Wier's Appeal

74 Pa. 230, 1873 Pa. LEXIS 197
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 20, 1873
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 74 Pa. 230 (Wier's Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, 1873 Pa. LEXIS 197 (Pa. 1873).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered, October 20th 1873, by

Sharswoob, J.—

The great difficulty in all cases of this character is not in the ascertainment of the true rule of equity, but in the application of that rule to the facts. While it may be easy to draw the line between what is and what-is not a nuisance, which equity ought to enjoin, it is by no means so easy to determine' whether the circumstances of any particular case ought to place it on one side or the other of that line. It is rare that any number of men will he found to agree in their judgment upon such a question. One remark, however, may be hazarded, as preliminary to a brief consideration of the circumstances of this case, in which I think all will agree. There are many kinds of business, useful, and even necessary, in every large community, especially where manufacturing' is carried on on a large scale, which certainly are not nuisances in themselves, but which nevertheless become .so in view of the circumstances of the neighborhood in which it is proposed to establish them. The present Chief Justice, in his opinion at Nisi Prius, in Rhodes v. Dunbar, 7 P. F. Smith 275, enumerates twenty-nine kinds of such useful establishments which have been declared public nuisances. There is a very marked distinction to be observed in reason and equity between the case of a business long established in a particular locality, which has become a nuisance from the growth of population and the erection of dwellings in proximity to it, and that of a new -erection threatened in such a vicinity. Carrying on an offensive trade for any number of years in a place remote from buildings and public roads, does not entitle the owner to, continue it in the same place after houses have been built and roads laid out in the neighborhood, to the occupants of which and travellers upon which it is a nuisance. As the city extends, such nuisances should be removed to the vacant grounds beyond the immediate neighborhood of the residences of the citizens. This, public policy, as well as the health and comfort of the population of the city, demand: 7 P. F. Smith 275. It certainly ought to be a much clearer case, however, to justify a court of equity in stretching forth the strong arm of injunction to compel a man to remove an establishment in which he has invested his capital and been carrying on business for a long period, of time, from that of one who comes into a neighborhood proposing to establish such a business for the first time, and who is met at the threshold of his enterprise by a remonstrance-and notice that if he persists in his purpose, application will be 'made to a court of equity to prevent him. In the case* before us the defendant occupies this position.

It is not contended that a powder-magazine — a building for-storing large quantities of gunpowder — in the midst of a thickly-settled neighborhood, is not a nuisance. By the Act of Assembly-of March 20th 1856, Pamph. L. 137, it is made unlawful for any person or persons to have or keep any quantity of gunpowder or-[242]*242gun-cotton in any house, store, shop, building, cellar or other place •within the city of Philadelphia (except in the public magazines, or in a quantity not exceeding two pounds for private use), unless in the manner provided in the act, which provisions in the main are, ■»that no person shall deal in the article without a license, and if licensed, shall not keep on hand more than twenty-five pounds, and shall have a painted sign distinctly legible to all passers-by, with the words “ Licensed to sell gunpowder,” and that every carriage for conveying the article shall have painted on each side, in letters distinctly legible to all passers-by, the word “ Gunpowder.” A public magazine has been erected, by the authority of the Commonwealth, near the mouth of the Schuylkill, and a state superintendent appointed, whose fees are regulated by law: Act of May 5th 1864, Pamph. L. 841. One of the general powers conferred upon boroughs by the Act of April 3d 1851, Pamph. L. 320, is “ to prohibit within the borough the carrying on of any manufacture, art, trade or business, which may be noxious or offensive to the inhabitants; the manufacture, sale or exposure of fireworks or other inflammable or dangerous articles, and to limit and prescribe the quantities that may be kept in one place of gunpowder, fireworks, turpentine or other inflammable articles, and to prescribe such safeguards as may be necessary.” Thus the legislature has recognised that the storing of gunpowder in large quantities in thickly-settled places, is a nuisance to be guarded against by public authority. But it is not confined to cities and boroughs. This court has acknowledged and declared it as a case clearly within the general rule of equity upon this subject, in the opinion of the majority as pronounced by Mr. Chief Justice Thompson, in Rhodes v. Dunbar, 7 P. F. Smith 274. After remarking upon the particular character and danger of the •establishment, the subject-matter of the complaint in that case, which was a steam planing-mill, which had long been established in the neighborhood, had been burned down, and the injunction asked for was against its re-erection, and which the majority of the court thought was not within the rule — he proceeds: “ These observations give no just grounds to draw the inference ■•that a powder-magazine or depot of nitro-glycerine, or other like explosive materials, might not possibly be enjoined even if not prohibited, as they usually are, by ordinance or law. It is not on the ground alone of their liability to fire, primarily, or even secondarily, that they may possibly be dealt with as nuisances, but on account of their liability to explosion by contact with the smallest spark of fire, and the utter impossibility to guard against the consequences, or set bounds to the injury, which, being instantaneous, extends alike to property and persons within its reach. The destructiveness of these agents results from the irrepressible gases once set ,i,n motion, infinitely more than from fires which might [243]*243ensue as a consequence. Persons and property in the neighborhood of a burhing building, let it burn ever so fiercely, in most cases have a chance of escaping injury. Not so when explosive forces instantly prostrate everything near them, as in the instances of powder, nitro-glycerine and other chemicals of an explosive or instantly' inflammable nature.” This reason is so cogent that nothing could be added which would increase its force.

All that remains, then, is to inquire whether the circumstances of the neighborhood in which it was proposed to establish the magazine in question, are such as to bring it within the rule. Let us remember that it is a new erection which is asked to be enjoined, not the continuance of an old one.' Actual irreparable damage, actual depreciation of property, of course, does not exist. It is the prevention of these consequences which is the object of the process. Perhaps the immediate neighborhood is not so densely filled up— in connection with the evidence in the case of the careful construction and location of the building to guard against the worst probable consequences of an explosion — as would justify the court in ordering its removal. But, as we have shown, this is not the case. The neighborhood is not thickly settled, but it is fast filling up. Land is in demand for small buildings, villas and country residences, and its market value before this structure was contemplated was at a high figure. It is evident that it must sensibly affect that value and the growth of the district. This might not, however, be sufficient of itself.

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Bluebook (online)
74 Pa. 230, 1873 Pa. LEXIS 197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wiers-appeal-pa-1873.