Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 2708

156 F. Supp. 430, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2156, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2800
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedNovember 20, 1957
DocketCiv. A. 9838
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 156 F. Supp. 430 (Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 2708) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 2708, 156 F. Supp. 430, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2156, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2800 (S.D. Tex. 1957).

Opinion

INGRAHAM, District Judge.

This is a class suit brought by five plaintiffs for themselves and others similarly situated for declaratory judgment, permanent injunction and damages. Plaintiffs are Negroes, members of the Local Union and employees of Sheffield.' The class suit is for all Negro member-employees.

Plaintiffs complain of the Agreement' of May 31, 1956, amending the Seniority Provisions covering employees of Sheffield Steel, claiming that such Agreement discriminates against Negro member employees.

The evidence shows that Sheffield employs both white and Negro employees and that the membership of the Local Union is composed of both white and Negro members. An estimate of the membership of the Local Union is 1700 white members and 1300 Negro members. The percentage of Negro membership is considerably in excess of the percentage of Negro population in the area. All members have equal voting rights. The evidence shows that the Local Union has elected Negro officers in 1956 and in prior years. The Local Union is the bargaining agent. The Agreement of May 31, 1956, was adopted by the membership of the Local Union by a vote of 1,417 to 202.

■ The Agreement provides for separate' lines of progression, classified as No. 1' *431 Line of Progression and No. 2 Line of Progression, the No. 1 Line encompassing jobs classified as skilled labor. The No. 1 Line affords greater opportunity for advancement. Point 6 of the Agreement provides:

“6. The Company will give tests as follows:
“A. Any present employee not now in a No. 1 Line of Progression will be eligible to take the tests, if he so desires. All such employees shall notify the Company in writing of their desire to take the tests within twenty (20) days after date of acceptance of this Agreement and such employees will be given the tests within forty (40) days thereafter.
“B. Any employee hired hereafter will be required to take the tests.
“C. An employee who elects not to take the tests during the twenty (20) day period may request and take the test after the lapse of six months. An employee who fails to pass the tests may retake the tests after the lapse of six months.
“D. The content of all tests and the minimum passing grades will be determined solely by the' Company. Upon request the results of an employee’s tests .will be open for inspection by the employee with or without the President or Chairman of the Plant Grievance Committee present, as he may elect.”

■Those desiring to transfer from a No. 2 Line to a No. 1 Line must not only satisfy the tests but, when qualified, must start at the bottom of the No. 1 Line grades, sometimes at a financial sacrifice.

Tests for No. 1 Line of Progression are available to white and Negro alike. From the evidence, 317 Negroes have taken the tests, 90 Negroes have made qualifying grades and 45 Negroes have actually moved into No. 1 Line positions. None of the nominal plaintiffs or their witnesses, all Negroes, has taken the tests. Each admitted that the tests were available to him.

Plaintiffs offered no evidence of damages.

The rules apply to Negro and white alike. Evidence of discrimination is not convincing.

The following are filed as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

Findings of Fact

a. The Parties

1. The five individual plaintiffs are Negro citizens of the United States and of the State of Texas. They purport to sue on behalf of themselves and other; persons similarly situated, that is, on behalf of all Negro citizens who are employees of the defendant Sheffield.

Plaintiffs are members of the defendant Local Union 2708, which is affiliated with the United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO. Likewise, the Negro citizens whom plaintiffs allege they represent are members of said Local Union No. 2708.

2. The defendant Armco Steel Corporation is an Ohio corporation. It commenced the operation of the steel mill at Houston, Texas, on July 1, 1954. In its Houston' operations it is now known as Sheffield Division Armco Steel Corporation. .. The original operator of the steel mill in question was the Sheffield Steel' Corporation pf Texas, a Texas corporation which was incorporated in the year 1941, and was dissolved on July 1, 1943. On July 1, 1943, the plant commenced operations by the American Rolling Mill Company, an Ohio corporation. Such operations continued until January 1,' 1946, when the operation of the plant was taken over by Sheffield Steel Corporation, an Ohio corporation. On July 1, 1954, Sheffield Steel Corporation was dissolved and the operation was taken over by the defendant Armco Steel Corporation. The corporate defendants will, for convenience, be referred to simply as “Sheffield” or the “Company”.

3. Defendant Local No. 2708 of the United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO is the exclusive bargaining agent of all production and maintenance employees at the Houston Plant of the defendant Armco Steel Corporation, except *432 those who are excluded from the bargaining unit by the collective bargaining agreement of November 29, 1956.

In the year 1942 in Case No. 16-R-488, United Steel Workers of America CIO was certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for employees at the Sheffield Steel Corporation of Texas. There was a further certification of the same Union in the year 1945 in Case No. 16-R-1233 for 25 additional employees. Local 2708 is a subordinate organization of the United Steel Workers of America.

Although there has been no further formal certification of the Union, Local 2708 has been, throughout the years, recognized by the various corporate employers as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees in question. At all times in this litigation Local 2708 has admitted for itself that it is under a duty to discharge its duties in conformity with the Constitution, laws and public policy of the United States, and has rested its defenses upon the ground that it has done so in all respects.

Defendant, United Steelworkers of America, Local 2708, will, for convenience, sometimes be referred to as the “Union”.

b. Jurisdiction

4. The jurisdiction of the court arises under Title 28 United States Code, § 1331, being brought as a suit under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to-wit: the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and Title 29 United States Code Annotated § 159, more commonly known as The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, with requisite jurisdictional amount in controversy.

c. History of Local 2708

5. There are approximately 3,000 employees in the production and maintenance unit who are represented by Local 2708! Of this number approximately 1,700 are white employees and 1,300 are Negro employees. Under the laws of the State of Texas, a Union shop may not be authorized by The National Labor Relations Act and has never been in effect at the Houston Plant, and all Union membership has been voluntary. However, practically 100 per cent of all employees are members of Local 2708.

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Related

Taylor v. Armco Steel Corporation
373 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Texas, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
156 F. Supp. 430, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2156, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2800, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whitfield-v-united-steelworkers-of-america-local-no-2708-txsd-1957.