 (1927). Since our decision in Killam v. March, 316 Mass. 646 (1944), we have recognized an exception: If a “purchaser of registered land has notice of the existence of a way over his estate, that person takes the land subject to such an easement, even if it is not mentioned as an encumbrance in the grantor’s certificate of title.” Feldman v. Souza, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1142, 1143 (1989).
Much like the Killam line of cases, the instant case requires us to consider the conclusiveness of an original decree of registration obtained by an owner with actual notice of an outstanding interest of another where the interest has not been unambiguously set forth in the owner’s certificate of title. The narrow question here is whether the logic of the Kil-lam line of cases applies to the present case. We conclude that it does.
General Laws c. 185, § 46 (1990 ed.), provides, in pertinent part: “Every plaintiff receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a judgment of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate . . . .” Killam and its progeny were largely based on this statutory requirement. See Feldman v. Souza, supra at 1143-1144. The defendant argues that the Killam rule does not apply to the instant case as it does not involve a subsequent purchaser.
The defendant would have us say that an owner with actual notice of a valid encumbrance existing prior to a land [668]*668registration proceeding is not bound by such notice if the encumbrance is not unambiguously set forth in the subsequent registration certificate. This is a statement we are not prepared to make in view of our decisions which hold that a subsequent purchaser with actual notice is bound by such notice, even if the encumbrance is not set forth on the certificate. It follows that the standard which applies to a subsequent purchaser with actual notice should apply to an owner (petitioner) with actual notice. A contrary conclusion would produce an illogical result. “To be sure, reason and common sense are not to be abandoned in the interpretative process, as it is to be supposed that the Legislature intended to act in accordance with them . . . .” VanDresser v. Firlings, 305 Mass. 51, 53-54 (1940).
“The legislative intention in enacting the statute must be ascertained, ‘not alone from the literal meaning of its words, but from a view of the whole system of which it is but a part, and in the light of the common law ....’” Killam v. March, supra at 650, quoting Boston v. Quincy Mkt. Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 312 Mass. 638, 644 (1942). It is without question that the defendant would not have prevailed at common law. A view of the whole reveals “that the underlying purpose of title registration is to protect the transferee of a registered title.”5 Kozdras v. Land/Vest Properties, Inc., 382 Mass. 34, 44 (1980). As the present case does not involve a transferee or a bona fide purchaser, our decision does not contravene the legislative purpose. Id.
The defendant contends that the decision that we reach today will undermine the integrity of the land registration process. This argument is untenable. For nearly fifty years [669]*669the rule has been that, if a purchaser of registered land takes with actual notice of an encumbrance that burdens his estate, he takes subject to the encumbrance. This rule, as history guides, has not served to cast a cloud over registered land titles. Rather, limited by the requirement of actual notice, the Killam rule has served to integrate fairness and justice into a system designed to promote certainty of title at the expense, in some instances, of equity. Our decision today does no more.
Judgment affirmed.
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