White v. Sacramento Police Dept.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 8, 2025
• Docket: 2:21-cv-02211
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MEGAN WHITE; JERONIMO No. 2:21-cv-02211-JAM-SCR AGUILAR; LOREN WAYNE KIDD, 12 LYRIC NASH; NICOLLETTE JONES; and ODETTE ZAPATA, 13 ORDER GRANTING IN PART Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 14 JUDGMENT v. 15 SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT; 16 THE CITY OF SACRAMENTO; DANIEL HAHN; and DOES 1-200 17 (the names and numbers of which are currently unknown), 18 Defendants. 19 20 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 21 as to Plaintiff Loren Wayne Kidd’s claim for failure to 22 accommodate. See Mot., ECF No. 78. The Court previously heard 23 and ruled on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to other 24 claims. See Minute Order, ECF No. 92. At the hearing, the Court 25 requested supplemental briefs regarding Kidd’s claim which the 26 parties submitted. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief, ECF No. 27 93; Defendants’ Supplemental Brief, ECF No. 94. For the 28 following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to 1 Kidd’s claim. 2 Defendants argue that because Kidd’s only requested 3 accommodation during his arrest was for marijuana, he cannot 4 present a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act 5 (“ADA”). See Defendants’ Supplemental Brief at 2. Kidd presents 6 four arguments as to why Defendants’ motion should be denied: (1) 7 Kidd was denied access to his medication, marijuana; (2) Kidd’s 8 restraints were not adjusted; (3) police did not expedite its 9 review of body cam footage; and (4) police did not provide Kidd 10 with his requested transportation upon his release from custody. 11 See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 1-5. None of these 12 arguments present a genuine dispute of material fact. 13 First, the Ninth Circuit has foreclosed Kidd’s claim for 14 being denied access to marijuana. The James court concluded, “We 15 hold that doctor-recommended marijuana use permitted by state 16 law, but prohibited by federal law, is an illegal use of drugs 17 for purposes of the ADA, and that the plaintiffs’ federally 18 proscribed medical marijuana use therefore brings them within the 19 ADA’s illegal drug exclusion.” James v. City of Costa Mesa, 700 20 F.3d 394, 405 (9th Cir. 2012). Kidd attempts to distinguish 21 James by citing a footnote in the Court’s opinion that stated, 22 “We do not hold, as the dissent states, that ‘medical marijuana 23 users are not protected by the ADA in any circumstance.’ We hold 24 instead that the ADA does not protect medical marijuana users who 25 claim to face discrimination on the basis of their marijuana 26 use.” Id. at 394 n.3. In this footnote, the court goes on to 27 explain that an individual who has a disability is not denied 28 protection under the ADA for that disability simply because they 1 use an illegal drug. See id. Thus, Kidd argues that James is 2 inapposite because he faced discrimination on the basis of his 3 epilepsy, not his marijuana use. The Court disagrees. 4 Kidd does not explain how the police’s refusal to provide him 5 access to marijuana was not based on his marijuana use. To do 6 so, he seemingly would have to show that police provided access 7 to marijuana to other individuals in custody. Put simply, there 8 is no showing that police refused because Kidd is epileptic 9 instead of the more plausible explanation that police refused 10 because marijuana is an illegal substance under federal law. In 11 addition to the James holding, courts across the nation that 12 “have considered ADA claims for failure to accommodate medical 13 marijuana use have relied on the [Controlled Substances Act’s] 14 classification of marijuana as a Schedule I illegal substance to 15 conclude that ‘using marijuana is not a reasonable 16 accommodation.’” Eccleston v. City of Waterbury, No. 3:19-CV- 17 1614 (SRU), 2021 WL 1090754, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2021) 18 (collecting cases). 19 Second, police did not fail to provide a reasonable 20 accommodation in adjusting Kidd’s restraints. Kidd relies on two 21 cases, both of which dealt with a motion to dismiss. See 22 Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 3. This dispositional stage 23 demands a higher burden. Kidd fails to explain how his 24 complaints of shoulder pain are related to his epilepsy other 25 than he sustained similar injuries during a prior seizure. Kidd 26 also does not cite any caselaw explaining how adjusting his 27 restraints was a reasonable accommodation for his epilepsy. 28 Third, police did not fail to provide a reasonable 1 accommodation in reviewing the body cam footage. As an initial 2 matter, Kidd fails to show that police did not expedite the 3 review process. Instead, he simply states it took “hours.” See 4 id. at 4. Kidd presents no evidence that allows the court to 5 compare the review process in this case to other review 6 procedures, which means Kidd has not raised a genuine dispute. 7 Also, Kidd presents a wide range of cases regarding matters that 8 are not relevant to this case, such as de-escalation procedures. 9 See id. He does not present caselaw establishing that police 10 have to expedite its review of footage for an epileptic 11 individual. 12 Finally, police did not fail to provide a reasonable 13 accommodation when they released Kidd from custody. The only 14 case Kidd presents is inapposite. In Gorman, the Eighth Circuit 15 heard a case in which the plaintiff claimed that police failed to 16 provide reasonable accommodations after he was arrested and while 17 being transported in custody. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 18 907, 910 (8th Cir. 1998) (Plaintiff “claimed that the manner of 19 his post-arrest handling and transportation evidenced unlawful 20 discrimination by all the defendants, including [officer] who 21 drove the police van that took him to the station”). Here, Kidd 22 claims that police failed to provide him “with appropriate 23 accommodations upon his release from custody.” See Plaintiffs’ 24 Supplemental Brief at 5 (emphasis added). Kidd does not cite any 25 other caselaw suggesting that he can state a claim for an 26 accommodation after his release from custody. 27 /// 28 /// nee enn nen I EE OEE OE

1 As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 2 judgment as to Plaintiff Kidd’s claim for failure to accommodate. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: January 7, 2025

JM fey JOHN A. MENDEZ 7 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28