White v. United States

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided December 23, 2020·No. 3:17-cv-00683·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WILLIAM A. WHITE, 13888-084, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 17-cv-00683-JPG ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GILBERT, District Judge: This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Revoke In Forma Pauperis Status and Dismiss Action With Prejudice filed October 15, 2020. (Doc. 92). Defendant seeks revocation of Plaintiff’s pauper status based on his omission of relevant financial information from his IFP application and his failure to notify the Court of subsequent changes to his finances. (Id.). Defendant also seeks imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of this action among other things. (Id.). For the reasons set forth herein, the motion shall be GRANTED and this case DISMISSED with prejudice. BACKGROUND Plaintiff William White is an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois (“USP- Marion”). On June 30, 2017, he filed this suit pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. (Doc. 1). Following screening of this matter, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with FTCA claims against the United States arising from the allegedly tortious conduct of federal officials. (Docs. 8 and 16). He seeks $10 million in damages. (Doc. 8). A. IFP Application On August 14, 2017, Plaintiff requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. 9). He used the District’s standard form, which states, in no uncertain terms, that the applicant must “answer[ ] the . . . questions under penalty of perjury.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff was

required to disclose all wages and income he received during the preceding twelve months. (Id.). He was also required to include a separate page listing each source of money, the amount he received, and the amount he anticipated receiving in the future. (Id.). In his IFP application, Plaintiff disclosed no wages and no income from any source, including gifts, inheritances, rent, insurance, etc. (Id.). He disclosed no money in a savings or checking account and no other assets. (Id. at 2). He attached no separate document itemizing wages or income. (Id.). He then certified the accuracy of this disclosure by “declar[ing] under penalty of perjury that the above information is true” and acknowledging that “a false statement may result in a dismissal of [his] claims.” (Id.). Plaintiff signed the declaration on August 8, 2017. His trust fund account statement listed his balance as $331.81 on August 27, 2017. (Doc. 17).

Based on this information, the Court found that Plaintiff was indigent and unable to pay his full filing fee of $400.00. (Doc. 23). Plaintiff’s IFP motion was granted September 11, 2017. (Id.). He paid the entire reduced fee of $350.00 by October 10, 2017.1 B. Defendant’s Motion to Revoke Plaintiff’s IFP Status Defendant now asks the Court to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status and dismiss this action for failure to disclose substantial income and/or gifts when seeking leave to proceed as a poor person in this action. Defendant points to documents Plaintiff filed in several other pending cases that establish the availability of significant funds during the pending action. The Court can take judicial

1 Plaintiff made the following payments toward his filing fee obligation: (1) $93.69 on September 19, 2017; (2) $196.31 on September 28, 2017; and (3) $60.00 on October 10, 2017. notice of these public records available on government websites. See Green v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 699 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1983); Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 n.2 (S.D. Ill. 2006). Defendant points to Plaintiff’s Sworn Declaration, available on the Public Access to Court

Electronic Records (“PACER”) website (www.pacer.gov) and filed as part of a 600-page Motion for Compassionate Release in the Western District of Virginia on October 5, 2020. United States v. White, No. 08-cr-00054-EDK (W.D. Va.) (Doc. 411). There, Plaintiff explains that benefactors have paid many tens of thousands of dollars to assist him with litigation during the past five years: My friend Paul Angel collects money for my legal defense which he transfers to my mother to repay the money she’s advanced me over the past twelve years to pay them. In 2019, my friends, family, and supporters, contributed about $30,000 to pay my legal and personal expenses. This year, I anticipate over $20,000 will be contributed towards the same. Over the past 5 years, I would estimate that 150-200 persons not related to me have made donations towards my legal costs.

(Doc. 411 at 8, ¶ 27; 116 at ¶ 310). Plaintiff also disclosed his receipt of—or easy access to— significant funds in other public filings. For example, he advised one federal court that he paid a psychologist $14,000 to prepare an expert report on his mental condition and reserved another $6,000-10,000 to pay for the expert’s testimony. See White v. USA, No. 20-cv-291-MWB-EBC (M.D. Pa.) (Doc. 106 at 1) (Att. 3). He alluded to income from book sales (Att. 4) and the sale of documents he received through his Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (Att. 5).2 In addition, Plaintiff filed an advertisement soliciting contributions to his legal defense fund in White v. FBI, et al., No. 17-cv-948-JPG (Doc. 25-6 at 30) (S.D. Ill.) (Att. 2), before disclosing donations from 150-200 individuals in his Sworn Declaration that is quoted above. Defendant maintains that these documents establish that Plaintiff received substantial undisclosed income and gifts that date back to 2015 and provide evidence that his IFP application

2 Defendant obtained this information from https://issuu.com/presspad/docs/i2395/7. was false when filed in 2017. (Doc. 92). Moreover, Plaintiff failed to provide the Court with a single notice that his financial situation changed after he was granted IFP. Accordingly, Defendant asks the Court to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status and/or dismiss this action with prejudice. (Id.). C. Plaintiff’s Response

In his pro se Response, Plaintiff claims that this matter is controlled by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Robertson v. French, 949 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2020).3 According to Plaintiff, Robertson only obligated him to disclose two pieces of information in his IFP application: (1) his current assets; and (2) his prison trust fund account statement for the six months preceding the action. Id. Plaintiff contends he was not obligated to report any other income for the preceding twelve months—only assets “available . . . without restriction.” (Doc. 95, p. 2). Moreover, Plaintiff argues that he paid the $350.00 filing fee in this matter in 2017, so his financial status is now irrelevant. (Doc. 95). Perhaps for this reason, Plaintiff goes on to admit that he has benefitted from a steady and unending stream of donations and gifts for more than a decade. (Id.). Plaintiff’s mother has paid his legal fees and expenses since 2008. (Id. at 2). To

date, he estimates that she has paid almost $200,000.00 on his behalf. (Id. at 5, ¶ 2). From 2014- 17, she paid “something like $21,500 on [his] legal expenses.” (Id.). His friend, Paul Angel, then raised “something less than $17,250” to pay her back during the same time period.4 (Id.). Because of this shortage, Plaintiff argues that he was technically indigent on the date he filed his IFP application. (Id.).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

White v. United States, (S.D. Ill. 2020).

White v. United States (White v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Clovis Carl Green, Jr. v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary
699 F.2d 364 (Seventh Circuit, 1983)
Frank Thomas v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
288 F.3d 305 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)
Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
446 F. Supp. 2d 926 (S.D. Illinois, 2006)
Shauntae Robertson v. Glendal French
949 F.3d 347 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Kennedy v. Huibregtse
831 F.3d 441 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)