White v. North Louisiana Legal Assistance Corp.

468 F. Supp. 1347, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 307, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13647, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9218
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedMarch 20, 1979
DocketCiv. A. 78-0487
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 468 F. Supp. 1347 (White v. North Louisiana Legal Assistance Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
White v. North Louisiana Legal Assistance Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1347, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 307, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13647, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9218 (W.D. La. 1979).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM RULING

STAGG, District Judge.

In January 1977, plaintiff Stevens J. White applied for the position of Executive Director of the North Louisiana Legal Assistance Corporation (NLLAC). The position was given to a white woman, and plaintiff filed a timely charge of sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In his charge, plaintiff stated, “I believe that I was discriminated against because of my sex. The job was given to a female.” This claim of sex discrimination was investigated by the EEOC which found “reasonable cause to believe that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . has been violated in the manner alleged.” 1 The parties were invited to attempt a joint resolution of the dispute. On March 9, 1978, plaintiff was issued his “right-to-sue” letter and he filed this lawsuit within the ninety-day time limit.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he is a white male and “a practicing attorney experienced in the administration of legal assistance programs . . . ” who was the most qualified individual applying for the job of Executive Director. Plaintiff bases his lawsuit upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, alleging that he was “arbitrarily denied the job on the basis of his sex and race. . . .” The relief sought is $350,000 in compensatory and punitive damages, plus $50,000 in attorneys’ fees. Named as defendants are the NLLAC, a nonprofit corporation formed pursuant to the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 (See 42 U.S.C. § 2996, et seq., and 45 C.F.R. § 1600); Bob McLeod, President of the NLLAC and a member of its nine-member Board of Directors; 2 and the Legal Services Corporation (Corporation), a nonprofit corporation created by the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 to “provide financial support [and] legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a).

On October 26, 1978, this court dismissed plaintiff’s prescribed Section 1983 claim. This Title VII action is currently before the court on motion of defendants Bob McLeod and Legal Services Corporation to be dis *1349 missed as party defendants and on the motion of all defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination and his request for compensatory and punitive damages.

MOTION TO DISMISS BOB McLEOD

Defendant Bob McLeod was President of the NLLAC at the time plaintiff applied for the position of Executive Director. As a member of the nine-member Board of Directors, Mr. McLeod, along with the other Board members, participated in the group interviewing of the job applicants. He never conducted a separate interview with plaintiff. Further, he did not possess the power to hire plaintiff or to reject his application. Mr. McLeod simply had the power to cast one of the nine votes on the decision concerning Mr. White’s application. (See Affidavit of Bob McLeod attached to defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.)

Mr. McLeod is an employer within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), 3 as he did participate in the processing of Mr. White’s application and, as President of NLLAC, he is also its agent. Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 157 (S.D.Ohio 1976) and Tarvesian v. Carr Division of TRW, Inc., 407 F.Supp. 336 (D.C.Mass.1976). However, McLeod was not named as a respondent in the EEOC charge and was given no notice of the charges against him until this lawsuit was filed. See Affidavit of Bob McLeod, supra. In enacting Title VII, Congress evidenced a desire for cooperation and voluntary compliance as a preferred manner for eliminating discrimination in the area of employment opportunity. 4 In furtherance of this policy, an aggrieved party is required to proceed through the conciliation process of the EEOC prior to bringing a lawsuit. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Construction Co., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971); East v. Romine, Incorporated, 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975). The joining of parties who have not had the opportunity to participate in conciliation procedures circumvents this Congressional mandate. Wallace v. International Paper Co., 426 F.Supp. 352 (W.D.La.1977). From his Affidavit, it is clear that Mr. McLeod had no opportunity to participate in any conciliation attempts conducted by the EEOC. Consequently, his joinder in this lawsuit runs counter to the express intent of Congress, and he must be DISMISSED from this action. Miekel v. South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 877, 88 S.Ct. 177, 19 L.Ed.2d 166 (1967).

Further, although there is an agency relationship between the named party, NLLAC, and the unnamed party, Bob McLeod, the unnamed party is merely the agent with no power to hire, fire, or pay the plaintiff. The entity with the power to alleviate the alleged grievances is the defendant NLLAC, who was a party to the EEOC conciliation attempts. Cf. Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F.Supp. 454 (S.D.W. Va.1971). The plaintiff will suffer no prejudice by dismissal of this defendant. 5

*1350 MOTION TO DISMISS LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION

The Legal Services Corporation was also not named as a respondent in the EEOC charge and, therefore, did not take part in any conciliation attempts. However, there exists a more cogent reason for dismissing this defendant from the lawsuit than the fact that plaintiff failed to follow the Congressional mandate. The relationship between NLLAC and the Corporation is purely a monetary one and no agency relationship exists. The Corporation was formed pursuant to the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. § 2996, et seq.) to provide legal services to those who are denied equal access to our system of justice because of an inadequate income.

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468 F. Supp. 1347, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 307, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13647, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9218, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/white-v-north-louisiana-legal-assistance-corp-lawd-1979.