Taylor v. Armco Steel Corporation

373 F. Supp. 885, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11913, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9550, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 979
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 14, 1973
DocketCiv. A. 68-H-129
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 373 F. Supp. 885 (Taylor v. Armco Steel Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Armco Steel Corporation, 373 F. Supp. 885, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11913, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9550, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 979 (S.D. Tex. 1973).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SEALS, District Judge.

PREFACE

“As a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights * * * * If the United States mean to obtain or deserve the full praise due to wise and just governments, they will equally respect the rights of property, and the property in rights.” James Madison, in the National Gazette, March 29, 1792.

BACKGROUND

This is a class action suit under Rule 23(b)(2), F.R.Civ.P., by and on behalf of certain black employees of Armco Steel against their employer and their collective bargaining representative, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 2708, and its parent organization, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, for alleged racial discrimination in the seniority and promotion/demotion systems at the Armco plant in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(4) and 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(f).

The Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors will be referred to collectively as *888 “the Plaintiffs” or will be identified by their surnames where appropriate. The Defendants will be referred to as “Arm-co,” “the International” and “the Local.” The Defendant Armco is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The Defendant International and the Defendant Local are labor organizations within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d) and (e).

Armco operates a basic steel mill at Houston, Texas, which employs 3,635 persons in production and maintenance jobs. Of these employees, 1,155 are black and 2,480 are white. The majority work in departments which are not involved in this suit. The plant itself is diamond shaped and located east of Houston on about 800 acres.

Operations began in 1942 under a predecessor corporation. Since that time the Local has served as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for the production and maintenance workers both black and white. See, Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 2708, 156 F.Supp. 430 (S.D.Tex.1957), aff’d 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959). At the Houston Works, Armco makes steel billets and steel blooms from raw materials for shipment to customers and for its own use. The steel which Armco retains is then further refined and shaped into “finished steel products,” such as bars, angles, rounds, plates, and beams, for industrial use by its customers. The production functions have been assigned to various departments, and within some departments Armco has established lines of progression for the jobs which it regards as “skilled,” or trade and craft, (Line 1), and the jobs which it regards as “unskilled,” or labor, (Line 2).

Originally, the functions now performed by Lines 1 and 2 were performed by segregated lines. From the time the Houston Works opened in 1942 until May 31, 1956, all whites were hired into the trade and craft line and all blacks were hired into the labor line. On that daté Armco and the Local signed a local working agreement (Appendix A, Pltf. Ex. 22) which eliminated the segregated hiring practices and permitted Line 2 employees to transfer to Line 1 on the basis of their Line 2 seniority after passing a test. The test requirement was waived by Armco as a precondition to transfer by a local agreement effective May 1, 1964. Accrued Line 2 seniority could not be used for advancement or retention in Line 1 under the 1956 agreement, but could be used for retention in Line 2 in the event of a reduction in forces. A so-called “extra board” for employees bumped out of the white (now No. 1) line was eliminated. Under the agreement all newly hired personnel, except apprentices, were sent initially to a labor pool from which they were assigned temporary jobs on a daily basis in any department or line including Lines 1 when no Line 1 or “test-qualified” Line 2 employee took the openings. Eventually, new personnel hired in this manner could bid on the starting job in any department or line and thereby receive a permanent position.

In this suit, the Plaintiffs allege that the seniority and transfer system in force at Armco when Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, became effective on July 2, 1964, was racially discriminatory and therefore unlawful. The Plaintiffs allege that the system in existence on that date carried forward past discriminatory policies and penalized black employees on account of their race by depriving them of an equal opportunity to transfer and to promote to better quality, higher paying jobs, and to retain their jobs in the event of a layoff. In particular, it was alleged that the blacks were denied equal opportunity in that:

(1) Prior to May 31, 1956, employees were segregated by race into white and black lines in each department and blacks were hired only for lower paying “labor” jobs;

(2) Blacks hired prior to May 31, 1956, and blacks hired after that date and channelled into Line 2, were not permitted to transfer to Line 1 until they had taken and passed a test; this *889 permitted Line 1 employees to stay ahead of both black groups since the test was not required for retention in the line;

(3) The operation of the agreement of May 31, 1956, permitted persons hired into the labor pool after May 31, 1956, to by-pass black Line 2 workers with greater departmental service who had not taken and passed the test, and to enter Line 1 ahead of them;

(4) After May 31, 1956, black Line 2 employees who did transfer to Line 1 had to enter Line 1 at the starting job in that line, often at a reduced rate of pay;

(5) After May 31, 1956, black employees who transferred from Line 2 to Line 1 could not use Line 2 seniority for advancement or retention in that line, but could only use Line 1 seniority which began to accrue only after receiving a permanent assignment in that line; as a result less-senior white employees in Line 1, who held higher jobs as a result of either the segregated hiring or the test requirement, were guaranteed their position ahead of the black transferees;

(6) Under the May 31, 1956, agreement Line 2 employees who filled temporary vacancies in Line 1 could not count that service towards their Line 1 seniority;

(7) Black employees were discriminated against by an agreement of August 9, 1966, which permitted jobs in the reorganized Structural Mill to be re-bid upon the basis of Line 1 seniority and not “departmental seniority” (Line 1 and Line 2 service combined) as previously agreed.

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373 F. Supp. 885, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11913, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9550, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 979, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-armco-steel-corporation-txsd-1973.