Wieland 666419 v. Morrison

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

ARRON WIELAND,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:24-cv-1306

v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney

BRYAN MORRISON et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a prior order, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 7.) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Macomb Correctional Facility (MRF) in New Haven, Macomb County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF) in Coldwater, Branch County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following LCF correctional staff: Warden Bryan Morrison, Deputy Warden T. Chrisman, Assistant Deputy Warden R. Rurka, Lieutenant Unknown Party #1, Sergeant Unknown Party #2, and Corrections Officer Unknown Party #3.

Plaintiff alleges that on November 2, 2022, he was “savagely attacked” and beaten while he slept in his bunk. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff had received an order from the commissary earlier in the day and had been approached by Prisoner Stephen Kares #261586, who asked Plaintiff if he could borrow some money to get high. (Id.) Plaintiff refused and went to his room and went to sleep. (Id.) Plaintiff states that Prisoner Kares then conspired with prisoners Strouse #578988 and Embry # 516698 to rob Plaintiff. (Id.) Prisoners Embry and Strouse subsequently went to Plaintiff’s cell and “beat Plaintiff so bad[ly] that he was unconscious for hours.” (Id.) The prisoners then took Plaintiff’s footlocker, which contained over one-hundred dollars’ worth of commissary items, and carried it past the officers’ station all the way to the dayroom and divided

up the contents. (Id., PageID.3–4.) On November 3, 2022, Plaintiff awoke and stumbled out of his room where he “was seen by staff and taken to health care.” (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff was subsequently taken to Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit, where he was diagnosed with fractures of the right mandible, right orbit, maxilla sinus, zygoma, and nasal bone, as well as hypothyroidism. (Id.) Plaintiff also suffered severe head trauma and continues to have difficulty with memory. (Id.) Plaintiff had surgery to repair fractures, but it took months to recover. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the conduct of Defendant Unknown Party #3 in leaving the officers’ station without a replacement allowed prisoners Strouse and Embry to gain access to Plaintiff’s room. (Id., PageID.4–5.) Plaintiff states that Defendants Unknown Parties #1 and #2 are “just as responsible” because they are supposed to know the location of the Corrections Officers at all times. (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff also claims that the fact that there was no lock on Plaintiff’s two-man cell allowed prisoners Strouse and Embry to attack him. (Id.) Plaintiff states that the lock had been broken and

was missing long before he was placed in the unit. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Morrison, Chrisman, and Rurka knew or should have known of the missing lock and that they were negligent and were running an unsafe prison. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by

a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants failed to prevent him from being assaulted by fellow prisoners on November 2, 2022. In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, directing that they may not use excessive physical force against prisoners and must also “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the

inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). To establish liability under the Eighth Amendment for a claim based on a failure to prevent harm to a prisoner, a plaintiff must show that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm facing the plaintiff. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766–67 (6th Cir. 2011); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence and requires that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Bishop, 636 F.3d at 766–67. Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Thus, prison staff are obliged “to take reasonable measures

to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526–27. In particular, because officials have “stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection[,]” “officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833. To establish a violation of this right, Plaintiff must show that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s risk of injury. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880–81 (6th Cir. 1988). While a prisoner does not need to prove that he has been the victim of an actual attack to bring a personal safety claim, he must at least establish that he reasonably fears such an attack. Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242– 43 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff has the minimal burden of “showing a sufficient

inferential connection” between the alleged violation and inmate violence to “justify a reasonable fear for personal safety.”). In order to state a failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must show (1) that he “objectively” was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and (2) that the official acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate safety, “meaning the official was ‘subjectively aware of the risk’ and ‘fail[ed] to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Reedy, 988 F.3d at 912 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 834, 847; see also Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 293–94 (6th Cir. 2004) (addressing whether knowing placement of a small, transgender female in a unit with a known predatory inmate amounted to deliberate indifference). In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that any of the named Defendants were subjectively aware of the fact that Plaintiff was likely to be attacked and that they failed to act despite such knowledge. Instead, as noted above, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were negligent in failing to protect him. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Allegations of negligence fall short of the deliberate indifference required to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 835 (holding that an Eighth Amendment violation requires a “state of mind more blameworthy than negligence”). Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, his complaint fails to state a claim. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff is asserting supervisory liability as to Defendants Morrison, Chrisman, Rurka, and Unknown Parties #1 and #2, the Court notes that government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v.

Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official: “[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300, and citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375–76 (1976), and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendants Morrison, Chrisman, Rurka, and Unknown Parties #1 and #2 encouraged or condoned the conduct of their subordinates, or authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct. His vague and conclusory allegations of supervisory responsibility are insufficient to show that Defendants were personally involved in the events set forth in the complaint. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Morrison, Chrisman, Rurka, and Unknown Parties #1 and #2 are premised on nothing more than respondeat superior liability, his claims against these Defendants fail to state a claim. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this

decision, the Court will assess the $605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $605.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: April 16, 2025 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge