White v. The State of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 24, 2019
Docket7:19-cv-00543
StatusUnknown

This text of White v. The State of New York (White v. The State of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White v. The State of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOHNNY WHITE JR., Plaintiff, “against 19-CV-0543 (CS) THESTATEOFNEW YORE DOC:COE | oRoER OF SERVICE PANZARELLA; LT. A. PONTANTE; C.O. LAWTON BROWN JR.; C.O. JOHN DOE, Defendants. CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 983, alleging excessive force. By order dated March 28, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.' STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frrvolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they sugges/,”

' Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Triestman y. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). DISCUSSION A. The State of New York and D.O.C.* Plaintiff’s claims against the State of New York and D.O.C. must be dismissed. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity... .” Gollomp vy. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Jd. DOCCS, as an arm of the state, stands in the same position as the State of New York. See Bryant v, New York State Dep’ of Corr, Servs. Albany, 146 F. Supp. 2d 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Sing Sing, as a part of DOCS, a state agency, is considered an arm of the state and stands in the same position as the State.”) (quoting Jones v. Bishop, 981 F. Supp. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman y. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Will v. Michigan Dept of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-71 (1989) (holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983). Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the State of New York and D.O.C. are therefore dismissed.

* To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against the New York State Department of Correctional Services, the Court notes that in 2011, the New York State Department of Correctional Services and the New York State Division of Parole merged to form the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS),.

B, Service on C.O. E. Torres, C.O. T. Cunningham, Sgt. M. Panzarella, Lt. A. Pontante, and C.O, Lawton Brown Jr. Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. See Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 (2d Cir, 2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all

process , , . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to

serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil _ Procedure generally requires service of the summons and complaint to be completed within 90 days of the date the summons issues, and it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to request, if necessary, an extension of time for service. Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012). But see Murray v, Pataki, 278 F. App’x 50, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants C.O. E. Torres, C.O. T. Cunningham, Sgt. M. Panzarella, Lt. A. Pontante, and C.O, Lawton Brown Jr. through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for each of these Defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue a summons and deliver to the Marshals Service all of the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these Defendants. Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so.

John Doe Defendant Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit DOCCS to identify the John Doe correction officer involved in the events that took place on March 1, 2018, at Sing Sing Correctional Facility. It is therefore ordered that the New York State Attorney General, who is the attorney for and agent of DOCCS, shall ascertain the identity of the John Doe Defendant whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here and the address where this Defendant may be served. The New York State Attorney General shall provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within sixty days of the date of this order. Within thirty days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint naming the John Doe Defendant. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original complaint. An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Gollomp v. Spitzer
568 F.3d 355 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Jones v. Bishop
981 F. Supp. 290 (S.D. New York, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
White v. The State of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/white-v-the-state-of-new-york-nysd-2019.